

2025 한국중동학회 공동국제학술대회
2025 KAMES Joint International Conference

트럼프 2.0시대, 중동 질서의 재편

The Trump 2.0 Era: Reshaping Middle Eastern Order

일시 / Date

2025년 5월 31일(토) 9:30 - 18:30 / May 31(Sat), 2025 9:30 - 18:30

장소 / Venue

한국외국어대학교 서울캠퍼스 국제관

International Building, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul

공동주최 / Co-Host



후원 / Sponsor



This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A5C2A01093123)

This research was supported by the Asia Research Foundation Grant funded by the Seoul National University Asia Center in 2025. (0448A-20250021)

2025 KAMES Joint International Conference

The Trump 2.0 Era: Reshaping Middle Eastern Order

- Date May 31(Sat), 2025
- Venue International Building, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies(HUFS), Seoul
- Co-Host Korean Association of Middle East Studies
Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Seoul National University Asia Center
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
- Sponsor National Research Foundation of Korea

PROGRAM

09:00~09:30

Registration

Opening Session

MC **Kyungsoo Lee**

(Secretary-General of KAMES, Institute of Middle East Studies,
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

09:30~10:00

Aekyung Hall

- Opening Remarks
Se Won Chang (President of the Organizing Committee for the 2025 KAMES International Conference, Dankuk University, Korea)
- Welcome Remarks
Soonlei Gwag (President of KAMES, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- Congratulatory Remarks
Kwang-yong Chung (Director-General for African and Middle Eastern Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea)
Teruaki Moriyama (President of Japan Association for Middle East Studies, Doshisha University, Japan)

10:00~10:15

Coffee Break

Session 1 [Politics: The Trump 2.0 Era: Reshaping Middle Eastern Order]

Chair **Kangsuk Kim**

(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

10:15~11:55
Aekyung Hall

- 1) Continuity or Change? A Comparative Theoretical Analysis of Trump's Second-Term Foreign Policy in the Middle East
Presenter: **Hassan Geon** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Seunghoon Paik** (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- 2) AI Competition in the Trump 2.0 Era: The U.S.-China Rivalry in the Middle East
Presenter: **Zhang Zhiyuan** (Shanghai International Studies University, China)
Discussant: **Saerom Han** (Sookmyung Women's University, Korea)
- 3) U.S. Policy on Syria and the Identity of HTS
Presenter: **Jisu Lee** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Sung-hun Ahn** (Israel Education Research Center, Seoul National University, Korea)

Session 2 [Politics: Diversity in the Politics of the Middle East]

Chair **Ikran Eum**

(Dankuk University, Korea)

10:15~11:55
Room 503

- 1) Türkiye-R.O.K. Relations in Great Power Competition
Presenter: **Robert Lawrence** (Dongduk Women's University, Korea)
Seunghoon Paik (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Aslı Kavurmacı** (Bandırma Onyedli Eylül University, Türkiye)
- 2) Iran's Water Crisis and Rural-Urban Migration: The Impact of Political and Structural Factors
Presenter: **Yuihyun Hwang** (Seoul National University Asia Center, Korea)
Discussant: **Hyuck Kim** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- 3) Making the Middle East Great Again? Trumpian Populism and Its Reframing in Arab Authoritarian Discourse
Presenter: **Seonwoo Kim** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Soojin Lee** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

Session 3 [Economics: Economic Diversification in the Middle East]

Chair **Kwon Hyung Lee**

(Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Korea)

- 10:15~11:55
Room 606
- 1) GCC Economic Diversification
Presenter: **Abdullah Baabood** (Waseda University, Japan)
Discussant: **Munsu Kang** (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Korea)
 - 2) Spatial Concentration of Foreign Direct Investment: Disparities across Governorates and Sectors in Egypt
Presenter: **Shimaa Hanafy** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Dasol Noh** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
 - 3) The role of Islamic finance in advancing renewable energy: An empirical analysis
Presenter: **Eunkyung Lee** (Sunmoon University, Korea)
Discussant: **Kwangho Ryou** (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Korea)

11:55~13:30

Luncheon

Roundtable [The Trump 2.0 Era: Reshaping Middle Eastern Order]

Chair **Joon-yong Park**

(Yonsei University, Korea)

- 13:30~15:30
Aekyung Hall
- 1) **Zaid Eyadat** (University of Jordan, Jordan)
 - 2) **Eitan Shamir** (Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, Israel)
 - 3) **Young-sam Ma** (Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University, Korea)

15:30~15:40

Coffee Break

Session 4 [History and Religion: History of Islam and the Middle East]

Chair **Hyondo Park**

(The Sogang Euro-MENA Institute, Sogang University, Korea)

15:40~17:45
Aekyung Hall

- 1) Measuring Islamic Constitutionalism: The Comparative Islamic Constitutions Database (1861–2022)
Presenter: **Moamen Gouda** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Alena Kulinich** (Seoul National University, Korea)
- 2) Mapping Diverse Buddhist–Islamic Coexistence: Hyecho’s Wangocheonchukgukjeon in the context of Trump 2.0 Era’s Global Interfaith Challenges
Presenter: **Jin Han Jeong** (Anyang University, Korea)
Discussant: **Sunah Choi** (Institute for Eurasian Turkic Studies, Dongduk Women’s University, Korea)
- 3) The Definition of Rational Diameter and Irrational Diameter in Republic (546c) from the Perspective of Ancient Near Eastern Mathematical Culture
Presenter: **Jenam Park** (Inha University, Korea)
Discussant: **Abdul Rahman Ballo** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- 4) The Intellectual Balance Between the Umayyad Policy of Condonation and Firmness in the Current Syrian Stance
Presenter: **Lujain Bitar** (American University in Dubai, UAE)
Discussant: **Wongu Kang** (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

Session 5 [Society and Culture: Gender Issue and Culture in the Middle East]

Chair **Gi Yeon Koo**

(Seoul National University Asia Center, Korea)

15:40~17:45
Room 503

- 1) Exploring Perceptions of Higher Education among Qatari Nationals: Gender, Generational, and Cultural Dynamics
Presenter: **Woohyang Sim and Keiko Sakurai** (Waseda University, Japan)
Discussant: **Somin An** (Myongji University, Korea)
- 2) Trends and Challenges in Cultural Exchange between Korea and the Middle East
Presenter: **Eunji Kim** (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Mohamed Elaskary** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- 3) The Erosion of Iran’s Middle Class and Its Impact on Democratic Movements
Presenter: **Qolamreza Nassr** (Kinki University, Japan)
Discussant: **Joo Han Lee** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

Session 6 [Language and Literature: AI and Language–Literature in the Middle East]

Chair **Inseop Lee**

(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

15:40~17:45
Room 606

- 1) A Comparative Study on Korean–Arabic Machine Translation of Press Releases:
Focusing on Proper Nouns and Terminology
Presenter: **Jungmin Jo** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Heejung Yang** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- 2) The Importance of Using The Speaking Avatar Powered by Generative Artificial Intelligence in Activating the Arabic–Korean Interpretation and Translation Activities
Presenter: **Reham Abdelsalam** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
Discussant: **Jung Min Seo** (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)
- 3) Narrative Manifestation of Historical Trauma in Sinan Antoon's Novels
Presenter: **Hyunho Yoon** (Dankuk University, Korea)
Discussant: **Salaheldin Elgebily** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

Closing Remarks

MC **Kyungsoo Lee**

(Secretary–General of KAMES, Institute of Middle East Studies,
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

17:45~18:00
Aekyung Hall

- **Soonlei Gwag**
(President of KAMES, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

18:00~20:00

Dinner

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Session 1

Politics

The Trump 2.0 Era: Reshaping Middle Eastern Order

1) Continuity or Change? A Comparative Theoretical Analysis of Trump's
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
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Continuity or Change? A Comparative Theoretical Analysis of Trump's Second-Term Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Hassan Geon
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

Continuity or Change? A Comparative Theoretical Analysis of Trump's Second-Term Foreign Policy in the Middle East

By: Geon Hassan

Visiting Professor
GSIAS, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies



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- Introduction
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-



Introduction

- U.S. Middle East policy balances strategic interests with ideological goals.
 - Realist principles like deterrence and alliance-building remain consistent.
 - Trump emphasized unilateralism and transactional diplomacy over multilateralism.
 - Key actions included exiting the JCPOA, signing the Abraham Accords, and troop withdrawals.
-



Introduction

- These moves prioritized national interest and reduced long-term commitments.
- The study analyzes Trump's second-term policies across four strategic domains.
- It compares his approach with past presidents through Realist and Transactional lenses.
- Findings reveal a shift in diplomatic style, not strategic objectives, amid rising multipolarity.



Theoretical Framework

- The study applies Realism and Transactional Diplomacy as analytical frameworks.
- Realism emphasizes power, survival, and national interest in an anarchic world.
- U.S. Middle East policy has historically prioritized alliances, deterrence, and energy security.
- Trump's strategies continued realist goals through pressure on Iran and support for allies.



Theoretical Framework

- Transactional Diplomacy explains Trump's ad hoc, short-term, and deal-oriented methods.
- Alliances became conditional exchanges, weakening institutional trust and multilateral norms.
- This approach is seen as "realism without a strategy," disrupting traditional diplomacy.
- The combined lens reveals continuity in goals but rupture in diplomatic style and execution.

Central dimensions of U.S. Middle East policy

Iran
containment

Arab-Israeli
normalization

U.S. military
posture


Energy
diplomacy



Iran containment

- Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and intensified a "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran.
 - His second term saw increased sanctions and unilateral coercion without achieving compliance.
 - Trump avoided major military conflict, relying on threats and limited strikes to project power.
 - His Iran policy reflected traditional containment goals but employed a more transactional style.
-

Arab-Israeli normalization

- 
- The Abraham Accords marked a break from the traditional emphasis on Palestinian statehood.
 - Trump used strategic incentives to secure bilateral normalization deals with Arab states.
 - His second term focused on bringing Saudi Arabia into the fold, sidelining the Palestinian issue.
 - The approach reflected realist goals but replaced multilateralism with transactional diplomacy.



U.S. military posture

- Trump linked U.S. troop presence in the Middle East to financial contributions from allies.
 - His military retrenchment reflected a realist offshore balancing strategy over ground engagement.
 - This approach diverged from past administrations' emphasis on multilateral stability and deterrence.
 - Critics warned it undermined alliance trust and accelerated regional multipolar realignment.
-



Energy diplomacy

- Trump reversed traditional energy security policy by leveraging U.S. energy independence for geopolitical pressure.
 - He demanded oil production increases from Gulf allies, tying energy policy to transactional diplomacy.
 - This approach diverged from Obama's climate-focused strategy, embracing a "hydrocarbon realism."
 - While it boosted short-term U.S. leverage, it strained alliances and empowered rivals like Russia and
-

Conclusion

- Trump's second-term policy upheld core Realist goals like deterrence and regional dominance.
- His strategies in Iran, Israel, military posture, and energy reflected historical U.S. priorities.
- What distinguished Trump was his rejection of institutional diplomacy for transactional deal-making.
- Alliances were treated as conditional exchanges, undermining multilateral stability.

Conclusion

- Trump monetized military support, sidelined Palestinians, and used oil as leverage.
- These tactics alienated allies and encouraged rival partnerships with China and Russia.
- Achievements like the Abraham Accords lacked long-term institutional or popular support.
- Trump's approach fused Realist goals with a disruptive style, raising doubts about durable U.S. leadership.



Thank you

AI Competition in the Trump 2.0 Era: The U.S.-China Rivalry in the Middle East

Zhang Zhiyuan
Shanghai International Studies University, China

Abstract: In the Trump 2.0 era, the Middle East has become a crucial arena in the escalating competition between the United States and China, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). This paper explores the intersection of geopolitics, economic interests, and technological advancements, with the Middle East serving as a strategic and technological focal point. The United States, leveraging its technological dominance, aims not only to sustain but also to expand its influence over the region's economic structures and security frameworks. In contrast, China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and rapidly advancing AI capabilities, is making substantial inroads, providing alternative governance frameworks that complement and occasionally contrast with U.S.-backed systems. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach that integrates political science, economics, and computer science, this study will analyze the broader geopolitical implications of AI technologies. It will examine how these innovations are reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East and reverberating across East Asia. Special attention will be given to South Korea's strategic positioning as it navigates the complex dynamics between the two superpowers while also advancing its own technological and AI ambitions. Through this lens, the paper aims to illuminate the interplay of political, economic, and technological forces that are driving the U.S.-China rivalry in the Middle East, highlighting how these forces will inevitably shape the future trajectory of East Asia. By understanding these interconnections, the paper will offer insights into the long-term geopolitical shifts that will affect the region and beyond.

1. Introduction

The Trump 2.0 era has brought a significant shift in global geopolitics, with the Middle East emerging as a vital arena in the U.S.-China rivalry. Trade protectionism, high tariffs, and technological decoupling have pushed China to strengthen ties with non-Western regions, notably through AI collaboration in the Middle East. In this context, AI has become a core instrument of influence. The United States seeks to maintain its dominance by embedding AI in security and economic frameworks, while China advances AI-driven projects like smart cities and digital infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering new alternatives to Middle Eastern nations. This paper addresses three key questions: How have Trump 2.0 policies reshaped U.S.-China AI competition in the Middle East? How is AI altering the region's power dynamics? And how do regional actors respond? Special attention will be given to South Korea, whose rising AI capabilities and strategic balance between the U.S. and China make its experience particularly relevant to today's discussions. "AI geopolitics" in this paper refers to the strategic deployment of AI technologies by states to shape global value chains, influence alliance structures, and assert ideological or regulatory preferences across borders.

2. Strategic Significance of the Middle East and the Geopolitical Value of AI

The Middle East remains a critical hub for global energy flows and international trade routes, with chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal making it indispensable to global commerce. Yet beyond oil and logistics, the region is rapidly transforming into a digital battleground where AI technologies are reshaping both economic and security architectures. AI's value in the Middle East is amplified through major smart city initiatives such as Dubai's Smart Dubai project, Abu Dhabi's Masdar City, and Saudi Arabia's NEOM, where Internet of Things (IoT) systems, machine learning algorithms, and computer vision technologies are integrated into urban management, surveillance, and service delivery (Salih et al.). AI-based surveillance systems are increasingly integrated into public management frameworks across the Middle East, supporting governments in improving urban safety, optimizing resource allocation, and enhancing emergency response capabilities. While these developments offer notable benefits, they also invite thoughtful discussions on ethical standards, data privacy, and societal impacts (Feldstein).

Military applications are also on the rise. Studies show that AI-powered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), autonomous surveillance platforms, and battlefield decision-support systems are increasingly adopted by Middle Eastern states (Sakr & Hakme). For instance, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have integrated AI-assisted targeting and operational planning in urban warfare scenarios since 2021 (Tekin). Rather than solely serving as instruments of competition, AI

technologies function as important catalysts for regional modernization and innovation. External actors, including the United States and China, contribute by introducing advanced technological standards and fostering collaborative models for governance enhancement. The Middle East's active adoption of AI positions it as a significant hub for exploring intelligent applications in contexts marked by diverse political and security environments.

3. U.S. Strategy: Leveraging AI for Regional Dominance

In the Trump 2.0 era, the United States has reaffirmed its commitment to sustaining influence in the Middle East, with AI technologies becoming an integral part of its strategic toolbox. The U.S. continues to view the Middle East as a critical theater for maintaining global leadership, especially under the pressures of an intensifying technological rivalry with China.

A defining feature of Trump's renewed approach is the further tightening of export controls on advanced technologies, particularly those related to AI, semiconductors, and cybersecurity systems — a strategy that traces back to his first term and has been extensively analyzed in earlier studies (Houser, 2020; Abrams, 2022).

The escalation of the trade war in April 2025 further complicated this landscape. Newly imposed tariffs on AI-related hardware, cloud infrastructure components, and sensor technologies limited Chinese companies' access to global markets, intensifying competition for influence over digital infrastructures in the Middle East (Marino, Stilo & Serra, 2025). As a result, American firms accelerated partnerships with regional stakeholders, offering AI-driven security platforms, smart energy systems, and urban management solutions aligned with U.S. standards.

In recent years, the United States has strengthened technological cooperation with key Middle Eastern allies, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, focusing on cybersecurity, AI ethics, and smart infrastructure security. The U.S.-UAE partnership was reinforced in 2023 through initiatives like the UAE's National AI Strategy 2031 and joint dialogues on cybersecurity resilience under the U.S.-UAE Strategic Dialogue framework (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Although no formal joint research center has been announced, collaborative efforts emphasize enhancing threat detection systems and critical infrastructure protection using AI-driven solutions.

While the U.S. strategy continues to highlight technological leadership, it also signals a shift toward a more selective, security-focused engagement model, contrasting with broader Chinese economic initiatives. For regional actors, this dynamic offers both opportunities and constraints in their pursuit of digital modernization.


Similarly, Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 plan includes major investments in AI for smart city projects like NEOM and collaborations with companies such as IBM and Google to develop predictive analytics platforms for urban management and cybersecurity (NEOM, 2023; Saudi Data

and AI Authority, 2022). These initiatives reflect a broader trend of U.S.-linked technological influence in regional security architectures, albeit primarily through private sector cooperation rather than direct government-to-government AI military integration.

4. China's Initiatives: Belt and Road Initiative and AI Diplomacy

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Digital Silk Road (DSR) have substantially deepened its engagement in the Middle East, positioning the region as a strategic nexus connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe. The DSR, first emphasized during the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019 and later reinforced through China's broader promotion of digital economy cooperation in its 2021 policy frameworks, advocates collaboration in artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and smart infrastructure development (Dahdal & Ghafar, 2025; Aboul-Dahab, 2021). Concrete initiatives include Huawei's involvement in smart city development across the Middle East—such as infrastructure cooperation linked to Saudi Arabia's NEOM project; Alibaba Cloud's establishment of its second Middle East data center in Dubai; and China Harbour Engineering Company's (CHEC) contribution to the digitalization of Port Said in Egypt and Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi, incorporating AI-driven operational technologies (Triolo et al., 2020; Hussain et al., 2023).

Beyond physical infrastructure, China's partnerships increasingly focus on building "Safe City" platforms, integrating technologies such as computer vision, biometric recognition, and predictive analytics to enhance urban governance and security management (Hussain, Imran, & Hussain, 2023). These projects, while aligned with local modernization goals, also offer Middle Eastern countries access to alternative technological ecosystems, providing diverse regulatory models compared to U.S.-centered digital governance. Chinese officials have consistently emphasized that the BRI and DSR initiatives aim to foster "open, inclusive, and mutually beneficial cooperation" without imposing political conditions, as reiterated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 2024 China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2024). This approach has been welcomed by many Middle Eastern nations seeking diversified and autonomous pathways to digital development.



AI Cooperation and Competition between China, the U.S., and Middle Eastern Countries.

This diagram illustrates the evolving dynamics of AI-related engagements in the Middle East. China, through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Digital Silk Road (DSR), focuses on economic and infrastructure collaboration, including smart cities and digital ports. Meanwhile, the United States emphasizes security cooperation via technology export controls, cybersecurity frameworks, and strategic defense partnerships. Middle Eastern countries actively balance strategic ties with both powers, leveraging opportunities for technological modernization while navigating economic and security dependencies. The diagram also highlights the growing intensity of U.S. security engagements since the escalation of trade tensions in 2025.

5. South Korea's Strategic Positioning Amidst U.S.-China Rivalry

South Korea has emerged as a dynamic player in global AI innovation, leveraging its robust semiconductor industry, leading research in machine learning, and strategic investments in next-generation computing technologies. According to Moon and Yeon (2024), South Korea ranks among the top five globally in AI patent filings, with leading companies like Samsung Electronics and Naver spearheading advancements in autonomous systems, natural language processing, and AI-driven semiconductor design.

Amidst the intensifying U.S.-China technological rivalry, South Korea faces a complex balancing

act. While maintaining its critical security alliance with the United States—highlighted by participation in frameworks like the U.S.-led “Chip 4 Alliance”—South Korea simultaneously preserves strong economic ties with China, its largest trading partner (Zhao, 2024). Notably, South Korean firms continue collaborations with Chinese technology ecosystems in areas such as cloud computing, AI chipsets, and smart manufacturing, reflecting a nuanced hedging strategy.

In the Middle East, South Korea has increasingly positioned itself as a credible technology partner, leveraging its strengths in AI-driven energy optimization, healthcare technologies, and smart urban systems. Companies such as Doosan and LG CNS have participated in smart city initiatives in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, integrating AI algorithms for energy management and digital healthcare services (Chaziza, 2024). Furthermore, Korea’s KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology) has established academic and research collaborations with institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to promote AI education and joint innovation projects.

South Korea’s ability to navigate between major powers while advancing its own AI capabilities underscores its strategic flexibility. As AI becomes a central pillar of geopolitical competition, Korea’s balanced approach and technical excellence will remain crucial assets in engaging both with global powers and emerging markets like the Middle East.

6. Implications of the AI Competition for Middle East and East Asia

At the economic level, Global Value Chain (GVC) theory provides a valuable lens to analyze these shifts. GVC theory posits that states integrate into global production and innovation networks by specializing in certain value chain segments (Xiao, 2025). In the context of AI and digital infrastructure, Middle Eastern countries are actively embedding themselves into Chinese-led ecosystems. For instance, Huawei’s partnership with Saudi Arabia to deploy 5G networks and AI-powered smart city applications under the NEOM initiative demonstrates the region’s strategic positioning within global digital value chains (Chaziza, 2024). Similarly, Alibaba Cloud’s establishment of its second data center in Dubai in 2022 provides critical cloud computing capacity not just for UAE domestic use but also as a regional hub serving broader Gulf and African markets.

Such integrations imply that Middle Eastern economies are not merely passive recipients but active participants in shaping the next phase of global digitalization, leveraging AI capabilities to move up the value chain, particularly in logistics, healthcare, and energy management sectors. For instance, Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Port, managed in collaboration with China’s COSCO, now utilizes AI-driven logistics optimization algorithms, significantly enhancing throughput efficiency and

regional trade connectivity (Triolo et al., 2020).

Broader ripple effects are also evident across East Asia. The intensifying AI-driven strategic competition is accelerating regional differentiation and “complex interdependence” (Horowitz et al., 2022). Countries like South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam are diversifying their AI supply chains: Samsung is expanding AI semiconductor R&D cooperation with Chinese universities even as it strengthens ties with U.S. firms; Singapore's Smart Nation initiative accepts Huawei's participation in specific sectors while aligning cybersecurity frameworks closer to U.S. standards (Horowitz, 2022). These differentiated alignments reflect how economic, security, and technological domains are increasingly intertwined, where AI functions as both a connector and a fault line, generating simultaneous cooperation and competitive friction.

7. Conclusion

This study reveals that the evolving AI competition between the United States and China is not merely an extension of traditional great power rivalry but signifies a fundamental reordering of geopolitical and economic architectures. Through the lens of Global Value Chain (GVC) theory, it is clear that Middle Eastern states are no longer peripheral actors; by embedding themselves into AI-driven digital ecosystems led by both powers, they actively reshape production and innovation networks. Political Realism similarly helps explain how these technological integrations alter alliance behaviors, as Middle Eastern countries diversify security and economic alignments beyond singular dependencies.

More critically, the convergence of AI competition with geopolitical strategy intensifies complex interdependence across regions. In East Asia, countries such as South Korea and Singapore exemplify adaptive strategic behaviors: maintaining security frameworks aligned with the U.S. while embedding economically within Chinese-led digital architectures. This differentiated alignment reflects a broader fragmentation of the international order, where economic, technological, and security spheres no longer map neatly onto traditional alliances.

Ultimately, AI competition transforms both the material structure and ideational frameworks of international politics. In the Middle East, it offers alternative development models, which are often more aligned with local modernization goals, thereby complementing existing regional strategies. In East Asia, it amplifies the agency of middle powers navigating an increasingly bifurcated technological environment. Understanding these interconnected dynamics is essential for forecasting the emergent, multipolar digital world order, where innovation capacity, technological governance models, and economic network integration will determine geopolitical influence as much as — if not more than — traditional military strength. Future research may explore how generative AI and quantum computing integration will further complicate alliance formation and regulatory

convergence in the Global South.

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U.S. Policy on Syria and the Identity of HTS

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1. Introduction

This study seeks to examine the relationship between the identity of (HTS, the main force of Syria's transitional government, and the United States' foreign policy toward Syria. HTS, which originated in 2017 as a rebel faction, overthrew the Assad family's 53-year-long authoritarian regime in December 2024 and declared an end to the Syrian Civil War. Since assuming de facto power, HTS has consistently expressed a desire to engage with Western and liberal democratic states. However, HTS, like ISIS, originated as an offshoot of al-Qaeda, and the United States continues to designate it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department. Although HTS has since officially announced a severance from al-Qaeda, this study assumes that 'al-Qaedaism' remains an ideological foundation of the group, and that this ideological background has influenced U.S. policy toward Syria.

2. Trump's Foreign Policy and Structural Realism

Many scholars agree that the the foreign policy of U.S. President Donald Trump has been largely grounded in the principles of Structural Realism. According to Kenneth Waltz, structural realism views the international system as anarchic, where states must ensure their own survival through self-help. Trump's "America First" doctrine perfectly reflects this logic. He repeatedly

emphasized that the U.S. should not depend on allies, but instead prioritize national interest above all. For example, his insistence on increased defense spending from NATO allies shows a clear rejection of collective security in favor of self-reliance. He also questioned the value of multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the World Health Organization, expressing deep skepticism toward international norms. From a neorealist perspective, this is a rational response to the structural condition of anarchy. States cannot rely on international cooperation, because there is no overarching authority to enforce it. Trump's approach to North Korea and Iran also reveals a realist mindset. He disregarded ideology or regime type, focusing instead on military deterrence and strategic leverage. In the case of China, Trump initiated a trade war and expanded military presence in the Asia-Pacific, aiming to restore balance of power. This directly reflects Waltz's notion that great powers act to prevent the emergence of a hegemon. Taken together, Trump's foreign policy aligns closely with structural realism, particularly in his emphasis on self-help, skepticism of institutions, and balance-of-power politics.

3. Identity of HTS

On March 13, 2025, President Ahmed al-Sharaa ratified an interim constitution intended to guide the nation through a five-year transitional period. This constitutional declaration contains several provisions indicative of an Islamist orientation:

- 1) Presidential Religious Requirement: Article 3 stipulates that the President of the Republic must be a Muslim.
- 2) Islamic Jurisprudence as Legislative Foundation: The same article designates Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as the principal source of legislation.
- 3) Religious Oath of Office: Ministers are required to take an oath swearing by Almighty God to perform their duties with honesty and loyalty.
- 4) Ambiguity in Minority Rights Protections: While the constitution proclaims the inviolability of freedom of belief and instructs the state to respect all religions, it lacks explicit mechanisms to safeguard the rights of religious minorities.

In conclusion, the provisions of Syria's 2025 interim constitution suggests a deliberate embedding of Islamist principles within the state's foundational legal framework.

4. Conclusion: U.S. Policy on Syria

The United States severed diplomatic relations with Syria in 2012, the year following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, and has yet to restore them. Although the U.S. government withdrew its bounty on President Ahmad al-Sharaa after HTS declared an end to the civil war and assumed control of the transitional government, HTS remains designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department. President Trump, shortly after HTS proclaimed victory in December 2024, issued a brief statement on Twitter, saying, “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend. The United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved!” Beyond that remark, he offered no official position or policy on Syria during his post-election transition period. This lack of policy engagement is widely interpreted as a reflection of deep-seated suspicions regarding HTS’s ideological orientation, particularly its roots in Islamist extremism.

Session 2

Politics

Diversity in the Politics of the Middle East

1) Türkiye–R.O.K. Relations in Great Power Competition

Robert Lawrence (Dongduk Women's University, Korea)

Seunghoon Paik (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

2) Iran's Water Crisis and Rural–Urban Migration: The Impact of Political and Structural Factors

Yuihyun Hwang (Seoul National University Asia Center, Korea)

3) Making the Middle East Great Again? Trumpian Populism and Its Reframing in Arab Authoritarian Discourse

Seonwoo Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)



Türkiye-R.O.K. Relations in Great Power Competition

Robert Lawrence

Dongduk Women's University, Korea

Seunghoon Paik

Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

1. Introduction

The Republic of Korea and the Republic of Türkiye share an Altaic heritage that creates an abundance of linguistic and cultural similarities. However, the two nations' modern political relationship was established when Türkiye recognized South Korea as an independent state in 1949, grew deeper when Türkiye sent tens of thousands of troops in support of the South in the Korean war, and became a Strategic Partnership in 2012. This brotherly bond between nations is ancient in its roots and multi-faceted in its modernity as they have increased bilateral trade and high-level diplomatic visits while occupying similar posturing in global affairs. Still, there is space for these two middle powers to improve bi-lateral cooperation.

The post-Cold War unipolar world in which the U.S. held unprecedented dominance in global affairs has shifted into a multipolar world order in which several great powers are competing in the economic, cultural, and political spheres. Multipolarity produces a political arena in which middle powers have increased agency to maneuver while great powers compete for agreements, compliance, and allegiance. This paper examines how Türkiye and South Korea are cooperating in this geo-political climate, in what fields they are collaborating, and whether they are maximizing the potential of this relationship.

This paper utilizes New Security and Middle Power Theory frameworks to assess current and potential cooperation in the economic security, energy security, cybersecurity, and transnational

threats, and expects to find fertile ground for increased cooperation between South Korea and Türkiye.

II. New Security & Middle Power Theory

New Security, a framework that has evolved over the last few decades, is an analytical framework that broadens the horizons of traditional approaches to security that are routinely state-centric and focused on military capacity. This new framework, though loosely defined, is multi-dimensional and combines elements of realism and constructivism and expands the definition of security to multiple sectors that address human and state aspects of security (Buzan 1991; Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Not without its critics (Paris 2001), this framework provides analysts with the tools to holistically deepen understandings of bi-lateral relations between states.

International relations theorists have difficulty in agreeing on the definition and efficacy of middle powers (Robertson 2017, Jordan 2017, Jeong 2019), and some question its explanatory value (Robertson and Carr 2023). This paper contends that the term is still efficacious and utilizes Park's conceptual shift that demonstrates middle powers' increased agency in the increasingly multi-polar global arena. Rather than the traditional hierarchical great, middle, and small power framework that denotes levels of development and global reach, this paper reinforces Park's framework in defining middle powers as states that operate in political space between great powers' core interests (Park 2022, 136). This paper maintains that both states are middle powers that have increasing agency in the geo-political arena that could be strengthened to benefit bilateral cooperation.

III. Multi-Dimensional Security Analysis

A. Economic Security

Türkiye and South Korea have increasingly cooperative economic ties, partially fostered by the free trade agreement that went into force in 2013 (Ministry of Trade 2025). Trade has grown from slightly under 8 billion in 2018 to 10.5 billion in 2023 (Observatory for Economic Complexity). This trade supports economic resilience through diversified supply chains and increases market access, but it is under-utilized. Despite South Korea's 2.4 billion dollar FDI in the Turkish economy between 2002 and 2023 and the 383 South Korean companies operating in Türkiye (Deggin 2023), further collaboration in the form of Korean firms utilizing the Turkish workforce as manufacturing hubs would strengthen local economies while further diversifying

supply chains and gaining better access to European markets.

B. Energy Security

Türkiye and South Korea are both extremely limited in their natural resources, but both have significant roles and ambitions global energy security. Therefore, while cooperation is limited at the moment further cooperation in this field makes strategic and economic sense. Hanwha was instrumental in the construction of the Karapınar Solar Park that was commissioned in 2022 and helped reduce dependency on fossil fuels, and KEPCO submitted a bid to construct four APR 1400 units in Türkiye's Sinop Nuclear Power Plant (Ahn 2025). Further nuclear cooperation and joint investments in advanced energy technologies such as green hydrogen along with green tech transfers have mutually beneficial potential to secure long-term clean energy security and business opportunities.

C. Cybersecurity

South Korea's advanced expertise in 5G and cybersecurity can help Türkiye build robust digital systems. Additionally, the Republic of Korea's unique experience and expertise in the cross-border cyber-attacks and espionage provides an opportunity for cooperation to enhance mutual cyber threat preparedness by coordinating efforts in cyber defense.

D. Transnational Threats

Beyond the obvious coordination in combating transnational threats such as international terrorism between these allies, this paper argues that the increasing agency of middle powers in geopolitics provides opportunities for improvement. More specifically, where interests converge and there is a deficit in political will from great powers, middle powers can opportunistically shape outcomes with strategic planning. In the case of Syria, both states have a vested interest in maintaining good relations with a stable Syria that will not be an antagonistic actor to either country as was its predecessor. Therefore, South Korea and Türkiye should work together to ensure their mutually desired result.

IV. Conclusion

To conclude, the Republic of Korea and Türkiye have a dynamic and evolving partnership that reflects their historic bonds and shared strategic interests. From cooperation in mega-projects like


the Yavuz Sultan Selim and Canakkale Bridges to sharing defense technology like the K9 howitzers and K2 Black Panther tank, the expanding relations between Türkiye and the R.O.K. are strategic and promising (Nam 2023). This robust relationship is multifaceted and robust, but there is room for mutually beneficial improvement in several sectors. Great power competition accentuates the importance of middle powers in global governance, and these two middle powers have a valuable opportunity to shape the political arenas in which they participate if they can efficaciously cooperate and maximize their potential gains.

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Iran's Water Crisis and Rural-Urban Migration: The Impact of Political and Structural Factors

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I. Introduction: Backgrounds

- ▶ How is climate change affecting Iran? How is it worsening Iran's water problems?
- ▶ Iran's water shortage has led to various social problems, including rural-to-urban migration, urban overpopulation, and the rise of urban poverty.
- ▶ In particular, Kurdistan and Khuzestan, the regions suffering from the most severe water shortages, are also among the most economically underdeveloped areas in Iran. Furthermore, these regions have been marginalized in terms of central government attention and development.

I. Introduction: Backgrounds

- ▶ The authoritarian politics, such as the excessively centralized decision-making process, competition among various interest groups that hinders the formulation and implementation of effective policies, and unsustainable policies—such as excessive subsidy expenditures aimed at compensating for regime's weak legitimacy—have prevented the Iranian government from effectively addressing water shortages.
- ▶ The social crisis caused by economic hardship could pose a threat to the stability of the Iranian regime, as demonstrated by the recurring protests since 2018 and the anti-hijab protests in 2022.
- ▶ The environmental problems caused by climate change and the resulting deterioration of socio-economic conditions are expected to further threaten the survival of the Iranian regime.

I. Introduction: Research Questions

- ▶ This study examines Iran's current water crisis, the decline of rural communities, rural-to-urban migration, and the increase in urban poverty.
- ▶ It also investigates the political-structural factors that hinder the formulation of effective policies to address the water shortage issue.
- ▶ By linking this analysis to the changing patterns of anti-government protests in Iran since 2018, the study explores the potential political implications of environmental issues for the Iranian regime.


II. Overview on Current Situations: Climate Change in Iran

- ▶ Nearly 85% of Iran is semi-arid and arid climates, except for the western parts and the northern coastal areas.
- ▶ While it is estimated that an increase in temperature in the Middle East would be up to 2 °C in the next 15–20 years and over 4 °C by the end of the century, and precipitation would decline by 20%, Iran will experience an increase of 2.6 °C in mean temperatures and a 35% decline in precipitation in the next decades, which means the climate change fact of Iran is more severe than other Middle East countries(Mansouri Daneshvar et al. 2019, 3).
- ▶ In 2023 heatwave caused a two-day nationwide shutdown.
- ▶ Continuous increase in temperature and decrease in precipitation are observed in between 1988~2018(Mansouri Daneshvar et al. 2019, 4–5).

Mohammad Reza Mansouri Daneshvar, Majid Ebrahimi and Hamid Nejadsoleymani (2019), "An overview of climate change in Iran: facts and statistics," *Environmental Systems Research* 8(7).

II. Overview on Current Situations: Climate Change in Iran


FIGURE 1: Mean annual temperature, 1900–2100



Under a high emissions scenario, the mean annual temperature is projected to rise by about 5.2°C on average by the end-of-century (i.e. 2071–2100 compared with 1981–2010). If emissions decrease rapidly, the temperature rise is limited to about 1.5°C.

Estimated increase in temperature

FIGURE 3: Percentage of hot days (heat stress), 1900–2100




The percentage of hot days^a is projected to increase substantially from about 15% of all days on average in 1981–2010 (10% in 1961–1990). Under a high emissions scenario, about 65% of days on average are defined as 'hot' by the end-of-century. If emissions decrease rapidly, about 30% of days on average are 'hot'. Similar increases are seen in hot nights^a (not shown).

Estimated increase in hot days

Source: Health and Climate Change Country Profiles: Iran (Islamic Republic)

II. Overview on Current Situations: Water Crisis in Iran


FIGURE 2: Total annual precipitation, 1900–2100



Total annual precipitation is projected to remain almost unchanged on average under a high emissions scenario, although the uncertainty range is large (-24% to +21%). If emissions decrease rapidly, there is a projected change of -5% to +15%.

Estimated uncertainty in precipitation

FIGURE 4: Contribution of very wet days (extreme rainfall and flood risk) to total annual rainfall, 1900–2100



Under a high emissions scenario, the proportion of total annual rainfall from very wet days^a (about 20% for 1981–2010) could increase by the end-of-century (to about 30% on average with an uncertainty range of about 20% to 40%), with less change if emissions decrease rapidly. These projected changes are accompanied by little change in total annual rainfall (see Figure 2).

Estimated Increase in extreme rainfall

Source: Health and Climate Change Country Profiles: Iran (Islamic Republic)

II. Overview on Current Situations: Water Crisis in Iran

TABLE 1 Cumulative precipitation in Iran (in mm)²⁰

Basin	2013/2014	2014/2015	2016/2017	2017/2018
Caspian Sea	366	457	345	400
Persian Gulf + Sea of Oman	328	230	369	211
Lake Urmia	280	319	277	409
Central Basin	141	133	161	105
Ghare-Ghum Basin	179	195	180	142
TOTAL	217	197	171	250

Source: Robert Czulda (2022), "Iran's Water Security: An Emerging Challenge," *Middle East Policy* 29(2), 116.

Iran's average annual precipitation is just 250 millimeters (mm) per year (Global: 1,050mm).

"Iran's large cities are facing "alarming water shortages," while an additional 517 were suffering from less severe water problems. Iranians are already using more than 70% of their renewable water resources; 40% is recognized internationally as the highest safe limit." (Czulda, 118).

"The period between September and December 2017 was the driest in Iran in more than 67 years: roughly 40% of the country reportedly suffered from a "serious drought." The Persian year 1364 (which began on March 21, 2018) was the driest in the past 50 years." (Czulda, 120).

II. Overview on Current Situations: Water Crisis in Iran




Lake Urmia in 1984 and in 2022 – 5,000km² in 1997, 500km² in 2013, 1,835km² in 2022

II. Overview on Current Situations: Water Crisis in Iran

EXPOSURES

FIGURE 7: Percentage change in crop growth duration in Iran (Islamic Republic of) in 1981–2020, relative to the 1981–2010 average, expressed as the running mean over 11 years (5 years before and 5 years after) (7,8)



Reliable food resources are essential to good health. Climate change significantly increases exposure to changes in the safety and sustainability of food systems, directly through its effects on agriculture and indirectly by contributing to underlying risk factors such as water insecurity, dependency on imported foods, urbanization and migration, and health service disruption.

Source: Health and Climate Change Country Profiles: Iran (Islamic Republic)

II. Overview on Current Situations: Water Crisis in Iran



II. Overview on Current Situations: Climate Migration

- ▶ As a result of climate change and natural disasters, around 800,000 Iranians had been internally displaced by January 2024. For instance, in 2019, the devastating flash flood pushed 520,000 Iranians to displacement (Rostami and Paski 2024). Over the past two decades, climate-induced migration in the country has increased ten-fold (Rokna, 2020).
- ▶ Drought and water scarcity is the main cause of climate migration. Most climate migrants come from the central and southern provinces like Khuzestan, Lorestan, Esfahan, Hamedan, Kerman, Yazd, and Sistan and Baluchistan, which are most affected by drought and water scarcity.
- ▶ During 1996–2011, Increase in temperature, decrease in precipitation → increase in emigration from affected provinces (Shiva and Molana, 2018). This argument is also supported by other research on demographic transformation of Khuzestan (Dehcheshmeh and Ghaedi 2020).
- ▶ Many of climate migrants moved to Tehran or the northern provinces such as Mazandaran and Gilan, where climate conditions are better than the central or southern provinces. However, as a result of the huge influx of migrants, Tehran and the northern province are also facing water scarcity and increasing demand on food, house, healthcare, and jobs.
- ▶ "Over the past two decades the city has added an estimated 200,000–250,000 people per year, and this rapid population growth has resulted in unbalanced urban development, making the capital ever more congested and difficult to live in." (Keynough 2023)

Source: Javid Rostami and Arash Asad Paski (2024), "Iran Faces Dwindling Water and Escalating Climate Pressures, Aggravating Displacement Threats," *Migration Information Source*, March 6.


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
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II. Overview on Current Situations: Climate Migration



Source: Rasool Sadeghi, Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, and Saeedeh Shahbazi, "Internal Migration in Iran," in *Internal Migration in the Countries of Asia: A Cross-national Comparison*, edited by arin Bell, Aude Bernard, Elin Charles-Edwards, Yu Zhu, 306–307.



III. How Authoritarian Politics Worsen Water Crisis?

- ▶ In addition to climate change, **political factors** are also pointed out as causes for water crisis in Iran.
- ▶ **Mismanagement of water resource** – The lack of policy to optimize water use, agriculture policy for self-sufficiency which leaves agriculture sector inefficient, subsidies for cheap water, etc.
- ▶ “After the 1979 revolution and resulting **international isolation**, **political leaders viewed agricultural self-sufficiency as key to Iran’s future and doubled down on being able to feed everyone in the country without importing food.**” (Rostami and Paski 2024)
- ▶ **Structural factors** – “Within the water sector, multiplicity of stake holders and regulators is naturally associated with conflicts and competition. The Department of Environment, responsible for safeguarding the country’s environment, has limited political power and lacks the required regulatory capacity to prevent...The hierarchical structure of the water management system in Iran creates opportunities for corruption and causes serious inefficiencies in turning decisions into action.” (Madani et al. 2016, 1006)

Kaveh Madani, Amir AghaKouchak and Ali Mirchi (2016). “Iran’s Socio-economic Drought: Challenges of a Water-Bankrupt Nation,” *Iranian Studies* 49(6): 997–1016.

III. How Authoritarian Politics Worsen Water Crisis?

- ▶ **Authoritarian political features**, such as **centralization of power and Inter-colonialism**, ignore and suppress different voices and opinions, thereby could worsen environment and water crisis in provinces (Ketabchy 2021).
- ▶ **Discriminative and exploitative development policies on local provinces** (Hassaniyan 2024) – In most environmentally affected provinces (Khuzestan and Kurdistan), the central policies aggravate exploit environment resources in these provinces, for instance **water relocation to economically important provinces and constructing water management infrastructures in provinces without consideration on local needs.**
- ▶ The local voices for environmental justice are suppressed by the government, which does not allow opposition, and sees any local activisms as threat to the regime (Hassaniyan 2020).


Allan Hassaniyan (2020). “Environmentalism in Iranian Kurdistan: causes and conditions for its securitization,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 20(3): 355–378.

Allan Hassaniyan (2024). “Iran’s water policy: Environmental injustice and peripheral marginalisation,” *Progress in Physical Geography* 48(3): 420–437.

Mehdi Ketabchy (2021). “Investigating the Impacts of the Political System Components in Iran on the Existing Water Bankruptcy,” *Sustainability* 13: 1–22.

IV. Increasing Threat to the Regime Stability

- ▶ In recent years(2017–2022), protests criticizing the Iranian regime and threatening its stability are increasing, the most prominent one is the massive protest caused by the death of Mahsa Amini.
- ▶ Many protests are caused and fueled by economic hardship, lack of public services and jobs, in addition to grievance on political suppression. The environmental disasters and climate crisis deteriorate economic hardship, thereby they are appeared as one of causes for protests.
- ▶ **"There were 261 environmental protests between January 2018 and October 2019, the majority of which were water related."**(Jones and Newlee, 2019)



Seth G. Jones and Danika Newlee (2019). "Iran's Protests and the Threat to Domestic Stability," *Crisis Brief*

IV. Increasing Threat to the Regime Stability

- ▶ **Relationships between environmental crisis in local provinces and spread of protests to peripheries?:**
 "In the history of modern Iran, the major protests which constituted a threat to the power of the state took place primarily in Tehran and other large urban centres. However, in both 2017 and 2019 there were serious escalations in towns and villages in the periphery."(Shahi and Abdoh-Tabrizi, 2020).
- ▶ Particularly protests in Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchistan strongly suggests that environmental grievances are related with the spread of anti-government sentiments.

Afshin Shahi and Ehsan Abdoh-Tabrizi (2020). "Iran's 2019–2020 demonstrations: The changing dynamics of political protests in Iran," *Asian Affairs* 51(1): 1–40..

V. Conclusion

- ▶ This study has limitations, in that it does not intend to verify this hypothesis through quantitative methods. However, the purpose of this study is to show **the dynamics of interconnections** of climate change, socio-economic changes such as migration, and political factors.
- ▶ The Iranian regime's **authoritarian features** strengthen negative effects of climate change, worsening socio-economic crisis. Political factors amplify the consequences of climate change. Therefore, not only the climate change, but also the political factor should be considered in analyzing what climate change will bring on in societies.
- ▶ Given that the anti-government sentiments are recently expanding into urban lower class, who become more infuriated by exacerbating economic hardship, the combined results of deteriorating effects of climate migration on socio-economic conditions of urban centers and increasing grievance among the urban lower class could pose significant threat to the Iranian regime's security.

Making the Middle East Great Again?

Trumpian Populism and Its Reframing in Arab Authoritarian Discourse

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1. Introduction

In recent years, populism has emerged as a powerful tool across both democratic and authoritarian regimes. While populism is often understood in the context of electoral competition and democratic backsliding, its appropriation by authoritarian leaders has attracted growing scholarly attention. This paper examines how Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has strategically reframed core elements of Trumpian populist discourse to consolidate authoritarian legitimacy in the post-2013 Egyptian political context.

This paper focuses on structural similarities in rhetorical style and political function, illustrating how populist strategies such as elite vilification, national renewal, and enemy construction emerge and adapt within different political systems. By comparing the case of Egypt under Sisi with Trump-era America, the study focuses on how populist discourse can operate across regime types to mobilize emotions, construct legitimacy, and suppress dissent, even under authoritarian rule.

2. Theoretical Framework Populism as Ideology and Political Performance

This study relies on two key approaches to populism. First, the ideational approach defines populism as a thin-centered ideology that frames politics as a moral struggle between a “pure

people” and a “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004). Second, the performative approach sees populism as a political style characterized by crisis narratives, media antagonism, and charismatic communication (Moffitt, 2016).

Trumpian populism reflects both perspectives. It combines nationalist revivalism, anti-elite rhetoric, and the strategic use of fear and polarization. This paper does not argue that Sisi imitates Trump, but that similar discursive patterns emerge in Egypt’s authoritarian setting—adapted to a political context where institutional checks are minimal, and leadership relies on military legitimacy and state-controlled media.

3. Methodology

This study employs rhetorical discourse analysis, based on public speeches by President Sisi (2014–2023), official government statements, and narratives from state-controlled media outlets such as Al-Ahram. It identifies key populist themes such as elite attacks, national rebirth, and enemy construction, and examines how these elements are reframed to serve authoritarian objectives.

4. Key Findings

The analysis identifies three core aspects where Sisi’s rhetoric mirrors and localizes Trumpian populist discourse.

- **Elite Attack:** Sisi frequently portrays Egypt’s instability as the result of betrayal by corrupt political elites and former regime actors, positioning himself as the only legitimate representative of the people.
- **National Renewal:** He promotes a vision of reviving Egypt’s former greatness, emphasizing civilizational pride and moral restoration, in a manner reminiscent of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” narrative.
- **Enemy Construction:** Sisi persistently identifies both internal and external threats—such as the Muslim Brotherhood, dissenting youth, foreign media, and Western critics—to rally public support and suppress opposition.

These strategies reflect a deliberate reframing of populist rhetoric, not for electoral purposes, but to consolidate authoritarian control and suppress dissent under the appearance of national unity. While the rhetorical patterns between Trump and Sisi show notable similarities, the political outcomes differ: Trump’s populism was constrained by democratic institutions, whereas Sisi’s rhetoric reinforces a system with few institutional checks, allowing for sustained authoritarian

consolidation.

5. Conclusion

The case of Sisi illustrates how populist rhetoric functions beyond electoral politics and liberal democracy. In authoritarian settings, such discourse serves as a tool of regime legitimation, moral justification for repression, and symbolic unification of the polity around a singular national narrative. The study suggests that populism is not inherently democratic or anti-democratic but is better understood as a flexible discursive repertoire adaptable to varying regime types.

By examining the structural convergence between Trumpian and Sisi-style rhetoric, this research contributes to a broader understanding of populism's global diffusion and its capacity to be reconfigured across diverse political contexts. Future comparative research may explore how similar patterns unfold in other authoritarian regimes and what this means for the global trajectory of populist politics.

Session 3

Economics

Economic Diversification in the Middle East

1) GCC Economic Diversification


Abdullah Baabood (Waseda University, Japan)

2) Spatial Concentration of Foreign Direct Investment: Disparities across Governorates and Sectors in Egypt

Shimaa Hanafy (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

3) The role of Islamic finance in advancing renewable energy: An empirical analysis

Eunkyung Lee (Sunmoon University, Korea)





GCC Economic Diversification

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GCC Economic Diversification

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GCC Economic Diversification Why diversify?

- Oil dependency: GCC region's reliance on oil revenues.
- Oil and gas production represent over 40% of GDP in GCC countries with the exception of the UAE and Bahrain.
- Oil and gas still account for around 70–90% of government revenues in most GCC countries.
- Oil extraction remains vital given its direct contribution to GDP and Government's revenue.
- More alarmingly, transfers of hydrocarbon revenues indirectly support the region's non-oil activity, which accounts for over 70% of total revenues in GCC countries except Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
- Sectors such as refining, chemicals, food and metals and power generation capacity are designed to take advantage of access to cheap oil and gas, while the ever-expanding tourism sector, reliant on long-haul visitors, is also relatively oil-intensive.

GCC Economic Diversification: Why Diversify?

- The expected fall in hydrocarbon reserves and revenues has long motivated GCC countries to diversify their economies by developing productive sectors outside oil and gas.
- The sustainability of hydrocarbon revenues among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies has been a major concern for decades, prompting a plethora of policies, visions and reforms focused on economic diversification.
- Oil extraction remains vital given its direct contribution to GDP.
- Undoubtedly, oil will continue to play an important role in the foreseeable future, even as demand for hydrocarbons is set to run out of steam and weaken from current levels, consistent with the gradual transition towards renewable energy, in line with the Paris Agreement to achieve net carbon zero by 2040.

GCC Economic Diversification . Why diversify?

- Global energy transition: Shift toward renewables and net-zero targets pressures oil-dependent economies.
- Oil price volatility complicates and reduces planning horizons; Even though the GCC states have accumulated substantial financial surpluses and maintained economic and political stability, the decline in oil prices has exposed the structural weaknesses of their economies.
- It is not a mere coincidence that economic diversification coincides with the accelerating global transition to renewable energy and electrification, a transition that is reshaping entire economies previously dependent on fossil fuels.

GCC Economic Diversification :


why Diversify?

- Rising energy demand in the region.
- Economic logic: free up oil & gas for export by using renewables domestically.
 - Climate change and Global energy transition: Global pressure to cut carbon emissions.
 - Shift toward renewables and net-zero targets pressures oil-dependent economies.

GCC Economic Diversification :

why Diversify?

- Demography and Youth Demographics in GCC
- The total population of the GCC region nearly doubled over 20 years, increasing from 26.2 million in 1995 to 56.4 million in 2021.
 - In 2021, over 50% of the local population was under 25 years of age), while the proportion of older citizens is low. In 2021, some countries had approximately 5% of locals over the age of 65 years of age.
 - Youth demographics: Rapidly growing, young populations require job creation in non-oil sectors



GCC Economic Diversification: Why Diversify?

- Challenges in maintaining the Social Contract.
- New leadership



GCC Economic Diversification: not an option but a necessity

- Economic diversification refers to the process of reducing reliance on a single income source by expanding into multiple sectors and markets.
- Economic diversification is essential for countries to lessen their reliance on a limited array of economic activities, thereby increasing their resilience to economic shocks and promoting sustainable growth.
- Economic diversification has been a primary policy goal for commodity-producing nations to reduce the volatility in growth, trade, and revenue resulting from price and volume fluctuations.
- While this strategy has long been used to foster economic growth and resilience, it is particularly relevant to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.



GCC Economic Diversification: : not an option but a necessity

- Economic diversification in the GCC involves shifting away from dependence on oil revenues towards a more balanced economy with diverse sectors, including technology, tourism, and renewable energy.
- This strategy aims to mitigate risks associated with fluctuating oil prices and achieve sustainable economic growth.
- The GCC nations are actively implementing initiatives to foster this transition, including attracting foreign investment and streamlining business procedures.



GCC Economic Diversification: country vision

- Within the GCC consortium, each member state has crafted individualized strategic economic roadmaps, with notable undertakings such as:
- **Bahrain's Economic Vision 2030:**
- Historically one of the most diversified countries in the GCC, with efforts focused on financial services and technology.
- Bahrain's blueprint for 2030 endeavors to steer away from petroleum dependency, emphasizing knowledge-centric sectors.
- Its ascent as a financial nexus and growth in domains like ICT and tourism are notable accomplishments.
- Nonetheless, labor market reforms and the private sector's frequent reliance on governmental projects pose challenges.
- **Kuwait's Vision 2035:**
- Termed 'New Kuwait', the 2035 vision aspires to metamorphose Kuwait into a financial and commercial epicenter. While there have been notable infrastructural advancements and a drive for foreign investments, bureaucratic impediments and protracted project timelines, coupled with continued petroleum revenue reliance, remain concerns.



GCC Economic Diversification: country vision

- **Qatar's National Vision 2030:**
- Developing a strong economy in other sectors including financial services and tourism. This vision encompasses human, societal, economic, and environmental components. Infrastructure preparations for the 2022 FIFA World Cup and ventures into tourism are commendable achievements.
- However, delays in certain project schedules have posed challenges, albeit ones they are navigating.
- **Oman's Vision 2040:**
- Oman's 2040 blueprint seeks economic diversification, improved living standards, and human capital development.
- Noteworthy are its inroads into sectors like eco-tourism and digital platforms.
- However, the pace of diversification, elevated youth unemployment, and challenges in eschewing petroleum dependency remain.



GCC Economic Diversification: country vision

- **Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030:**
- Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision amounts to an extensive economic transformation. It focuses on non-oil sectors like tourism, entertainment, and renewable energy, with initiatives like the Women Empowerment Budget Initiative.
- Opening its gates to international tourism and ushering in a nascent entertainment sector are laudable steps forward. Yet concerns over societal reforms, the velocity of change, and challenges in attracting global investment persist.
- **UAE:**
- The UAE has presented comprehensive strategies like the UAE Centennial 2071 and the 'We the UAE 2031' vision, augmented by regional endeavors such as the Abu Dhabi's Vision 2030.
- Economic diversification visions are designed to reduce dependence on oil and foster sustainable, knowledge-based economies.
- Leading the way in diversification with a focus on technology, finance, and tourism, and providing an enabling environment for business and entrepreneurship.
- Aiming to enhance the UAE's position as a global economic hub, We the UAE 2031 follows the UAE Vision 2021's plan to develop the nation's healthcare, education, sustainability, and infrastructure.
- The vision focuses on moving the nation forward through society, diplomacy, the economy, and ecosystem.
- Challenges persist in fostering a genuinely diversified economy beyond petroleum and property, and there are apprehensions regarding the sustainability of certain ambitious projects amidst global economic shifts.

Focus Areas vs. GCC Vision Priorities

- For example, Saudi Arabia's commitment to this paradigm shift is evident through ventures like the NEOM project and the King Abdullah Financial District.
- Bahrain's progress, particularly following the release of its Economic Vision 2030, exemplifies the potential of diversification.
- Dubai's rise as a global hub is underlined by achievements such as the Burj Khalifa and hubs like the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) that cement its global standing.
- Concurrently, Abu Dhabi is making strides in its diversification efforts while acknowledging the continuing economic contribution of its petrochemical assets.
- Its ventures into tourism, culture, and education are evident with establishments like NYU Abu Dhabi and The Louvre Abu Dhabi.

Focus Area	Saudi Arabia (Vision 2030)	UAE (Vision 2021/2071)	Qatar (Vision 2030)	Kuwait (Vision 2035)	Bahrain (Vision 2030)	Oman (Vision 2040)
Economic Diversification	High	High	High	Medium	High	High
Private Sector Empowerment	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
Human Capital Development	Medium	High	High	High	Medium	High
Innovation and Technology	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
Sustainability and Environment	High	High	High	Medium	Medium	High
Tourism, Culture, and Entertainment	High	High	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
Infrastructure and Logistics	High	High	Medium	High	Medium	High
Governance and Institutional Reform	High	High	High	Medium	High	Medium

GCC Economic Diversification

- For the most part, despite each tailored to their respective nations, they overall have a strategy where they aim for their economies to achieve some of the following aims:
- Diverse economic sectors
- Drive Innovation and Entrepreneurship
- Digital transformation
- Job Creation and Economic Growth
- The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is at a transformative moment as it pivots from its historical reliance on oil towards a more diversified, investment-attractive economy.

GCC Economic Diversification

- In the years following the pandemic, GCC countries have introduced several reforms to enhance non-oil sector activities, albeit at different paces.
- These reforms encompassed a wide range of measures, including Saudi Arabia's introduction of a new investment code, privatization initiatives in the UAE and Oman, enhancements to regulatory and business environments, and comprehensive labor market reforms.
- The latter included offering long-term visas, increasing labor market flexibility, promoting female participation in the workforce, and encouraging national employment within the private sector.
- Combined with the pursuit of large-scale projects, these efforts, have significantly strengthened the resilience of GCC economies.
- Qatar's hosting of the the World Cup serves as a prime example, driving growth and attracting substantial investments.
- Similarly, Saudi Arabia has made notable strides through the implementation of giga projects, promotion of FDI-led activities, and the gradual opening of previously restricted sectors.
- Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have experienced a non-oil-driven trade growth, further contributing to the region's economic diversification efforts.
- Fiscal reform: Taxation and cutting of subsidies; The introduction of broad-based revenue measures like VAT, and corporation tax not only to reduce deficits but will also improve GCC states' administrative capacity.

GCC Economic Diversification: Is it going to work?

- The visionary strategies undertaken by the GCC nations are poised to transform the regional economic landscape, showcasing their readiness to embrace a future beyond petroleum.
- However, while these strategies have undeniably influenced the direction of their economies, their full potential has yet to be actualized.
- Several of these initiatives, though innovative at inception, did not fully account for the myriad challenges the future held.
- The global disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic significantly altered economic dynamics, impacting trade, tourism, and global collaboration, areas where GCC nations hold significant stakes.
- Furthermore, escalating geopolitical tensions in recent years have further complicated the realization of these strategic visions.

GCC Economic Diversification: Is it going to work?

- **Challenges and future prospects:**
- Economic diversification remains a multifaceted process that requires a holistic approach. Through strategic efforts and learning from global best practices, GCC countries can mitigate economic vulnerabilities and build more sustainable futures.
- Current development plans unanimously identify diversification as the key to securing stable and sustainable income levels in the years ahead. Nevertheless, structural barriers to diversification persist, including the replication of economic activities among GCC states and sizable obstacles to interregional trade.
- **Maintaining momentum:** The issue of economic diversification has gained a renewed sense of urgency in Gulf Arab countries. Sustaining diversification efforts requires consistent policy reforms and a commitment to attracting investment. Reinventing the private sector and implementing broader reforms are crucial components in the future of economic diversification for GCC nations.
- **Addressing workforce challenges:** Job localization: Replacing expatriate labor with nationals remains difficult. Ensuring that GCC nationals have access to opportunities in the diverse economy is a key challenge. The rentier psychology which includes entitlement is not easy to overcome!
- **Balancing public and private sector roles:** Striking a balance between government initiatives and private sector development is crucial for sustainable growth. The limitation of State Capitalism will continue to be a challenge to the private sector.
- **Implementation gaps:** Bureaucracy and resistance to change can slow reform
- **Regional and global partnerships:** Collaborating with other countries and international organizations can help GCC nations achieve their diversification goals. Conflicts and reconciliations. Caravans in different directions!
- **Geopolitical risk:** Regional tensions (e.g., Iran-Yemen) can deter investors

- Thank you

Spatial Concentration of Foreign Direct Investment: Disparities across Governorates and Sectors in Egypt

Shimaa Hanafy

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Regional Concentration of Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt: Disparities across Regions and Sectors

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Extended abstract

This paper analyses the spatial and sectoral distribution of Greenfield FDI flows across Egypt's 27 governorates from the early years of FDI in the 1970s until 2020. The paper employs a unique dataset at the governorate level from the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones in Egypt. The dataset has several advantages. First, it begins in 1972, when Egypt received its first Greenfield FDI inflows in anticipation of the country's new open-door policy. Second, Greenfield FDI inflows are disaggregated for all 27 Egyptian governorates, which enables a spatial analysis at the governorate level. Third, the dataset allows for a disaggregation of Greenfield FDI inflows by sector (excluding the petroleum sector), capturing the sectoral heterogeneity of Greenfield FDI. The dataset also differentiates between five service subsectors. Fourth, the dataset includes domestic private investments.

The data show that Greenfield FDI is unevenly distributed across Egyptian governorates. Assessing the development of the spatial concentration of Greenfield FDI over time by employing different inequality measures, the analysis shows that regional concentration of Greenfield FDI initially declines until the mid/late 1990s, followed by a phase of stagnation in the 2000s, before increasing again in the 2010s. Moreover, disaggregating Greenfield FDI by sector reveals differences in the patterns of FDI spatial concentration across sectors, supporting the notion of sectoral heterogeneity regarding FDI spatial patterns (Haini and Tan, 2022; Hanafy and Marktanner, 2019). We find that FDI in the service sector shows the strongest spatial concentration, particularly in ICT and finance, whereas manufacturing FDI shows the most geographically dispersed pattern. Although the spatial concentration of FDI within a country is not unusual, its concentration in only a few regions might prevent the dissemination of positive FDI effects throughout the whole economy and thus increase regional inequality and weaken national and social cohesion.

Employing fixed-effects panel data estimations at the governorate level reveals the determinants of the regional concentration of Greenfield FDI inflows across Egypt, considering agglomeration, market, labor, and regional policy variables. An interesting result is that new FDI is not attracted to locations of previous FDI agglomerations per se; instead, it is the agglomeration of domestic private investments that matters. That is, foreign investors strongly prefer the locations where Egyptian private investors have already concentrated their activities. This could be due to several factors, including the presence of agglomeration economies in the form of forward and backward linkages, as well as joint venture options. Moreover, local investors are expected to be better informed about a location's relative attractiveness. This finding regarding foreign investors' behavior in Egypt is strongly supported by evidence from the meta-regression analysis by Jones (2017), which shows that agglomeration economies generated from domestic, rather than foreign, activity have the strongest effects on FDI location choice.

Considering these findings, we argue that the regional concentration of Greenfield FDI in Egypt is partly a consequence of already pre-existing economic disparities between governorates, which affect the latter's ability to attract domestic investors in the first place. That is, foreign investors may amplify existing regional disparities, but they do not necessarily cause them. Another interesting finding is that regional public investments seem to crowd out Greenfield FDI from non-Arab countries, which should be alarming for policymakers, especially considering the current growing role of public investment in Egypt. Instead, the government should focus on promoting and facilitating private investments (e.g. through Free Zones) to attract FDI into lagging regions.

JEL Codes: F21, E22, R12, O53, Z10

Keywords: Foreign Direct investment, regional FDI, regional disparities, agglomeration economies, sectoral heterogeneity.

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The role of Islamic finance in advancing renewable energy: An empirical analysis

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2025 KAMES International Conference



The role of Islamic finance in advancing renewable energy: An empirical analysis

Eunkyoung Lee
Sunmoon University

Contents

1. Introduction
2. Theoretical background
3. Literature review and hypothesis
4. Methods
5. Result and discussion
6. Conclusion

1. Introduction

- The global environmental crisis has increased the need for sustainable development
- However, implementing and engaging in environmentally friendly projects and investment requires substantial funding
 - ✓ The Asian Development Bank estimates that particularly, developing countries will need an annual investment US\$210 billion from 2016 to 2030 to sustain growth, eliminate poverty, and address climate change challenges
- Many studies emphasize the importance of financial development in promoting renewable energy (Le et al. 2020; Shahbaz et al. 2021; Awijen et al. 2022; Pata et al., 2022)
- Building on this, Islamic finance has been gaining global traction as an emerging source of funding for environmentally sustainable projects
- However, despite the growing role of Islamic finance, existing studies have rarely explored its connection with sustainable development initiatives.



1.1 Research aim and questions

1. Introduction

Aim

- To uncover the potential role of Islamic financial development in promoting renewable energy production across different regions

Main question

- Does Islamic finance development significantly promote the development of renewable energy?


Sub-question

- How does the relationship vary across different regions?
- Is the impact of IFDI on RE more pronounced in specific institutional contexts?

4

2. Theoretical background

Islamic Finance Assets Growth
(2017-2023, USD Billion)




<Source: IFDI, 2023>

- Islamic finance has gained significant attention
- Global Islamic financial asset US\$ 4.9 trillion (2023)
- Sukuk
 - ✓ Islamic bonds, providing *shariah*-compliant liquidity in the public debt market
 - ✓ "An certificates that represents the holders' proportionate ownership in undivided shares of tangible assets, usufructs, services or assets of specific projects" (AAOIFI, IFSB)
 - ✓ The value of sukuk outstanding in 2022 was US\$ 788.39 billion


5

2. Theoretical background



**Islamic Finance Assets by Top Countries
(USD Billion, 2023)**

<Source: IFDI, 2023>



**Share of Islamic assets by country
(% , 2020)**

<Source: Statista, 2022>

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2. Theoretical background

Financial Channel Perspective

- Financial development is positively associated with Renewable energy (RE) growth
- In particular, green finance has shown a strong positive link with RE development
- Accordingly, instruments such as green Sukuk and Islamic green loans can facilitate RE financing
- Several countries have started to adopt Islamic finance as an alternative financing mechanism for environmental friendly projects
- The asset-based nature of Islamic finance makes it well-suited for infrastructure investment such as RE projects


Sustainability Perspective

- CSR, ESG and Islamic finance share common principles rooted in ethics and responsibility
- Stakeholder theory
- CSR-related obligations encourages Islamic financial institutions to actively support sustainable development goals

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2.1 Conceptual model

2. Theoretical background



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3. Literature review

Financial Development and Renewable Energy

- Existing studies identify key determinants of renewable energy development
- Various factors have been examined, including institutional quality, financial development, carbon emissions, innovation, and human capital (Bamati & Raoofi, 2020; Li et al., 2020; Uzar, 2020; Khan & Ozturk, 2021; Awijun et al., 2022, Li et al., 2024)
- In particular, many studies have highlighted the positive link between financial development and renewable energy deployment (Le et al., 2020; Shahbaz et al., 2021; Pata et al., 2022)

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Green finance and Renewable Energy

- Green finance instruments have been found to significantly promote renewable energy development (Wang et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2021; Zheng et al., 2022; Dong et al., 2023)
- Several studies focus on the context of China, non-OECD, and Southeast Asian countries

Islamic finance and Environmental Sustainability

- Several studies examine the relationship between green sukuk or Islamic banking and CO2 emissions (Iskandar et al., 2020; Setiawati & Salsabila, 2022; Suriani et al., 2024)
- The use of sukuk has been explored through qualitative approaches and case studies (Handayani & Surachman, 2017; Morea & Poggi, 2017; Alhammadi, 2024)
- The link between Islamic finance and renewable energy (Siswantoro, 2023)
- However, these studies primarily focus on the total issuance of sukuk or the volume of financing, rather than broader development outcomes

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3.1 Hypothesis development

H1: Islamic finance development has a positive impact on renewable energy development

H2: The impact of Islamic finance development on renewable energy varies across different regions

H3: The impact of Islamic finance development on renewable energy development varies according to a country's institutional settings

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4. Methods

1 Data

- Panel data covering 32 countries
- Time period: 2012 ~ 2021

2 Model Specification

- Fixed effects panel regression

$$RE_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 IFDI_{it} + \beta_2 X_{it} + \mu_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where:

- ✓ RE_{it} : Renewable energy development in country i at time t
- ✓ $IFDI_{it}$: Islamic Finance Development Indicator
- ✓ X_{it} : Vector of control variables (FD, GDP, CO_2, FDI , Natural resources)
- ✓ μ_i : Country fixed effects
- ✓ γ_t : Time fixed effects
- ✓ ε_{it} : error term

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List of variables

Variable	Definition	Sources
Dependent variable		
RE	Renewable energy development (production)	BP Statistical Review of World Energy
Independent variable		
$IFDI$	Islamic finance development indicator	Refinitiv & ICD
Control variable		
FD	Financial development (domestic credit by financial sector, % of GDP)	World Development Indicators (WDI)
GDP	GDP per capita	World Development Indicators (WDI)
CO_2	CO2 emissions	World Development Indicators (WDI)
NR	Total natural resources rent (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators (WDI)
FDI	Foreign direct investment	World Development Indicators (WDI)

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Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
<i>RE</i>	320	-4.2465	2.5905	-8.7403	0.1441
<i>IFDI</i>	320	2.4028	1.3536	-2.0975	5.0526
<i>FD</i>	283	86.810	60.87002	6.8143	254.6681
<i>GDP</i>	320	10.2589	0.9120	8.3645	11.8763
<i>CO2</i>	320	4.9546	1.4175	1.8624	8.5648
<i>Natural Resources</i>	319	9.1783	12.8155	0.00017	58.1449
<i>FDI</i>	283	22.92657	1.7079	18.543	26.9604

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Descriptive statistics by region

	MENA		Asia		West			Malaysia & Indonesia		GCC	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.		Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
<i>RE</i>	-5.5855	2.2676	-4.0414	2.1795	-3.0551	2.8173	<i>RE</i>	-2.9549	1.2176	-6.8795	1.5183
<i>IFDI</i>	3.1977	0.9082	2.6418	1.2244	1.1744	1.0761	<i>IFDI</i>	4.3590	0.5411	3.9626	0.2510
<i>FD</i>	54.0709	30.6705	81.6589	62.2766	135.6421	56.0113	<i>FD</i>	79.7466	43.4197	70.3341	24.3886
<i>GDP</i>	10.3135	0.8291	9.7304	0.8981	10.9614	.3700	<i>GDP</i>	9.79655	0.4746	11.0470	0.3820
<i>CO2</i>	5.1082	0.6708	5.0508	1.2580	4.6451	2.0665	<i>CO2</i>	5.9053	0.4154	5.0616	0.7287
<i>Natural Resources</i>	21.1217	15.5152	4.8332	7.0494	2.3169	3.9847	<i>Natural Resources</i>	5.4658	2.0215	28.4408	11.5736
<i>FDI</i>	21.9432	1.1619	22.8381	1.5291	24.1559	1.7614	<i>FDI</i>	23.3207	0.5479	21.7604	1.3729

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5. Result and discussion

Full-sample

Variable	Renewables
<i>IFDI</i>	0.218*
	(0.1095)
<i>FD</i>	0.005
	(0.0037)
<i>GDP</i>	2.500*
	(1.2719)
<i>CO2</i>	1.123
	(1.2843)
<i>NR</i>	-0.031
	(0.0183)
<i>FDI</i>	0.027
	(0.0735)
<i>Intercept</i>	-36.370***
	(10.0018)
<i>R</i> ²	0.226
Observations	252

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5. Result and discussion

Sub-sample

Regional analysis

Variable	(1) MENA	(2) Asia	(3) West
<i>IFDI</i>	0.188	0.463*	-0.025
	(0.4332)	(0.2454)	(0.0670)
<i>FD</i>	0.029	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.0228)	(0.0169)	(0.0035)
<i>GDP</i>	1.309	2.885**	1.975
	(3.3047)	(1.2873)	(1.7266)
<i>CO2</i>	5.524**	0.327	-2.968***
	(2.0673)	(1.6532)	(0.4957)
<i>NR</i>	0.018	0.027	0.050
	(0.0399)	(0.0475)	(0.0272)
<i>FDI</i>	0.148	0.069	0.000
	(0.1947)	(0.0977)	(0.0436)
<i>Intercept</i>	-52.520*	-36.150***	-10.339
	(26.6304)	(9.6125)	(18.4543)
<i>R</i> ²	0.447	0.308	0.602
Observations	73	118	61

17

5. Result and discussion

Sub-sample	Variable	(1) Low	(2) High
Institutional quality	<i>IFDI</i>	0.355** (0.1353)	-0.081 (0.1297)
	<i>FD</i>	-0.013 (0.0163)	0.003 (0.0044)
	<i>GDP</i>	0.373 (2.0292)	2.257* (1.2918)
	<i>CO2</i>	3.475 (1.9987)	-1.293 (1.2572)
	<i>NR</i>	-0.033 (0.0262)	-0.057* (0.0298)
	<i>FDI</i>	-0.050 (0.0874)	0.113 (0.1165)
	<i>Intercept</i>	-24.571* (13.0033)	-24.624* (13.3668)
	<i>R</i> ²	0.437	0.112
	<i>Observations</i>	132	120

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6. Conclusion

Key findings

- Islamic finance development has a positive and statistically significant effect on renewable energy production
- Regional heterogeneity:
 - In Asia, IFDI shows a positive and significant effect
 - ✓ Active green sukuk market, strong Islamic finance adoption
 - In MENA, the effect is positive but not statistically significant
 - ✓ Oil dependency, government-led RE projects
 - In the West, the effect is negative and not significant
 - ✓ Minimal IF presence, mature conventional finance
- Institutional quality heterogeneity:
 - In countries with low institutional quality, IFDI has a positive and significant effect

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6. Conclusion

Policy implication

- Strengthening Islamic finance infrastructure can serve as an effective alternative funding source for renewable energy projects
- It is essential to actively utilize Islamic financial instruments to support renewable energy projects in Asia
- Promoting private-sector participation in MENA's renewable energy sector may boost the relevance of Islamic finance
- The role of Islamic finance in sustainable development is expected to expand further

Future research

- Use broader panel datasets with more countries and longer time spans
- Investigate the impact of specific Islamic finance instruments
- Compare Islamic and conventional finance in promoting renewable energy

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Thank you

Session 4

History and Religion

History of Islam and the Middle East

1) Measuring Islamic Constitutionalism:

The Comparative Islamic Constitutions Database (1861–2022)

Moamen Gouda (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

2) Mapping Diverse Buddhist–Islamic Coexistence: Hyecho's

Wangocheonchukgukjeon in the context of Trump 2.0 Era's Global Interfaith Challenges

Jin Han Jeong (Anyang University, Korea)

3) The Definitions of Rational Diameter and Real Diameter in Plato's

Republic 546c: A Perspective from the Mathematical Thought of the Ancient Near East

Jenam Park (Inha University, Korea)

4) The Intellectual Balance Between the Umayyad Policy of Condonation and Firmness in the Current Syrian Stance



Lujain Bitar (American University in Dubai, UAE)

Measuring Islamic Constitutionalism: The Comparative Islamic Constitutions Database (1861-2022)

Moamen Gouda
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea


The Comparative Islamic Constitutions Database (1861-2022)

Moamen Gouda
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Seoul, South Korea)



WVS Wave 7 (2017-2022)


Important child qualities: religious faith



Source: World Values Survey, 2025

WVS Wave 7 (2017-2022)

Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right



Source: World Values Survey, 2025

Introduction

- Over the past century and a half, the relationship between Islamic law and constitutions has developed from a concern for the educated and economic elite to a fundamental political topic, addressed across many Muslim-majority societies (Brown & Revkin, 2015).
- This is not surprising given that polls have been consistently showing that most Muslims demand more role for Islam in shaping politics and laws (ASDA'A BCW Arab Youth Survey, 2023; Pew Research Center, 2022; 2013).
- March (2015) states that almost all Muslim-majority states have some formal commitment to Islam and Islamic law in their constitutions.
- Ahmed and Ginsburg (2014, p. 635) show that Islamic constitutional clauses have been widely spreading since the second part of the twentieth century and were featured in the constitutions of about forty percent of Muslim-majority countries in 2014.
- The rise in the role of Islam in constitutions often correlates with changes in economic, social, political and legal outcomes.

6

How is Islam (inappropriately) measured?

- Most of the empirical (quantitative) social science studies on Islam suffer from a fundamental flaw; Muslim population share is used as a measure for Islam, ignoring the fact that religiosity among Muslim population significantly varies in time and place.
 - Nigerian Muslims, comprising around 50% of population, are significantly more observant to Islam than Turkish Muslims, representing around 98% of population (PEW Research Center, 2008).
- Moreover, it is not clear how the Muslim population share might be transmitted into various economic, social and political outcomes.

Bottom Line: Empirical studies focus mainly on Muslims, and not on Islam per se.

7

Islam as a formal Institution

- While formal institutions include written constitution, laws, policies, and regulations enforced by official authorities, informal institutions are (the often unwritten) social norms, values, customs or traditions that shape thought and behavior (Leftwich & Sen, 2010; Berman, 2013).
- Religious belief is usually considered an informal institution (Pejovich, 1999; Dobler, 2009; Domjahn, 2012).
- Yet, [religious provisions in constitutions are considered formal institutions](#), as religion is coded and administrated under constitutional authority (Gouda, 2013; Gouda and Gutmann, 2021).

8

Islamic Constitutions Index (ICI)

- Using the framework of the Comparative Constitutions Project by Elkins et al. (2009), Ahmed and Gouda (2015) develop the Islamic Constitutions Index measures the degree of Islamization of constitutions.
- This is done through utilizing a unique model Islamic constitution, developed in 1978 by Al-Azhar University (Gouda, 2013), as a point of reference to identify a set of 30 distinctive Islamic characteristics of constitutions.
- The Islamic Constitutions Index remains the only dataset that offers a systematic coding of Islamic constitutional provisions. It covers the enacted national constitutions of the 57 countries that are members of the Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) in the year 2014 (Ahmed & Gouda, 2015)

9

Consequences of Islamic Constitutionalism

- Considerable empirical literature shows that Islamic constitutional provisions have significant consequences on gender equality (Gouda & Potrafke, 2016), rule of law (Gouda, 2013; Gutmann & Voigt, 2015; 2018), protection of rights of religious minorities (Gouda & Gutmann, 2021), as well as democracy (Gouda & Hanafy, 2022).
- Nevertheless, a significant caveat with this body of literature is that the period investigated is considerably limited, usually between the years 1990 and 2014 (Gouda & Gutmann, 2021; Gouda & Hanafy, 2022).
- Due to this drawback, the Islamic constitutional provisions do not change in almost all constitutions investigated, thus limiting robust examination of the causality between Islamic constitutional provisions and various outcomes.


10

This study

- This study significantly expands the work of Ahmed and Gouda (2015) through investigating and codifying all historical and current constitutions of all OIC members, starting with the Tunisian constitution of 1861 which is considered to be the first constitution of a Muslim-majority country and reaching the constitutions in force in 2022.
- I modify and reorganize the 30 “Islamic clauses” identified by Ahmed and Gouda (2015) as capturing the universe of all Islamic clauses based on the Al-Azhar constitution and construct a survey instrument codifying the clauses.
- The extended dataset includes more than 275 thousand data entry points, since 30 benchmarks are investigated through the constitutions of around 57 countries in a period of around 161 years.
- Research assistance from Harvard Islamic Law Program.

11

Al-Azhar Constitution of 1978



An English translation can be downloaded from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272306686_The_1978_Al-Azhar's_Project_for_an_Islamic_Constitution

12

Background on The Al-Azhar Constitution

- Initiation: Islamic Research Academy (IRA) 8th meeting, October 1977.
 - IRA to draft an Islamic constitution as a guide for any country that “wishes to model itself after the Islamic *shari’a*.”
 - “Principles laid down agree with those shared between the various Islamic schools of jurisprudence to the utmost extent possible.”
- Finalized and published in Al-Azhar official magazine (1978).
- Ignored due to political circumstances (Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty & the assassination of President Sadat).
- Several influential Islamic political movements calling for its implementation in Egypt (2011-2012).

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Why study Al-Azhar Constitution?

1. Only modern constitution that is fully developed by a religious entity (imagine the Pope writing Ireland's constitution!).
2. Sums up Islamic legal thought on government and state.
3. The committee behind its development are not Islamists *per se*.
4. As Al-Azhar is considered by many as the most sought-for moderate entity in the Islamic world, this constitution represents a moderate version of contemporary Islamic thought.
5. The constitution principles converge various legal schools of Islam to the maximum. ('median' thesis of Islamic *shari'a*)

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CICD Methodolgy

- I identify and regroup 30 "Islamic clauses" capturing the universe of Islamic clauses found in the Al-Azhar constitution.
- The 30 Islamic clauses are divided into 7 categories:
 - A. General Characteristics
 - B. Rights
 - C. Executive
 - D. Legislation
 - E. Judiciary
 - F. Economy
 - G. Islamic Social Norms
- I survey constitutions of countries that are members of the Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC)
 - "the collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world." (OIC website, 2013).

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CICD Components

Benchmarks	Al-Azhar Constitution
A. General Characteristics	
Q1. [Preamble]- Does the Preamble reference Islamic idiom?	Preamble
Q2. [Calendar]- Does the constitution reference an Islamic calendar and/or holidays?	Article 15
Q3. [StateRel]- Does the constitution declare Islam as the state religion?	Article 1b
Q4. [Oath]- Does it include Islamic references in the presidential, ministerial, or parliamentary oath?	Article 48
Q5. [Amendment]- Are provisions related to Islam unamendable?	Preamble, Article 1b
Q6. [Authority]- Does the source of authority or power stem from religious principles?	Articles 55, 56, 57
B. Rights	
Q7. [Rights]- Are any rights or freedoms subject to Sharia requirements?	Article 29
Q8. [CTZMuslim]- Does the constitution require all citizens to be Muslim?	No mention of non-Muslims
Q9. [Women]- Does the constitution declare that women should serve their husband or that serving the family is their priority?	Article 8

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CICD Components

Benchmarks	Al-Azhar Constitution
C. Executive	
Q10. [Duty]- Does the head of state/government have some religious duties or symbolic obligations?	Article 47
Q11. [HDMuslim]- Must the head of state/government be Muslim?	Article 47
Q12. [HDKnowledge]- Is Islamic knowledge a prerequisite for the head of state/government?	Article 47
Q13. [Accountability]- Is the government accountable for ruling in accordance with Islam?	Article 7
Q14. [Pledge]- Is the head of state/government appointed through a pledge of allegiance (bai'ah)?	Article 48
Q15. [Advisory]- Does the constitution establish a religious advisory council?	Article 83
D. Legislation	
Q16. [Source]- Is Islam identified as a source of legislation?	Article 1b
Q17. [Supremacy] - What is the degree of Islamic supremacy in legislation? Code the intensity (Only asked if Q16 is answered "Yes")	Article 1b
Q18. [Repugnance]- Does the constitution prohibit laws that contradict Islam?	Articles 83, 92
Q19. [Crime]- Does the constitution explicitly provide for the implementation of Islamic criminal penalties (e.g., amputations, stoning)?	Articles 56, 59, 69, 71, 72, 79

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CICD Components

Benchmarks	Al-Azhar Constitution
E. Judiciary	
Q20. [Judiciary]- Is there a provision requiring the judiciary to apply Sharia or reject laws contradicting it?	Article 81
Q21. [JDMuslim]- Must judges of the highest court be Muslim?	Articles 61, 65
Q22. [JDKnowledge]- Must judges of the highest court have Islamic legal knowledge?	Article 65
Q23. [Compliance]- Does the constitution establish a religious council or judicial court to review legislation for Sharia compliance?	Article 83
F. Economy	
Q24. [Economy] - Does the constitution mandate that economic activities, trade, or banking adhere to Islamic principles?	Article 23
Q25. [Interest]- Does the constitution prohibit interest (riba)?	Article 23
Q26. [Alms]- Does the constitution provide for the recognition or organization of alms, charity, zakat, or waqf?	Article 26
G. Islamic Social Norms	
Q27. [Moral]- Are Islamic morals given a constitutional foundation?	Article 7
Q28. [Education]- Does the constitution mandate the provision of Islamic (or religious) education?	Articles 10, 11
Q29. [Unity]- Does the constitution reference unity with the Muslim world or the concept of Ummah (Islamic political community)?	Article 1-3
Q30. [Jihad]- Does the constitution reference jihad or the defense of faith?	Article 56

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Coding

- All questions are coded in binary format (Yes=1; No=0), with one exception:
- Q17. [SUPERMACY] - What is its degree of supremacy of Islam? Code the intensity
 - Regarding Islam:
 - Islam/Islamic law/sharia=2 points
 - "Principles" of Islam/Islamic law/sharia= 1 points
 - Regarding Law:
 - "A" source of law or if there is no other law governing a matter then Islamic law can come in=1 points
 - "A" primary or basic or foundational source of law=2 points
 - "THE" source (or the only source). (In case it is implying that Islamic law is the only source)=3 points
 - Examples:
 - "Islamic law is the source of all legislation" Score:2+3=5
 - "The principles of Islam is the source of all legislation" Score: 1+3=4
 - "The principles of Islam are the major/primary source of all legislation" Score: 1+2=3
- I subtract 1 out of the total score to adjust the distribution of this indicator. (v.2)

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Islamic Constitutions Index (Ahmed and Gouda, 2015)

Rank	Countries	Sum	Rank	Countries	Sum
1	Iran 1979 (r. 1989)	26	15	Oman 1996 (r. 2011)	8
2	Saudi Arabia 1992 (r. 2005)	23	16	Qatar 2003	8
3	Maldives 2008	17	17	Kuwait 1962 (ri. 1992)	7
4	Pakistan 1973 (ri. 2002, 2012)	15	18	Morocco 2011	7
5	Somalia 2012	14	19	UAE 1971 (r. 2004)	7
6	Afghanistan 2004	13	20	Comoros 2001 (r. 2009)	6
7	Yemen 1991 (rev. 2001)	13	21	Brunei 1959 (r. 1984)	5
8	Bahrain 2002	11	22	Malaysia 1957 (r. 1996)	5
9	Iraq 2005	11	23	Syria 2012	5
10	Algeria 1963 (r. 2008)	9	24	Tunisia 2014 (Draft)	5
11	Mauritania 1991 (r. 2012)	9	25	Jordan 1952 (r. 2011)	4
12	Sudan 2005	8	26	Bangladesh 1972 (ri. 1986, r. 2011)	2
13	Egypt 2013	8	27	Djibouti 1992 (r. 2010)	1
14	Libya 2011	8			

Countries scored zero: Albania 1998 (r. 2008)*, Azerbaijan 1995 (r. 2009)*, Benin 1990*, Burkina Faso 1991 (r. 2012)*, Cameroon 1972 (r. 2008), Chad 1996 (r. 2005)*, Cote D'Ivoire 2000, Gabon 1991 (r. 1997), Gambia 1996 (r. 2004)*, Guinea 2010*, Guinea-Bissau 1984 (r. 1991), Guyana 1980 (r. 1995), Indonesia 1945 (ri. 1959, r. 2002), Kazakhstan 1995 (r. 1998)*, Kyrgyz Republic 2010*, Lebanon 1926 (r. 2004), Mali 1992*, Mozambique 2004 (r. 2007), Niger 2010*, Nigeria 1999, Senegal 2001 (r. 2009)*, Sierra Leone 1991 (ri. 1996, r. 2008), Suriname 1987 (r. 1992), Tajikistan 1994 (r. 2003)*, Togo 1992 (r. 2007), Turkey 1982 (r. 2002)*, Turkmenistan 2008*, Uganda 1995 (r. 2005), Uzbekistan 1992*

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Thank you

Mapping Diverse Buddhist-Islamic Coexistence: Hyecho's Wangocheonchukgukjeon in the context of Trump 2.0 Era's Global Interfaith Challenges

Jin Han Jeong
Anyang University, Korea

Mapping Diverse Buddhist-Islamic Coexistence:

Hyecho's Wangocheonchukgukjeon in the context of
Trump 2.0 Era's Global Interfaith Challenges




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정진한




Anyang University HK+ East-West


Huntington faded away but...



Hinduvuta, and Buddhism



Bamiyan Buddha, arrival of Islam & before Taliban



Hyecho, the First Korean Cosmopolitan

- Birth in Silla (704)
- Study abroad to China (719)
- Travel to India by Sea (723)
- Southeast Asia > South Asia > West Asia > Central Asia > China (~727)
- Composing a Travelogue
- Translating Buddhist Scripts
- Death in China (780)



Rediscovering the Value of Hyecho




Heycho's (Uncertain) Route

By Su-il, Jeong



Visit: “(從, 又從) ... (東.西.南.北) (行) (入, 隔) ... (日, 月, 程) ... (至) ...”

By Michigan University Press




Hearsay: “(從, 又從) ... (已) (東.西.南.北) ... (是, 即, 有)”

The only survival MMS of Hyecho's Travelogue



The lost original text, consist of three books



吐火羅國(Tokharistan)

- From Bamiyan I travelled further north and after twenty days arrived at the country of Tokharistan. The capital city is called Bactra. At present, the place is guarded and oppressed by Arab forces. The original king was compelled to leave the capital, and he resided at Badakhshan, which is one month's journey from the capital towards the east. It is also under the authority of the Arabs. ... The king, the chiefs, and the common people respect the Three Jewels (Buddhism). There are many monasteries and monks. Hinayana Buddhism is practiced. They eat meat, onions, and leeks. They do not profess any other religions. All men cut their beards and hair, but women keep their hair. The land is mountainous.

波斯國 (Persia)

- From Tokharistan I travelled further west and after one month arrived at the country of Persia. **Formerly, the king of this country ruled over the Arabs, One Arab, the camel keeper of the Persian king rebelled, assassinated the king, and declared himself the ruler. This is the reason why the country is now annexed by the Arabs.** ... The language is different from that of other countries. The natives of this land are naturally skilful in trade. They frequently sail to the western sea and enter the southern sea, and take precious things from the country of Ceylon. ... They also take gold from the Malay archipelago, sail to Chinese territory, and proceed straight to Canton to buy silk gauze, silk wadding, and similar things. The land produces fine cotton. **The inhabitants like to slaughter animals. They serve Heaven and have no knowledge of Buddhism.**

大寔國 (Arab)

- Again, from the Kingdom of Fars, after ten days' travel north and entering the mountains, one arrives in Arabia. The king of this country does not stay on his own land. **The king of Arab does not live in his own country but resides in 小拂臨 (Lesser Fulin, Syria).** In order to conquer and claim Syria, he even lives on one of its mountainous islands he resides in. ... The king and the common people wear the same kind of clothing without distinction.... When they eat food, there is no distinction between noble and commoner. They take food together from the same plate with their hands, and also use spoons and skewers. They very much dislike taking readymade things. They say that to eat the meat that is slaughtered by one's own hands brings boundless fortune. **The inhabitants of this country are fond of slaughtering. They serve Heaven, and have no knowledge of Buddhism. In the law of the country, there is no convention of prostration.**

大拂臨 (Byzantine Empire)

- Northwest of Lesser Fu-lin, along the sea shore, is the country of Greater Fu-lin. The king has a very strong and large army. He is not subject to any other country. **The Arabs made a few attacks, which did not succeed. The Turks also tried an invasion, which was also unsuccessful.** The land has many precious things. Camels, mules, sheep, horses and such are very abundant. **The dress is similar to that of Persia and the Arabs. The language is distinct from others.**

胡國(Six Central Asian Countires)

- From the country of the Arabs to the east, all the countries belong to the Hu(Muslim) people. These are the countries of Bukhara, Kaputana, Kish, Shih-lo, Maimarg, and Samarkand. **Though each of these countries has its own king, they are all under the authority of the Arabs.** These countries are small, their armies are very limited, and they are unable to protect themselves. ... **Moreover, all these six countries serve the Fire Religion. They have no knowledge of Buddhism.**

Samarkand & Koreans in the Afrasiab Mural

- Only in Samarkand is there one monastery and monk, who does not know how to revere [the Three Jewels]. In these countries of the Hu people, both the beard and hair are cut. People like to wear white caps made of cotton.



跋賀那國 (Ferghana)

- To the east of Samarkand is the country of Ferghana where they have two kings. The great Fu-yu river flows to the west from the center of the country. The king to the south of the river is subject to the Arabs. The king to the north of the river is subject to the Turks. The products of the land include camels, mules, sheep, horses, and cotton cloth. The dress is made of fur and cotton. The food is mainly pastry and parched wheat. The language is different from that of other countries. The inhabitants have no knowledge of Buddhism. There are no monasteries, monks or nuns.

骨咄國(Khuttal)

- East of Ferghana there is a country called Khuttal. The king is of Turkish origin. Half of the local inhabitants are Hu people, and the other half are Turks. The products of this land include camels, mules, sheep, horses, cows, asses, grapes, cotton cloth, and woolen rugs. The dress is made of cotton and fur. The language is one-third Tokharian, one-third Turkish, and one-third local dialect. The kings, the chiefs, and the common people respect and believe the Three Jewels. Hinayana Buddhism is practiced. This country is under the control of the Arabs. Although other countries call it a country, its size is only comparable with a great prefecture in China. The men of this country cut their beards and hair. The women keep their hair.


突厥(Turks)

- From the country of the Hu people up to the northern sea in the north, the western sea in the west, and China in the east, is the territory inhabited by the Turks. The Turks have no knowledge of Buddhism. There are no monasteries or monks. The dress is fur and woolen shirts. Insects are used for food. There are no cities or houses. Felt tents are used for houses, which people carry with them wherever they go. The movement of the Turks follows the course of water and grass. The men cut their beards and hair. The women keep their hair. The language is different from that of other countries. **The people of this land are fond of killing. They do not distinguish between good and bad. The land has many camels, mules, sheep, horses and such.**

胡蜜(Wakhan)

- From Tokharistan I walked east for seven days and arrived at the city where the Wakhan king resides. When I was at Tokharistan, I met the Chinese Ambassador to foreign lands. ...The king of Wakhan has a small and weak cavalry and can not protect himself. At present he is under the authority of the Arabs. He pays annually three thousand rolls of silk to the Arabs. He is stationed in a valley which is narrow, and most people are poor. The dress is fur and woolen shirts. The king wears silk gauze and cotton cloth. Only pastry and parched wheat are used for food. ... The monasteries and monks are there. Hinayana Buddhism is practiced. The king, the chiefs, and the common people all serve Buddha and do not belong to other religions. This is the reason why other religions are not in this land. The men cut their beards and hair. The women keep their hair. The people live on the mountains where there are no trees, water, or grass..

In addition to the Research



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The Definition of Rational Diameter and Irrational Diameter in Republic (546c) from the Perspective of Ancient Near Eastern Mathematical Culture

Jenam Park
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Abstract. The ancient Greek mathematical writings recorded on papyrus have all been lost because of the Mediterranean climate. Of the original writings, we only have a fragment concerning the lunes of Hippocrates. In this context, M. Kline claims that it is not an exaggeration to say that the history of ancient Greek mathematics relies on the commentaries of Pappus (late third century AD) and Proclus (410–485 AD). Plato had much to say about mathematics. Plato's primary contribution to mathematics was to the underlying principles of science including the method of analysis. It is said that Plato visited Egypt for the purposes of trade but chiefly so that he might acquire knowledge, and he is known to be a deep admirer of Egyptian wisdom. Plato mentions Egypt as a source of mathematics in his *Phaedrus* (274c5). This study examines the mathematical concept of the 'rational diameter' as mentioned in Plato's *Republic* (546c), taking into account the mathematical sophistication of ancient Greek culture, while also investigating the possible influence of ancient Near Eastern mathematical traditions. Therefore, when we philosophically explore the topics related to mathematics in Plato's dialogues, we should strive to approach Plato's mathematics with the mathematical concepts used in Plato's era, rather than modern mathematics. Furthermore, I believe it is essential for us to examine how ancient Middle Eastern mathematics is reflected in Plato's mathematics to gain a deeper understanding of Plato's philosophy.

1. Rational diameters: Meno (82b-84a) and Republic (546c)

In Republic (546c), Plato designates as the 'irrational diameter' of 5, while describing 7 as its 'rational diameter'—that is, the integer most nearly approximating $\sqrt{5}$. From this perspective, in the *Meno* (83e)—composed five to ten years later—Plato introduces the rational diameter of 2 as 3 during the dialogue between Socrates and the slave boy.


We argue that while in the *Meno* Plato critically highlights the significance of geometry—framed through the collective values of the Pythagorean school and examined via Socratic elenchus—in *Republic* (546c) he emphasizes a cooperative relationship between arithmetic and geometry. From this perspective, Plato's use of the term 'geometric numbers' reflects his broader philosophical engagement with the intersection of mathematics and metaphysics.

2. Theon's "Side and Diagonal Numbers" (c. 130 A.D.E.)

In his *Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato*, written circa 130 A.D.E, Theon of Smyrna introduces the conceptual pair 'side and diagonal number,' and, within this framework, posits 17 as the rational diameter corresponding to the side-length 12. The side (s) and diagonal (d) numbers introduced by him, and the relationship between them, are presented as follows. Specifically, the beginning of the new set originates from two units (or monads).

$$\begin{aligned}
 s_1 &= 1 & d_1 &= 1 \\
 s_2 &= 1 + 1 = 2 & d_2 &= 1 + 2 \times 1 = 3 \\
 s_3 &= 2 + 3 = 5 & d_3 &= 3 + 2 \times 2 = 7 \\
 s_4 &= 5 + 7 = 12 & d_4 &= 7 + 2 \times 5 = 17 \\
 2 \times 2^2 - 3^2 &= -1, & 2 \times 5^2 - 7^2 &= 1, & 2 \times 12^2 - 17^2 &= -1
 \end{aligned}$$

From an arithmetico-geometric perspective, it becomes evident that the subsequent triangles progressively converge toward the form of right isosceles triangles.



3. Proclus’ “Side and Diagonal Numbers” (410–458 A.D.E.)


In his *Commentary on Plato's Republic*, written in the 5th century A.D.E., Proclus attributes the introduction of side and diagonal numbers to the Pythagorean school (Proclus 2022, 232–233). This claim emerges more than 800 years after the classical Pythagorean period. Proclus refers to specific pairs of side and diagonal numbers, denoted (s, d) , listing three such pairs: $(1, 1)$, $(2, 3)$, and $(5, 7)$. He further introduces an equation of the form $s^2 + d^2 = 2s^2$, which, notably, he regards as the work of Euclid (Proclus 2022, 237).

4. Is there evidence that Pythagoras, Plato, or Proclus conceived of the side and diagonal numbers as approximations to $\sqrt{2}$?

There is no solid textual evidence that “the Pythagoreans and Plato”- or even Proclus for that matter- were interested in rational approximations of $\sqrt{2}$ such as those of Aristarchus of Samos (c. 310–230 B.C.E.) and Hero of Alexandria (10–70 A.D.E.) (Balolou and Thomaidis 2022, 20, arXiv:2011.07335). They claim that what really mattered to them was the approximations of $\sqrt{2}$ by

If Proclus's claim is accurate, it may be inferred that the Pythagoreans employed the method of *anthyphairesis* (ἀνθυφαίρεσις)—a process known in modern mathematics as the Euclidean algorithm, which Euclid treats in *Elements*, Book VII, Propositions 1 and 2—in their understanding of side and diagonal numbers. This method constitutes one way of demonstrating irrationality. Plato, in the *Laws* (820c), emphasizes the significance of recognizing incommensurability, though he does not provide a precise method. Aristotle, moreover, refers to incommensurability on no fewer than eight occasions in the *Metaphysics*, underscoring its philosophical importance.

5. Ancient Egyptian’s “Side and Diagonal Numbers”



It is presumed that during Egypt's 12th Dynasty (c. 1990–1780 B.C.E.), two approximate

methods were employed to calculate the area of a circle. One is expressed as (see left figure), and the other as (see right figure). From , we may infer two distinct forms of side and diagonal numbers:

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{2} &\approx 1, 2\sqrt{2} \approx 3, 5\sqrt{2} \approx 7, 12\sqrt{2} \approx 17, \dots \\ \sqrt{5} &\approx 2, 4\sqrt{5} \approx 9, 17\sqrt{5} \approx 38, 72\sqrt{5} \approx 161, \dots \end{aligned}$$

The Intellectual Balance Between the Umayyad Policy of Condonation and Firmness in the Current Syrian Stance

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Abstract

This paper explores the policy of condonation during the establishment of the first Arab state, which chose Syria as its capital. The people of Damascus, known as "Fastat," were characterized by their moderation. At the time, Syria had been under Byzantine rule, and its people had assimilated Byzantine customs. This historical context led the Umayyad Caliph to adopt a flexible approach, avoiding strict regulations that could destabilize the newly established state while ensuring security and stability. Instead, a policy of tolerance was implemented, which, according to many critics, ultimately contributed to the decline of the Umayyad era.

The balance between leniency and firmness remains a crucial element in governance, particularly in post-conflict societies. In the present day, after decades of the absence of virtue and righteousness, people increasingly seek wisdom and moral guidance. The reconstruction of Syria, following its extensive destruction, cannot be achieved through revenge and bloodshed but rather through legal and institutional development. Lessons from the Umayyad period highlight the risks of excessive leniency, while modern history demonstrates the dangers of unchecked rigidity. A middle-ground approach, one that integrates justice with pragmatism, is essential for rebuilding a stable and prosperous Syria.

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This contemporary stance contrasts with the perspective of the Syrian philosopher who once stated, "A mind without a beard and a beard without a mind," emphasizing the necessity of harmonizing intellect with governance. Ultimately, history serves as a reminder that a sustainable future depends on the ability to balance wisdom with decisive leadership.

The rise or fall of a civilization can often depend on the simple act of listening—on the wisdom of the listener and the integrity of the speaker. Dialogue, when rooted in sincerity and guided by reason, has the power to build empires or bring them to ruin. A notable example of this idea can be found in the early Umayyad era, particularly in the character and leadership of Muawiya bin Abi Sufyan, the first Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty.

Muawiya was not only a skilled statesman but also a wise and pragmatic leader. He offered his son Yazid bin Muawiya, who would become the second Umayyad Caliph, a foundational piece of advice regarding governance. He warned him not to rely solely on force to establish or maintain the empire, emphasizing instead the importance of diplomacy, patience, and strategic thinking. His approach to power was marked not only by negotiation and flexibility but also by the principle of condonation—choosing to overlook certain transgressions or provocations when doing so preserved unity and prevented greater harm.

Muawiya is remembered for a famous saying that encapsulates his political philosophy and diplomatic style. He once said:

"I do not use my sword if my whip can solve the issue, and I do not use my whip if my words can resolve it. There is only one hair between me and the people—it never breaks. If they pull it, I loosen it; if they loosen it, I pull it, so it never breaks."

This metaphor of "Muawiya's hair" became widely known in Arab culture as a symbol of delicate but intelligent leadership. It expresses his ability to maintain a balance in governance—never letting tensions break, but adjusting them wisely to preserve unity and control. His leadership style rested not only on power and persuasion but also on the deliberate act of forgiveness and condonation when it served the greater good.

The history of the Arabs is rich with examples that reflect this kind of shrewd and pragmatic leadership. One powerful story is that of Abdulrahman Al-Dakhil, a descendant of the Umayyads who fled the Abbasid massacre after the fall of the Umayyad empire in the East. While many of his relatives, including his brother, were killed by the Abbasids—often referred to as the "Black Army" because of their black flags and uniforms—Abdulrahman managed to escape.

Rather than return to certain death by joining his brother near the Euphrates River, he made the difficult but strategic decision to flee west. He eventually reached Al-Andalus (modern-day Spain), where he established a new Umayyad state and revived the legacy of the dynasty. His decision reflected a deep sense of political realism: he chose the greater public good over personal loyalty.

or emotional reaction. This act, too, revealed an understanding of condonation—not in the sense of pardoning others' actions, but in forgiving fate itself and adapting to it with clarity and resilience. He looked beyond grief and vengeance to build a lasting future.

Abdulrahman's story stands as a continuation of Muawiya's legacy—a commitment to pragmatic governance, flexibility in leadership, and the prioritization of statecraft over personal or tribal loyalties. Together, these stories highlight how the wisdom of listening, the grace of condonation, and the integrity of leadership can shape history in powerful and enduring ways.

The political identity of Syria today is deeply rooted in the pride it takes in its ancient and continuous civilization. As historian Fernand Braudel noted in his seminal work *A History of Civilizations*, the Near East was "born mature" due to the cumulative layers of history, culture, and thought that have shaped the region over millennia. Syria, as one of the cradles of civilization, carries a profound awareness of this heritage, which continues to influence its modern political and philosophical outlook.

The current political narrative in Syria, particularly in the post-conflict context, reflects a strategic shift—one that could be interpreted through the lens of chaos theory and the butterfly effect. This theory suggests that small actions can lead to significant global changes. Syria's renewed focus on environmental policies, especially those promoting green energy, is one such "small action" intended to signal a break from past associations and reshape global perceptions. This subtle shift aims to challenge long-standing stereotypes that equate the image of the bearded man with extremism, violence, and irrationality.

This ideological resistance can be traced back to the critical philosophy of the blind Syrian poet and thinker, Abu al-Ala' al-Ma'arri, who famously said:

“A mind without a beard, and a beard without a mind.”

His words continue to resonate as a sharp critique of superficial judgments, emphasizing intellect over appearance and echoing Syria's desire to reclaim its moral and philosophical voice on the world stage.

This shift in narrative is also reflected in the evolving image of Syrian leadership. The transformation of public perception from figures like Abu Mohammad al-Julani to emerging leaders such as Ahmad al-Sharaa symbolizes a broader ideological reformation. With nearly 80 percent of domestic consensus, this symbolic transition represents a desire for a more inclusive, progressive, and globally integrated Syria.

Internationally, Syria seeks to engage with the world not through coercion but through influence, aligning with Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. Ahmad al-Sharaa, in particular, has positioned himself as a leader committed to restoring the dignity and value of the Syrian passport and, by extension, the Syrian people. His rhetoric emphasizes diplomacy, cultural pride, and reconciliation over militarism.

This emerging political philosophy—rooted in the Damascus character—blends firmness with forgiveness, strength with subtlety, and history with hope. It resembles a well-played basketball game, where strategy, timing, and team coordination are more important than brute force. Leaders such as Ahmad al-Sharaa and Ahmad al-Shaibani are proving to be adept players on this new court, balancing ambition with realism and ideology with pragmatism.

In the near future, the involvement of major global powers—such as the anticipated visit of a future American president like Donald Trump to the Middle East—may bring dramatic developments. However, Syria seems poised to shape its destiny not merely through alliances or opposition, but through a mature and confident return to the values of civilization, reason, and renewal.

Session 5

Society and Culture

Gender Issue and Culture in the Middle East

- 1) Exploring Perceptions of Higher Education among Qatari Nationals:
Gender, Generational, and Cultural Dynamics

Woohyang Sim and Keiko Sakurai (Waseda University, Japan)

- 2) Trends and Challenges in Cultural Exchange between Korea and the Middle East

Eunji Kim (Institute of Middle East Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)


- 3) The Erosion of Iran's Middle Class and Its Impact on Democratic Movements

Qolamreza Nassr (Kinki University, Japan)



Exploring Perceptions of Higher Education among Qatari Nationals: Gender, Generational, and Cultural Dynamics

Woohyang Sim and Keiko Sakurai
Waseda University, Japan



Outline

1. Research Background and Objectives
2. Survey Methodology
3. Key Findings
4. Conclusion and Future Research

1

Research Background

Qatar National Vision 2030 & Importance of Higher Education

Qatar National Vision 2030




Human Development

Qatar aims to build a modern world-class educational system that provides students with a first-rate education, comparable to that offered anywhere. "Education is one of the basic pillars of social progress. The state shall ensure, foster and endeavor to spread it." Permanent Constitution

Qatar aims to build a modern world-class educational system that provides students with a first-rate education, comparable to that offered anywhere. "Education is one of the basic pillars of social progress. The state shall ensure, foster and endeavor to spread it." Permanent Constitution

School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) - Qatar



2

Research Background

Current Issues in Higher Education


- **Gender Gap in Higher Education**
 - Women consistently represent approximately 70% of university students.

Qatar has the largest gender disparity in higher education among GCC countries.

- **Generational Education Gap**
 - Significant educational attainment gap between older and younger generations.

Older generation had limited access to higher education during their youth.

Total number of registered Qatari male and female students in Qatar University (1973 -2020)



Sources: For 1973 to 1998, Qatari male and female figures (Qatar 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020). For 1999 to 2019, Qatari male and female figures (Qatar 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020). Data of female figures 2014-2019.

3

Literature Review

Educational Aspirations and Career Expectations

Sellami et al., 2024; Sellami et al., 2017 etc

Perceptions of Educational Quality and Accreditation

Benmansour, 2017 etc

4

Research Objectives and Questions

Objectives:

- To examine Qatari nationals' perceptions of university degrees.
- To explore expectations related to higher education and career prospects.
- To analyze how gender and generational differences in educational attainment influence perceptions of university degrees.

Key Research Questions:

- 1.How do Qatari nationals perceive the value of a university degree?
- 2.What differences exist in perceptions of university degrees across gender and generations?

5

Methodology

Quantitative

Research Collaboration:

- Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University
- Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies, Waseda University

Quality Assurance:

- Rigorous interviewer training and protocol adherence
- Remote monitoring of interview calls for data quality and consistency
- Gender-sensitive interviewing practices respecting cultural norms (female respondents interviewed exclusively by female interviewers)

6

Data Overview

Data Collection Method:

- Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system
- Interview Duration: Approximately 30 minutes per respondent
- Survey Period: October 13 to November 6, 2022

Survey Population & Sampling:

- Total respondents: 1,298 Qatari nationals
- Eligibility criteria: Qatari citizens, aged 18 and older, residing in Qatar


Data Analysis:

- Weighted Data: to adjust for the probability of selection and non-response
- The data were analyzed using STATA

7

Respondents' Gender Distribution

- Female: 51%
- Male: 49%




■ Male ■ Female

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Respondents' Age Distribution


- 18-24 years: 22%
- 25-34 years: 27%
(largest group)
- 35-44 years: 19%
- 45-54 years: 17%
- 55 years and above: 15%



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Respondents' Marital Status


- Married: 60%
- Never Married: 31%
- Other: 9%



10

Respondents' Educational Attainment

- High School or Less: 45%
- Undergraduate Degree: 46%
- Postgraduate Degree (Masters or Ph.D.): 9%



11

Perceived Value of University Education by gender

	Male	Female
University education helps to get a well-paid job in Qatar	95.28	97.16
University education helps to improve career opportunities in Qatar	93.94	94.72
University education promotes social prestige and status in Qatar	88.89	94.87
University education helps to build a good family relationship	76.26	80.63
University education helps achieve personal growth and development	96.64	98.73

* Percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with each statement

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Perceived Value of University Education by age

	24 or less	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and more
University education helps to get a well-paid job in Qatar	97.91	96.24	94.73	96.63	95.2
University education helps to improve career opportunities in Qatar	94.79	93.31	92.3	94.83	97.26
University education promotes social prestige and status in Qatar	89.3	91.18	91.78	96.68	92.18
University education helps to build a good family relationship	70.45	73.03	77.48	89.41	88.96
University education helps achieve personal growth and development	97.88	96.21	98.04	99.54	97.73

* Percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with each statement

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Perceptions of university education, marriage and family roll by gender

	Male	Female
In order to be a good wife, in general, it is better to have a university degree.	49.75	57.16
In order to be a good husband, in general, it is better to have a university degree.	62.57	65.57
In order to be a good mother, it is better to have a university degree.	49.27	53.05
In order to be a good father, it is better to have a university degree.	55.48	59.89
University graduates deserve a higher Mahar.	15.07	19.06
For men, having a job is more important than having a degree.	65.35	68.43

* Percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with each statement

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Perceptions of university education, marriage and family roll by age

	24 or less	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and more
In order to be a good wife, in general, it is better to have a university degree.	60.00	45.07	47.66	55.26	63.3
In order to be a good husband, in general, it is better to have a university degree.	62.38	58.24	63.02	69.38	71.91
In order to be a good mother, it is better to have a university degree.	43.18	43.79	51.8	60.51	64.22
In order to be a good father, it is better to have a university degree.	49.81	51.97	58.26	62.92	72.73
University graduates deserve a higher Mahar.	24.11	14.63	11.65	13.68	21.31
For men, having a job is more important than having a degree.	64.52	67.6	67.3	70.56	64.73

* Percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with each statement

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Key Results

1. Personal Growth and Development:

Respondents overwhelmingly agree (over 95% across all age groups and genders) that having a university degree significantly contributes to personal growth and self-development.

2. Employment Opportunities and Income:

University degrees are consistently viewed as essential for securing high-paying jobs and enhancing employment opportunities. This belief is uniformly strong, with agreement rates above 95% among all age groups and genders.

3. Social Prestige and Status:

Most respondents also believe that obtaining a university degree substantially elevates social prestige and status. This perception is particularly strong among women and older respondents, who emphasize the role of education in improving social standing.


4. Gender:

Women tend to place greater importance on the role of university degrees in fulfilling traditional family and societal roles, particularly regarding being a good wife and mother. Men, although also highly valuing university education, show slightly more emphasis on economic and employment benefits, but this difference did not reach statistical significance.

5. Generation:

Younger generations regard university degrees primarily as vital for personal development and initial entry into professional life. However, Older generations place stronger emphasis on traditional family roles and maintaining social prestige through higher education.

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Trends and Challenges in Cultural Exchange between Korea and the Middle East

Eunji Kim

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Cultural cooperation between Korea and the Middle East has witnessed significant expansion in recent years. While earlier interactions were predominantly limited to the political and economic domains, they have increasingly extended into the spheres of culture and the arts. Since the emergence of the Korean Wave (Hallyu) in the 1990s, global interest in Korean culture, initially focused on K-pop and television dramas, has broadened to include a diverse range of cultural expressions. This trend is also evident in the Middle East. Over the past decade, the number of fans of Korean culture in the Middle East and North Africa region has increased by approximately 130%. This steady rate of growth reflects the region's growing interest in Korea and its culture.

This study aims to analyze the evolving patterns of cultural exchange between Korea and the Middle East by systematically categorizing and comparing cultural and artistic events held in both regions. In Addition, relevant datasets and reports will be reviewed, and interview findings concerning the popularity of the Korean Wave will be analyzed to evaluate the level of interest in Korean culture within Middle Eastern societies. The scope of this analysis is limited to the public sector, with a particular focus on government institutions and affiliated organizations. To ensure a comprehensive and data-driven approach, this study draws upon materials published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea Foundation, the Korean Cultural Center, and the Korea Creative Content Agency. In contrast, the private sector will be addressed through selected case studies, rather than through an exhaustive analysis.

Despite the growing interest in Korean culture in the Middle East, Korea's engagement with Middle Eastern culture remains relatively limited. Although there have been some recent signs of increased attention, research on this subject is still insufficient. This study seeks to examine

Korean interest in the Middle Eastern culture and to identify key areas in which strengthened cultural cooperation between the two regions could prove mutually beneficial. This imbalance in cultural engagement highlights the need for a more diversified cultural exchange framework. While Korean cultural exports such as K-pop, dramas and films have attracted widespread interest in the Middle East, Korean society's awareness and understanding of the Middle Eastern culture remain minimal.

Such asymmetry may hinder the development of deeper intercultural understanding and limit opportunities for sustainable collaboration. Promoting a more balanced exchange could not only contribute to enriching Korea's multicultural discourse but also contribute to building long-term partnerships with the Middle East. Encouraging academic initiatives, media collaboration, and youth cultural exchange program may serve as effective instruments for cultivating mutual respect and recognition between two regions. In recent years, the concept of public diplomacy has increasingly been emphasized as distinct from the concept of traditional diplomacy. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public diplomacy is defined as "diplomatic activities that promote diplomatic relations and enhance the national image and brand by directly communicating with foreign publics and building trust in the country's history, traditions, culture, art, values, policies, and vision." While there are ongoing debates regarding whether culture should be regarded as a means or an end within the context of cultural diplomacy, there is broad consensus that culture plays a vital role in public diplomacy and exerts a direct influence on the enhancement of a nation's soft power.

The collection of cultural and artistic event cases in this study draws on the *Global Hallyu Status* report, published annually by the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange. This report compiles information on the status of the Korean Wave (Hallyu) across countries worldwide. It not only provides data on the global spread of Hallyu, but also documents major cultural events held in each country on an annual basis. As the report is based on information submitted by Korean diplomatic missions abroad, it serves as a primary source for identifying cultural and artistic events organized or supported by the Korean government and major public institutions. To trace recent trends and shifts in Korea's cultural diplomacy, this study compares and analyzes cultural and artistic event data compiled in the *Global Hallyu Status* reports published from 2012 to the present.

The Erosion of Iran's Middle Class and Its Impact on Democratic Movements

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Introduction

Historically, Iran's middle class has been instrumental in shaping the trajectory of democratic movements. Its role as a socio-economic buffer and an intellectual driver positioned it as a catalyst for reform and political mobilization. However, this once-vibrant force is now in retreat. This paper explores the socio-economic transformations and political disillusionment that have eroded Iran's middle class and critically assesses the implications of this erosion for democratic participation in Iran.

The Decline of the Middle Class: Economic Roots

Over the past decade, Iran has experienced a sharp contraction in its middle-class population. Two central causes drive this decline: persistent economic mismanagement and the devastating effects of international sanctions. Inflation, currency devaluation, high unemployment, and reduced purchasing power have systematically undermined the financial autonomy of middle-income families. Previously stable sectors such as education, healthcare, and small enterprise have been destabilized, pushing many middle-class citizens into lower economic strata.

This socio-economic descent has not only diminished material well-being but has also reshaped class identity. The shrinking middle class is no longer economically empowered to engage in civic life, support reformist platforms, or maintain independent political voices. Economic survival has

become paramount, often replacing political involvement with apathy.

The Political Consequences: Disillusionment and Apathy

Economic hardship is compounded by a deepening political crisis. Years of unfulfilled promises by reformist leaders, coupled with growing authoritarianism and systemic corruption, have led to a widespread erosion of political trust. The once-dynamic reformist discourse has lost credibility among much of the middle class, who now view institutional politics as ineffectual or complicit.

This disillusionment manifests in various forms: declining voter turnout, withdrawal from protest movements, and a retreat from political dialogue in public and private spaces. Iran's middle class, once the backbone of student activism, civil society, and cultural critique, now exhibits signs of quietism and disengagement. The social capital necessary for democratic mobilization is increasingly fragmented.

From Engine to Obstacle: A Reversal of Roles

The middle class traditionally serves as a stabilizing force in democratizing societies, promoting the rule of law, tolerance, and pluralism. In Iran, however, the current trajectory marks a reversal of this trend. The diminished capacity and will of the middle class to lead or support democratic initiatives have created a vacuum that authoritarian structures have swiftly exploited. Repression has increased with relatively little organized resistance, and political space has narrowed without effective contestation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The erosion of Iran's middle class is not merely an economic crisis—it is a structural transformation with profound political consequences. Restoring its role in democratic processes requires both domestic reform and a reconsideration of international strategies that inadvertently harm civil society. Targeted socio-economic support, renewed efforts toward transparency and justice, and the re-engagement of intellectual leadership are essential.

This study calls for a reexamination of democratization strategies in contexts where economic collapse and authoritarianism intersect. Iran's experience may serve as a cautionary tale for other Middle Eastern nations undergoing similar transitions, where the survival of the middle class is closely tied to the prospects of democratic development.

Keywords: Middle Class Decline, Democratic Movements, Political Apathy, Economic Inequality,

Iran, Authoritarianism, Reformist Disillusionment, Sanctions, Political Trust, Socio-Economic Transformation

Session 6

Language and Literature

AI and Language-Literature in the Middle East

- 1) A Comparative Study on Korean-Arabic Machine Translation of Press Releases:
Focusing on Proper Nouns and Terminology

Jungmin Jo (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

- 2) The Importance of Using The Speaking Avatar Powered by Generative
Artificial Intelligence in Activating the Arabic-Korean Interpretation and
Translation Activities

Reham Abdelsalam (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

- 3) Narrative Manifestation of Historical Trauma in Sinan Antoon's Novels

Hyunho Yoon (Dankuk University, Korea)



A Comparative Study on Korean-Arabic Machine Translation of Press Releases: Focusing on Proper Nouns and Terminology

Jungmin Jo

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea




محتويات العرض

- I. المقدمة
- II. الدراسات السابقة
- III. محتوى البحث
 1. عينة البحث
 2. منهجية البحث
- IV. نتائج البحث
- V. المراجع

I. المقدمة

I. المقدمة

تحديات جديدة أم فرص واعدة في مجال الترجمة؟



I. المقدمة

هل سيحل الذكاء الاصطناعي محل البشر؟

ضرورة الاستفادة من تقنيات الذكاء الاصطناعي لتحويل التحديات التي تواجه مجال الترجمة إلى فرص حقيقية وواعدة

- استخدام الترجمة الآلية القائمة على الذكاء الاصطناعي كأداة مفيدة لتعزيز كفاءة وأداء عملية الترجمة
- تعزيز القدرات الجوهرية الأساسية التي تحتاج إليها المترجم البشري لتمكينه من التحقق من محدودية الترجمة الآلية وتدقيق أخطائها

II. الدراسات السابقة

II. الدراسات السابقة

- كواك سون ليه (2024). "دراسة مقارنة لترجمة الحوار الطبي من الكورية إلى العربية بين Google و ChatGPT، اللغة العربية وآدابها، المجلد 28، العدد 2، 23-49.
- كواك سون ليه (2022). "دراسة حول الترجمة الآلية من الكورية إلى العربية: مع التركيز على النصوص غير الأدبية"، اللغة العربية وآدابها، المجلد 26، العدد 2، 65-87.
- كيم جونغ أوو (2023). "بعض الاقتراحات المتعلقة بترجمة المصطلحات"، مجلة الدراسات الإنسانية، العدد 61، 85-107.
- شين سو كها (2025). "دراسة تعليم استراتيجيات ترجمة المصطلحات باستخدام الترجمة التعليمية من العربية إلى الكورية"، اللغة العربية وآدابها، المجلد 29، العدد 1، 85-102.
- آن، هي يون & هونغ سو يون (2025). "تقييم أداء محركات الترجمة بالذكاء الاصطناعي - مع التركيز على المحادثات الطبية الكورية-العربية"، مجلة الجمعية الكورية للدراسات الإسلامية، المجلد 35، العدد 1، 233-258.
- لي كيه يون (2021). "تدريس الترجمة إلى اللغة العربية باستخدام تقنية ما بعد التحرير"، دراسات تعليم الترجمة الشفوية والتحريرية، المجلد 19، العدد 1، 81-106.
- جو جونغ مين (2024). "دراسة حول مدى إمكانية تطبيق الترجمة الآلية من الكورية إلى العربية في ترجمة الخطابات: مقارنة بين Google Translate و ChatGPT و Papago، دراسات قضايا الشرق الأوسط، المجلد 23، العدد 3، 89-114.
- تشوي هيو أون (2022). "تحليل أنماط الأخطاء في ترجمة المصطلحات في الترجمة الآلية من الكورية إلى الإنجليزية - دراسة لترجمة Google، الدراسات اللغوية، المجلد 27، العدد 1، 217-244.

III. محتوى البحث

III. محتوى البحث

1. عينة البحث – البيان الصحفي

البيان الصحفي المنشور على الموقع الرسمي لوزارة الاقتصاد والمالية في جمهورية كوريا بشأن انعقاد "الدورة الثامنة للجنة الاقتصادية المشتركة بين كوريا والإمارات العربية المتحدة"

(https://www.moef.go.kr/nw/nes/detailNesDtaView.do?searchBbsId1=MOSFBBS_00000000028&searchNttId1=MOSF_000000000064796&menuNo=4010100)

تم اختيار هذا البيان الصحفي نظرًا لأهمية دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة في علاقات كوريا مع العالم العربي، كما يتضمن هذا البيان عددًا كبيرًا من أسماء العلم والمصطلحات المتخصصة مثل أسماء الوزارات والمؤسسات والاتفاقيات والمشاريع.

참고 1

「제8차 한-UAE 경제공동위」 주요 내용

1. 제8차 한-아랍에미리트(UAE) 경제공동위 개요

- 한국과 아랍에미리트(이하 UAE) 양국은 「제8차 한-UAE 경제공동위」를 7월 6일(목), 서울에서 개최하였다.
 - * 한-UAE 경제공동위는 '06년에 양국 정상이 합의하여 설치한 기획재정부와 UAE 경제부간 장관급 회의체로서, 범부처 차원의 협력 사안을 총괄·조정하는 경제협력 채널
 - 이번 회의는 5년 만에 대면으로 개최되었으며, 올해 초 정상회담을 계기로 양국의 협력 의지가 어느 때보다 강한 만큼, 양국 모두 높은 관심을 보였다.
 - * (1차) '07.6월 (2차) '10.5월 (3차) '12.5월, (4차) '14.4월 (5차) '16.5월 (6차) '18.3월 (7차: 영상) '20.9월
 - 한국측에서는 추경호 부총리 겸 기획재정부 장관을 수석대표로 산업부, 국토부, 외교부, 중기부, 복지부, 문체부, 식약처, 특허청, 통계청 등 경제부처 국장급이 참석하였다.
 - UAE측에서는 압둘라 빈 투크 알 마리 경제부 장관을 수석대표로, 외교부, 통계청, 우주청, 무바달라, 원자력공사(ENEC), 수출신용보험공사(ECI), 칼리파경제지구(KEZAD), 연방상공회의소(FCCI) 등 20여명의 대표단이 한국을 방문하였다.


III. محتوى البحث

1. عينة البحث - أدوات الترجمة الآلية القائمة على الذكاء الاصطناعي




III. محتوى البحث

2. منهجية البحث



IV. نتائج البحث

IV. نتائج البحث



IV. نتائج البحث

ST: 경제공동위는 추경호 부총리와 아랍에미리트(UAE) 알 마리 경제부장관을 수석대표로 하는 경제분야 최고위급 회의체로



V. المراجع

V. المراجع

- كوك سون ليه (2024). "دراسة مقارنة لترجمة الحوار الطبي من الكورية إلى العربية بين Google و ChatGPT، اللغة العربية وآدابها، المجلد 28، العدد 2، 23-49.
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<https://openai.com/index/chatgpt/> (تاريخ البحث: 2025. 5. 1)

<https://translate.google.co.kr/?hl=ar&tab=wT&sl=ko&tl=ar&op=translate> (تاريخ البحث: 2025. 5. 1)


https://www.moef.go.kr/nw/nes/detailNesDtaView.do?searchBbsId1=MOSFBBS_00000000028&searchNttId1=MOSF_00000000064796&menuNo=4010100 (تاريخ البحث: 2024. 12. 30)

شکرا جزىلا على حسن استماعکم



The importance of using the speaking avatar feature in activating the Arabic-Korean interpretation and translation training activities

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Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea



- المقدمة.
- الذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي: نظرة عامة.
- الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي.
- أمثلة تطبيقية للأنشطة الصفية باستخدام الأفاتار الناطق في الترجمة العربية الكورية.
- مقارنة بين بعض تطبيقات الذكاء الاصطناعي الخاصة بتقنية الأفاتار الناطق.
- مزايا استخدام الأفاتار الناطق في الأنشطة الصفية.
- التحديات التقنية عند استخدام الأفاتار الناطق.
- نتائج الاستبانة الخاصة باستخدام تقنية الأفاتار الناطق في صفوف الترجمة العربية الكورية.
- الخاتمة.
- قائمة المراجع.

By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

يشهد العالم تحولاً رقمياً متسارعاً، وتتغلغل تقنيات الذكاء الاصطناعي في مختلف جوانب حياتنا، بما في ذلك مجالات التعليم والترجمة. يبرز الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي كأداة واعدة تجمع بين القدرة على توليد الكلام البشري والتفاعل المرئي، مما يفتح آفاقاً جديدة في كيفية تقديم المحتوى التعليمي وتسهيل عملية التواصل عبر اللغات.



تهدف هذا الدراسة التجريبية إلى تقديم تعريف شامل للذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي واستعراض تطبيقاته المتنوعة، مع التركيز بشكل خاص على إمكانية استخدام الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بهذه التقنية في الأنشطة الصفية لمادة الترجمة العربية الكورية. كما ستسلط هذه الدراسة الضوء على المزايا والتحديات المحتملة التي تواجه تطوير وتطبيق هذه النماذج. وكذلك عرض لنتائج الاستبانة الخاصة باستخدام تقنية الأفاتار الناطق في صفوف الترجمة العربية الكورية في جامعة هانكوك للدراسات الأجنبية بحرم "يونغ إن".

By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

الذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي: نظرة عامة:

التعريف:

"الذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي (Generative AI) يشير إلى نماذج الذكاء الاصطناعي القادرة على إنتاج بيانات جديدة تحاكي خصائص البيانات التي تم تدريبها عليها. وهذه البيانات الجديدة يمكن أن تتضمن نصوصًا، صورًا، أصواتًا، مقاطع فيديو، أو أي أنواع أخرى من البيانات."

أهم التطبيقات الحالية للذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي:

1. توليد النصوص ومعالجتها.
2. توليد الصور والرسومات.
3. توليد الأصوات والموسيقى.
4. توليد الفيديو والرسوم المتحركة.



By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam


الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي:

تعريف الأفاتار الناطق ودوره في التفاعل البشري الآلي:

الأفاتار الناطق هو تمثيل رقمي ثنائي الأبعاد (2D) أو ثلاثي الأبعاد (3D) لشخصية افتراضية يمكنها التحدث والتعبير عن المشاعر بشكل مرئي، وهذه الشخصية قادرة على نطق الكلمات والجمل بصوت بشري (أو اصطناعي)، بالإضافة إلى إظهار تعابير الوجه والإيماءات التي تتناسب مع الكلام المنطوق، مما يجعلها واجهة تفاعلية تجمع بين الصوت والصورة لتقديم المعلومات أو التفاعل مع المستخدم.

أهم خصائص الأفاتار الناطق:

- القدرة على توليد الكلام.
- التعبير المرئي.
- مزامنة الشفاه مع الصوت.
- التفاعل (في بعض الحالات).



By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي:



أمثلة تطبيقية للأنشطة الصفية باستخدام الأفاتار الناطق في الترجمة العربية الكورية:

- محاكاة حوارات ثنائية اللغة: يقوم الأفاتار بدور المتحدث بالعربية ويطلب من الطلاب ترجمة كلامه إلى الكورية، أو العكس.
- عرض مقاطع فيديو أو نصوص قصيرة: يقوم الأفاتار بتقديم المحتوى ويطلب من الطلاب ترجمته شفهيًا أو كتابيًا.
- تمارين المقارنة بين التراكيب اللغوية: يعرض الأفاتار جملًا متشابهة في المعنى ولكن مختلفة في التركيب بين اللغتين ويطلب من الطلاب تحليلها.
- ألعاب تفاعلية للتعرف على المفردات والعبارات: يستخدم الأفاتار الصور أو السياقات لتقديم المفردات ويطلب من الطلاب تسميتها باللغة الأخرى.



By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي:



أسرة سام



By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

مقارنة بين بعض تطبيقات الذكاء الاصطناعي الخاصة بتقنية الأفاتار الناطق



اسم التطبيق	الخصائص	الاستخدام	دعم اللغة العربية	مجانية الاستخدام
HeyGen	إنشاء شخصيات رقمية في مقاطع فيديو	تقديم محتوى تعليمي مرئي	نعم	تجربتي
D-ID	تحويل النصوص إل فيديو بوجه ناطق	تقديم محتوى تعليمي مرئي	نعم	محدود
Vidnoz	تحويل النصوص الى فيديوهات بأفاتار ناطق	إنشاء مقاطع فيديو تعليمية مخصصة وديناميكية	نعم	مجاني جزئيا

مزايا استخدام الأفاتار الناطق في الأنشطة الصفية:

- زيادة التفاعل والمشاركة.
- توفير تجربة تعليمية تتناسب مع الفروق الفردية.
- تجاوز الحواجز اللغوية والثقافية.
- إتاحة الوصول إلى التعليم في أي وقت ومكان.
- توفير بيئة تعليمية آمنة ومريحة.

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التحديات التقنية عند استخدام الأفاتار الناطق:



١. دقة مزامنة الشفاه مع الصوت (Lip Sync Accuracy):

- تعقيد النظام الصوتي العربي.
- تعدد اللهجات.
- الحروف المتشابهة في الكتابة والمختلفة في النطق.

٢. جودة توليد الصوت باللغة العربية (Text-to-Speech Quality):

- التشكيل.
- التعامل مع الكلمات غير المشكّلة.
- علامات الترقيم.
- الطبيعية والانسيابية.
- التعبير والتنغيم.

٣. فهم اللغة العربية ومعالجتها (Natural Language Understanding - NLU):

- التعقيد النحوي والصرفي.
- الغموض في اللغة.
- التعامل مع اللهجات العامية.

By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

الأفكار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي:



مزايا استخدام الأفكار الناطق في الأنشطة الصفية:

- زيادة التفاعل والمشاركة.
- توفير تجربة تعليمية تتناسب مع الفروق الفردية.
- تجاوز الحواجز اللغوية والثقافية.
- إتاحة الوصول إلى التعليم في أي وقت ومكان.
- توفير بيئة تعليمية آمنة ومريحة.

التحديات التقنية عند استخدام الأفكار الناطق:

- اختلاف الأبجدية وأنظمة الكتابة.
- الاختلافات النحوية والصرفية الجذرية.
- التباينات الثقافية والسياقية التي تؤثر على المعنى.
- صعوبة إيجاد موارد تعليمية تفاعلية تجمع بين اللغتين.

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نتائج الاستبانة الخاصة باستخدام تقنية الأفكار الناطق في صفوف الترجمة العربية الكورية



شارك في هذه الاستبانة ٢٠ طالبًا وطالبة من طلاب قسم الترجمة العربية في جامعة هانكوك للدراسات الأجنبية بحرم "يونغ إن" في مادة "الترجمة العربية الكورية ١"، ٢٠٢٤ خلال الفصل الدراسي الثاني لعام ٢٠٢٤ والفصل الدراسي الأول للعام الجاري.

(١) هل سبق لك استخدام أفكار ناطق في أي سياق تعليمي من قبل؟

- نعم
- لا

(٢) إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، فهل كان ذلك تجربة إيجابية أم سلبية بشكل عام؟

- إيجابية جدًا
- إيجابية إلى حد ما
- محايدة
- سلبية إلى حد ما
- سلبية جدًا

(٣) إلى أي مدى ساعدك الأفكار الناطق في فهم الأنشطة الصفية وممارستها في الصف؟

- ساعدني كثيرًا
- ساعدني إلى حد ما
- لم يساعدني كثيرًا
- لم يساعدني على الإطلاق

By: Dr. Reham Abdelsalam

نتائج الاستبانة الخاصة باستخدام تقنية الأفاتار الناطق في صفوف الترجمة العربية الكورية



٤) ما مدى جاذبية الأفاتار الناطق في الحفاظ على اهتمامك ومشاركتك في الأنشطة الصفية؟

- جذاب جدًا
- جذاب إلى حد ما.
- محايد.
- غير جذاب إلى حد ما.
- غير جذاب على الإطلاق.

٥) هل شعرت أن الأفاتار الناطق جعل الأنشطة الصفية أكثر تفاعلية؟

- نعم، بالتأكيد
- نعم، إلى حد ما.
- لا، لم أشعر بذلك.
- لا، على الإطلاق.

٦) ما مدى سهولة فهم لغة الأفاتار الناطق ونبرة صوته؟

- سهلة جدًا
- سهلة إلى حد ما.
- محايدة.
- صعبة إلى حد ما.
- صعبة جدًا.

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نتائج الاستبانة الخاصة باستخدام تقنية الأفاتار الناطق في صفوف الترجمة العربية الكورية



٧) هل تعتقد أن وجود الأفاتار الناطق أضاف قيمة إلى الأنشطة الصفية؟

- نعم، قيمة كبيرة
- نعم، قيمة معينة.
- لم يضيف قيمة كبيرة.
- لم يضيف أي قيمة.

٨) هل تفضل وجود أفاتار ناطق في المزيد من الأنشطة الصفية المستقبلية؟

- نعم، بالتأكيد
- نعم، إلى حد ما.
- لست متأكدًا.
- لا، ليس بالضرورة.
- لا، على الإطلاق.

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وهكذا تكون هذه الدراسة التجريبية قد ألقت الضوء على استخدام الأفاتار الناطق المدعوم بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي، وكيف يمكن أن تحدث تحولاً إيجابياً في الأنشطة الصفية لمادة الترجمة العربية الكورية، وذلك من خلال تقديم أمثلة تطبيقية باستخدام الأفاتار الناطق في الأنشطة الصفية لمادة الترجمة العربية-الكورية. وكذلك عرض المزايا والتحديات المحتملة التي تواجه تطوير وتطبيق هذه النماذج. كما خلصت الدراسة إلى أهمية استخدام تطبيقات الأفاتار الناطق المدعومة بالذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي في تفعيل الأنشطة الصفية وذلك من خلال عرض لنتائج الاستبانة الخاصة بتطبيق هذا النوع من نماذج الذكاء الاصطناعي التوليدي على طلاب مادة الترجمة العربية-الكورية بجامعة هانوك للدراسات الأجنبية (حرم يونغ إن). وختاماً تقترح الدراسة إجراء المزيد من البحوث والدراسات العلمية لتقييم فاعلية استخدام الأفاتار الناطق في تحسين مستويات المتعلمين اللغوية، وتطوير أفضل الممارسات لتطبيقه في البيئات التعليمية المختلفة لتحقيق أقصى استفادة من هذه الإمكانيات.

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Narrative Manifestation of Historical Trauma in Sinan Antoon's Novels

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التجليات السردية للصدمة التاريخية في روايات سنان أنطون*

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ترمي هذه الدراسة إلى الوقوف على بحث تأثير ما يُعرف بالصدمة التاريخية على الروايات الأربع للروائي العراقي سنان أنطون (١٩٦٧-)، من خلال تحليل العناصر القصصية، والبنى السردية، والصور الفنية التي تولدها اللغة. ويستند هذا التحليل إلى فرضية مفادها أن الصدمة التاريخية تؤثر على طريقة تشكل الأعمال الروائية عندما تتجلى فيها، تماما كما تؤثر على طريقة تشكل البنى النفسية والذهنية لدى جماعة بشرية تعيش تداعياتها.

وتبدأ هذه الدراسة -قبل الدخول في تحليل الأعمال الروائية المعنية بالبحث- بتمهيد الطريق للتعرف على بعض المفاهيم النظرية في الفصل الأول الموسوم بـ "السرد وإعادة كتابة التاريخ: المفهوم والظاهرة"، حيث يُعنى بمفهوم التاريخ ومسألة تمثيله سرديا وما تكتسبه من أهمية. كما يتناول الفصل أيضا مفهوم الصدمة التاريخية وخصائصها، بوصفها مدخلا لفهم آليات حضورها في الأعمال الروائية.

ثم، تستلظ الدراسة في الفصل الثاني الضوء على التمثيلات السردية والبنائية لعناصر الروائية، من خلال تقسيم المباحث إلى أربعة محاور: (١) الأحداث، (٢) الزمان، (٣) الفضاء، (٤) الشخصية؛ وذلك في سياق تأثير عناصر القص هذه بالسمات المحيطة للصدمة التاريخية.

- **المحور الأول (الأحداث):** يتفرّع إلى جزأين، يُعنى أولهما بتمثيل الصدمة التاريخية وملاحها في تقديم الأحداث من خلال تقاطع القصة الواعية مع القصة اللاواعية، بينما يتناول الثاني تمثيل الصدمة التاريخية وملاحها في عرض الأحداث بالتقاطع مع نصوص أخرى واردة من خارج المتن الروائية.

- **المحور الثاني (الزمان):** يركّز على ظواهر البناء الزمني وخصائصه في الروايات، حيث يتعرّض التسلسل الزمني لانقطاعات عشوائية وتلقائية. وبناء على ذلك، يهتم المبحث بخصوصية الزمن

* هذا البحث مستمّد من أطروحة الدكتوراه الخاصة بالباحث.

الروائي، مع التركيز على حضور كلٍّ من الذاكرة الصادمة والبواطن الداخلية في الحظة الحاضر السردية.

- **المحور الثالث (الفضاء):** يعالج الفضاء الروائي بأنواعه المختلفة في الروايات في دائرة علاقاته بالصدمة التاريخية؛ وذلك بتقسيمه إلى نوعين: أولهما الفضاء الواقعي المرجعي، هو فضاء موجود في الواقع الحقيقي الذي تعيش فيه الشخصيات الروائية مثل السجن، والمدارس والجامعات، والأماكن الدينية، والشوارع، وسواها. والآخر هو الفضاء التخيلي المفترض، ومعناه فضاء لا يوجد إلا عبر خيال الشخصيات ورؤاها الحلمية الوهمية نتيجة لكثافة النوازع الداخلية النفسية عندها.

- **المحور الرابع والأخير (الشخصيات):** يسلط الضوء على الشخصيات الروائية، سواء أكانت رئيسية أم ثانوية، علماً بأنها بدون استثناء- تقع حياتها فريسة للمآسي التاريخية التي مرّ بها العراق، ألا وهي ما يُعرف في اصطلاح جورج لوكاش بـ"الأبطال الإشكاليون". فيسعى المبحث إلى الكشف عن خصائص هذه الشخصيات والدلالات الخفية التي تحملها من خلال علاقتها بما يطرأ على ما حولها؛ وذلك عبر تصنيفها إلى ثلاثة أنواع: (١) الشخصية ذات الكثافة النفسية، (٢) الشخصية النازفة (الضحية جسدياً ومادياً)، (٣) الشخصية المغتربة والمهاجرة قسراً.

ويركّز الفصل الثالث والأخير، تحت عنوان "الصدمة التاريخية وتأثيرها على الخطاب اللغوي للسرد"، على استكشاف التجليات اللغوية في ثلاث صور رئيسية: (١) الاستعارية، (٢) الرمزية، (٣) الحسية، بالإضافة إلى تفسير ما تنطوي عليه هذه التجليات من دلالات ومغازٍ كامنة؛ وذلك -بالتالي- من خلال ثلاثة محاور تحليلية استناداً إلى ثلاثة أبعاد صورية تم ذكرها آنفاً.

- **البعد الاستعاري:** ينقسم في البحث إلى ثلاث صور: الموت، والعنف، والعاطفة (الحالة الداخلية والنفسية). تظهر الاستعارة في روايات سنان أنطون كتجَلٍّ لغوي ينبثق من تصوّر الشخصيات لما يحيط بها من عالم خارجي، وما تنطوي عليه من عالم داخلي، أي نواتها. ومن هنا، تسهم الاستعارة في التعبير عن مظاهر الحياة المؤلمة الناتجة عن الصدمة التاريخية التي تزيد على الحد المقبول، والتي لا يمكن تمثيلها ضمن نظام اللغة العادية التي تُستخدم للتواصل المباشر والإفهام والإيضاح.

- **البعد الرمزي:** يقسّم البحث إلى نوعين رئيسيين: الرموز الطبيعية، والرموز الحيوانية. ويستفيد سنان أنطون من البنية الرمزية للغة في تمثيل الصدمة التاريخية؛ إذ حين يأتي بالصورة الطبيعية والحيوانية في النص، لا يستعملها كما هي بدلالاتها المباشرة، بل يحملها ببعد رمزي إيحائي بما يتناسب والسياق الروائي.

- **البعد الحسي:** يتناول البحث من خلال تصنيفه إلى خمسة صور حسية، هي: البصرية، والسمعية، والذوقية، واللمسية، والشمية. ولا تقتصر هذه الصور كلها على الدلالة المادية الحسية فحسب، بل يُعاد بناؤها

وتركيبتها لتوليد دلالات جديدة ترتقي إلى مستوى يمكن فيه التعبير عن الصدمة التاريخية بصورة غير مباشرة ولكن أكثر تأثيرًا.

يخلص البحث إلى مجموعة من النتائج المستقاة من تحليل ما تمت الإشارة إليه في الفصول السابقة.

