A Role of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in Peaceful Resolution of Disputes and Creating Peace Regimes: The Case of Cyprus

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Key words: Confidence Building Measures(CBM), Conflict Resolution, Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkey

I. Introduction

With the end of the Cold War structure, the international situation has undergone historic changes. At the global level, confrontation seems to have given way to conciliation and cooperation. Many states are seeking more open forms of economic policy, creating a worldwide sense of dynamism and movement. But at the regional level, ethnic, religious and even ideological rivalries are still erupting into conflicts in various parts of the world. As a result, the necessity of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is increasing and becoming unlimited in scope. CBMs are not made just to negotiate the military-security arena, but have been developed as measures
to promote economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation. CBMs are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. It is important to underline the role of CBMs in creating a peace regime. The motivation for CBMs arises primarily from a shared concern about the tension in the security environment and the risk of its escalation. Under such circumstances, CBMs offer a viable alternative by providing a channel of communication to prevent escalation into conflict and, at the same time, insulation from volatile political dynamics (Sood 1995, 134).

The function of CBMs has been defined as the “communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats” (Mottola 1993, 132). This formulation dates from the days of cold war division in Europe, when large active forces with offensive capabilities faced each other in the central front and posed a permanent threat of surprise attack. Its function derives from shadow of future.\(^1\) Communication enhances transparency, which is by no means inimical to true confidence building. Indeed, what spurs on the arms race is suspicion. Mistrust generates arms race and the arms race in turn generates suspicion. Communication helps groups to establish trust and overcome fear and threat. It provides groups with more information about the opposing group and its expected choices. In other words, communication provides groups with a mechanism to focus on or coordinate their expectations on one particular equilibrium, the mutual cooperation equilibrium (Majeski & Fricks 1995, 628). As Stephen J Majeski and Shane Fricks’ showed in their experiment, when groups cannot communicate, mutual cooperative outcomes occur about 25% of the time. This increases dramatically to 75% of the time when groups can communicate with each other (ibid. 639, 641).\(^2\) Openness, however, should not be an end itself; rather, it should be an instrument for confidence building. Poor communication between states is a major impediment in acting and reacting prudently in the face of apparent provocations.

Accordingly, the overall objective of this article is to explore how CBMs can provide a communication channel and seek common ground, and narrow the gap

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\(^1\) Players are more likely to cooperate if the stakes in any round are low and they expect to play many more times. - if the “shadow of future” is long. For more information see a concept of “shadow of future”.

\(^2\) Stephen J Majeski and Shane Fricks showed how the role of communication is important between states for cooperation. They conducted 79 rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and tested the effect of communication. Results indicate that groups cooperate more and defect less when they can communicate. According to their experiment, communication appears to be a good mechanism for alleviating fear. For more information see their article.
between the confronting states. It attempts to illustrate how it can help states to build trust and reduce tension, not only as a means to avoid wars but also a device of reconciliation and normalization. Further, it will examine how CBMs can facilitate to achieve peaceful co-existence after protracting inter-group conflict by using cases. The main discussion and analysis will be the role of CBMs in creating peace regime and their use by key players.

Rakesh Sood argues, there is no global CBM formula which can be automatically applied in all situations. He observes that often, the forum itself becomes as important as what is being discussed within it (Sood 1995, 137). Many regions are now quietly but actively engaged in the negotiation and implementation of CBMs, each region tailoring the process to suit its unique circumstances. The inputs shaping the confidence-building process in each region have been different. The richness of each regional experience, however, suggests that some utility may be derived from comparative evaluation. Some suitably adapted borrowing from region to region may be in order. Over time, for example, the multilateral arms control and regional security talks in the Middle East may provide useful instruction on how to forge confidence building on a multilateral level in other regions. Certain aspects of the Argentine-Brazilian experience in nuclear confidence building may prove helpful in shaping a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East or South Asia, as some analysts have already begun to consider (Al-Ashaal 1993, 78). And in South Asia, where progress toward confidence building has been frozen by political leaders, progress in other regions can serve as a useful goad. Therefore, CBM packages need to be tailored to specific situations. The more it is attuned from the other cases, in terms of obligation and commitments, to specific perceptions, the more effective is the measure likely to be (ibid., 137).

There are not many clear-cut cases of divided countries. One may list Korea, Cyprus, China, Ireland, Samoa, Germany and Yemen in the past, and few others. Each one of them has distinctive features, was and is influenced by different political environments. Among those cases, this article will evaluate the use of CBMs in Cyprus, and explore the potential relevance of CBMs in creating peace regime.

II. Confidence building Measures in Peace Building

The concept of CBM was first put forward in January 1973 at the preparatory consultation in Helsinki to establish an agenda for the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It is true that confidence-building measures, it is often observed, are an outgrowth of the cold war era. In fact, however, it was the cold war’s gradual decline from the 1950s and 1960s that permitted confidence-building diplomacy to proceed in Europe, from the first steps of the Helsinki Final Act to the achievements of Stockholm, Vienna and other negotiations which occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result of this progression, we have witnessed a substantial enlargement in the scope of confidence-building activities to encompass aspects of confidence- and security-building measures as well.

It is a moot point whether CBMs were the key factor in bringing about the end of the Cold War, but there is no doubt that CBMs played an important role in improving cooperation, reducing tension and opening up East-West relations (Sood 1995, 133). During the 1980s, the subject of CBMs assumed a higher profile in the United Nations disarmament agenda. A number of resolutions on CBMs were adopted by the General Assembly during the last ten years.

While some may view CBMs as an East-West product that cannot be exported to other regions, in fact, almost all regions have implemented measures to reduce tensions or resolve disputes. These measures were implemented before the Cold War even began - although these arrangements were not called confidence-building measures at the time (ibid., 135). Consequently, viewing CBMs as only an East-West product is an excessively narrow view. Many regions are now quietly but actively engaged in the negotiation and implementation of CBMs, each region tailoring the process to suit its unique circumstances. In other words the content of CBMs changes according to given situation, while the ultimate aims remain the achievement of international peace and security. And from the experience of others, we can always learn, and some elements, some concepts, might indeed be suitable, mutatis mutandis, for application in other regions as well (UNODA 1993, 7). Having ceased to serve as an instrument of the cold war, the concept has evolved and became unlimited in scope.

Besides, even though the end of the cold war has made the specter of global war disappear, local and regional conflicts have remained, or in certain areas, resurfaced as former stability of political blocs has given way to political fragmentation, ethnic and domestic strife and economic disruption. In this situation, the way to reconciliation, peace and stability will nearly always require the first stepping-stones of confidence- and security building measures. As Yasushi Akashi noted, “the most urgent priorities would appear to be improving communication, contact, and greater openness to

Considering the mentioned above, here in this section, it will examine the state of the art with respect to confidence building measures, the main role and process of confidence building measures and the evolution of Confidence Building Measures methodology from the European CBM process to other regions of the world.

II.1. The Origin and evolution of Confidence Building Measures

To understand the subject, the first thing is to think systematically about what we mean by “confidence building,” and possibly by “confidence” and “security building measures.” Such definition would have to go beyond the constraints of time and context and attempt to reach meanings that would be universally valid, otherwise we will never be able to transcend the limitation of the fact that terms were born in the East-West context, with particular emphasis on Europe, in the 1970s and the 1980s. Consequently, in order to understand its role in a broad context this section will review its origin and evolution initially.

In the shadows of the Cold War, some analysts and statesmen, unhappy with the high tension, especially after the Cuban missile crisis, focused upon confidence building measures (Sood 1995, 133). They faced a difficult challenge: they had to convince not only the other side, but also the hawks in their own camp, that such measures were not a sign of weakness and would not diminish security. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union made an agreement like the “hot line”, notification of missile launches, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, etc., which were described originally as arms control measures. Today, however, these are undisputedly the first of the CBMs in the East-West context, except that they pre-date the development of philosophy of CBMs. Certain kinds of CBMs were developed during the 1950s and the 1960s, particularly in the framework of Soviet-United States relations. These kinds of measures permitted confidence building diplomacy to proceed in Europe who also was dominated by two clearly differentiated power blocs that confronted each other both politically and militarily across a broad spectrum of issues. Europe, precisely speaking, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process between 1973 and 1975, took the idea of such measures and has steadily developed their concept and their content. Their main aim was to increase transparency and thus enhance military stability. Considering the stated above, then we will look more carefully how the CSCE has enormously contributed to an international
knowledge, understanding and acceptance of confidence building measures.

CBMs\(^3\) in that process underwent a step-by-step development. The first ones, the so-called CSBMs of the first generation were enshrined in the Final Act of the Conference at Helsinki in 1975. It marked the climax of the first phase of détente between East and West in Europe.

In the Helsinki Final Act, the participating states committed themselves to give notification of military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops 21 days or more in advance.\(^4\) The area covered by this agreement was the whole of Europe with a special regulation applying to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union accepted these recommendations, which were not yet an obligation, only for an area extending to 250 kilometers from the border. This illustrates that the whole process was incremental. In the document, states were encouraged, but not obliged, to invite military observers from other nations to such maneuvers.\(^5\) It is very important to underline that no country has been accused of failing to fulfill its obligations under the Helsinki regime. All states have duly fulfilled their duty to inform the other participating states about military exercises above the 25,000 level.\(^6\) In classifying this first generation of CSBM in the CSCE context, it served the following two purposes: first, to inhibit the political exploitation of military force. In other words, it tried to reduce the scope for political intimidation by military means. Secondly, to reduce the danger of surprise attack by creating the obligation to give advance notification of maneuvers beyond a certain level (Hohenfellner 1990, 22). The idea was not merely to limit the use of military forces, but it was also to prepare the ground, politically and psychologically. Increased openness was needed in order to enhance predictability, which was essential for the development of mutual confidence. And mutual confidence was needed in order to restrain the dynamics of arms build-ups and achieve arms limitation and disarmament (Lodgaard 1991, 19). This was the core of the logic and the reason of being of first generation CBMs, which created the normative foundation for relations between all the participating countries. This overture lead to more far reaching

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\(^3\) During this period CBMs(Confidence Building Measures) were called CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures). “S” for security was in the context of constraints on military activities. It was deemed logical to proceed from notification of military activities to actually doing something about them.

\(^4\) Helsinki Final Act, Document 2(HFA2), paras. 1, 5.

\(^5\) Helsinki Final Act, Document 2(HFA2), paras. 9.

\(^6\) Norway and Yugoslavia were the first countries to do so. Austria even gave notification of a command post exercise involving only some 5,000 men. Hungary was the first Warsaw Treaty country to provide notification of maneuver below the required threshold. (Holst: 1983, 7-10)
agreement at later stages.

This first generation of CBMs was to remain in use for 10 years. In September 1986, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) reached agreement, referred to as a second generation of CBMs. That document not only stressed the confirmation and reinforcement of the Helsinki Final Act, but further elaborated on CBMs by improving, expanding and enlarging them. It explicitly stresses that countries have the obligation to fulfill the provisions “regardless of State’s political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespectively of whether or not they maintain with the state relations of alliance” (Hohenfellner 1990, 23). A new element of the Stockholm Document is the obligation to exchange an annual calendar of all notifiable maneuvers for the subsequent year.

Certainly, major achievement of the Stockholm Document was the regulation of verification. Every participating State has the right to conduct an inspection on the territory of another participating state whenever it has doubts about compliance with the agreed confidence and security building measures (ibid., 25). No limit was inserted on how often inspection can be requested by a state. In other words, on-site inspections are guaranteed without any right of refusal. This was really a breakthrough in international military relations and meant that the concept of confidence building has been transformed into practical procedure. Accordingly, we may conclude that the purpose of the first generation CBMs (Helsinki 1975) and the second generation CBMs (Stockholm 1986) was to alleviate such concerns through transparency of military activities. Measures were based on the information and notification of activities as well as on their verification, with some initial constraints included in the system. Furthermore, these two CBMs showed that the international community is, however, becoming increasingly aware that its survival is no longer possible through confrontation, but only through cooperation. We should notice that although antagonistic structures can ensure relatively stability under certain conditions, such as military equilibrium, they couldn’t guarantee lasting security. This is the reason why we need a confidence build measures and a peace regime.

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7 The Helsinki Final Act contained 10 principles entitled “Guiding Relations between Participating States.” The Stockholm Document (a second generation CBMs) reiterated these, and reaffirmed the determination of the participants to respect them. Among the principles are: the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of States, the non-use of force, non-intervention in internal affairs. In their absence, CBMs could hardly have been instituted. This suggests the limitation of United Nations’ initiated CBMs to Cyprus in 1993, which bypassed the above principles. As mentioned earlier, there are some prerequisite in order to achieve or implement confidence building measures successfully.
Three years later, in 1989, the Vienna Document on CBMs, adopted in November 1990 just prior to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, set out provisions for some further additions and improvement, which is the third generation of CBMs. It stressed the complementary nature of efforts within the framework of the CSCE process aimed at building confidence and security and establishing stability. The Vienna Document provided for an annual exchange of information on the command organization of military forces down to and including the brigade level. Another new element of the Vienna Document concerned was consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities and hazardous incidents of a military nature. The mechanisms for such consultation and cooperation are built around the new Conflict Prevention Center established by the Paris Summit. Moreover, to enhance transparency in the air force sector, the Vienna CBMs call on each participating state with air combat units to arrange visits for representatives of all other participating states to one of its normal peacetime air bases (Lodgaard 1991, 24).

The evolution of CBM in Europe can be traced to decades of diplomatic efforts to seek an operational framework for crisis prevention and conflict management (Dewitt 1987, 247). The nexus between Helsinki, Stockholm, and the Vienna negotiations on security and confidence building measures is the CSCE. From the first stage to the third generation CBMs, the CSCE lent a new conceptual and political dimension to the attempt to overcome tensions and differences between countries by means of a systematically woven network of confidence building measures. So, the European experience showed that the CBMs approach could be a suitable instrument to use when seeking ways and means of transforming deep rooted antagonistic structures into cooperative security structures through gradual processes (Hoik 1991, 39).

II.2. Regional approaches to Confidence Building Measures

Over the last two decades, since first being sporadically applied in relations between the former Soviet Union and the United States and then consistently adopted in Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna, the concept of CBMs has evolved. Particularly, the CBM concept was first articulated with reference to the European experience of the 1970s and 1980s. The European experience showed that the CBM approach can be suitable instrument to use when seeking ways and means of transforming deep-rooted antagonistic structures into cooperative security structures through a gradual process.

There are valuable lessons to be learned from the experience derived from the
CSCE. But at the same time we must recognize that the CSCE was born and bred in Europe to respond to a specific set of circumstances. Very different strategic environments prevail in other parts of the world. What has been impossible and successful in Europe cannot necessarily be applied to other regions. Each local conflict, such as those in Korean peninsula, Cyprus, Middle East and Ireland, has its own unique background. Efforts to settle such conflicts should be pursued through frameworks that are best suited to the particular circumstances. In a nutshell, because of different historical and political conditions, it is certainly not possible automatically to transfer the positive experience gained with CBM concept in Europe to other regions of the world. A peace and security order for a region must in the first instance always emanate from that region itself and take account of the specific local interests and circumstances.

Because CBM concept was first articulated in Europe during the East-West contest, some may view confidence building measures only as an East-West product that cannot be exported to other regions, in fact, almost all regions have implemented measures to reduce tensions or resolve disputes. These measures were implemented before the Cold War even began - although these arrangements were not called confidence-building measures at the time. In Latin America, for example, CBMs were put into practice long before they began to be introduced in Europe. Through bilateral or multilateral agreements, certain Latin American countries have long conducted joint land and naval maneuvers, which were designed to avoid scaring neighboring countries as unilateral military exercise may do. These practices have had a beneficial influence on the continent, decreasing mutual suspicious and promoting good-neighborly relations.

Also limited confidence buildings have been in practice among states in various part of Asia. The practice may not be highly institutionalized at this time, but it is nonetheless an ongoing process. In this connection, examples of economic and political cooperation were cited among States belonging to sub regional organizations, like ASEAN, SAARC (The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Most countries in the region enhance their internal and external security by promoting economic development, thereby strengthening the resilience of their societies (Kunieda 1993, 84). In short, economic development was resulting in more mature political and social conditions in each country, which, in turn, are contributing to the stability of relations among countries
throughout the region.

Trevor Findlay suggests some tentative lessons for other regions when exercising CBMs. They are summarized as follows: (Kunieda 1993, 84)

1) Keep the arrangements as simple as possible
2) Either integrate CBMs fully into a well-thought-out and negotiated peace arrangement or keep them completely separate from grandiose schemes
3) Involve disinterested outside parties, but not too many
4) Use verification technology where appropriate, but be certain before agreements are concluded that it will be available and that it will suit the climatic, geographical and political conditions
5) CBMs work best when frontiers are relatively clear and nonporous and are not transgressed by insurgent forces
6) CBMs also appear to work best when they involve politically stable governments in charge of well trained and disciplined armed forces

Based on the above analysis, and also taking into account the lessons of CSCE process, there are enough reasons why we can attempt CBMs to other regions, such as Cyprus in our case. Each lesson is applicable in Cyprus when considering the current situation in Cyprus.

As discussed earlier, the content of CBMs changes according to given situation, while the ultimate aim remains the achievement of international peace and security. Within this context it is necessary to underline that the negotiating and implementing experience of CBMs is bound to differ from region to region and can at best serve as the basis of a case study approach. Often, the forum itself becomes as important as what is being discussed within it (Sood 1995, 137). The United Nations Charter is one such example. Acceptance of the Charter is necessary, but hardly considered an adequate CBM. Therefore, CBM packages need to be tailored to specific situations. The more it is attuned, in terms of obligations and commitments, to specific perception, the more effective the measures are likely to be.

### III. A Role of Confidence building Measures in Cyprus

#### III.1. Background of the Cyprus Disputes

Situated in the Eastern Mediterranean only 40 miles from Turkey and 900 miles from Greece, Cyprus is divided into the Greek Cypriot South and the Turkish Cypriot North, the latter embracing 36 percent of the island. The Cyprus conflict, which is
now entering its fourth decade since the violent usurpation of power by the Greek Cypriots in 1963 has not only caused the human loss and suffering but also had negative implication on the relations of Turkey and Greece, furthermore, the security and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. Like the case of Korea, in which a strife can go beyond the Korean peninsula and ignite disorder in East Asia, a crisis in Cyprus could trigger a chain of events that could go far beyond the boundaries of Cyprus, e.g. a violent demonstration by the Greek Cypriots in August 1996 resulted in Greece and Turkey threatening war, which was about to jeopardize the regional security. Thus, the urgency of the need for change in the island to transform the confrontation and destructive relationship of the two communities into a cooperative relationship is very crucial.

The Cyprus conflict is an instance of how to treat numerical minority, Turkish Cypriots, who used to be the masters of the island for more than 300 years when the Ottoman Empire conquered the Venetian. They claimed their freedom from the Greek Cypriots in setting up the new states after the departure of the colonial rule of Great Britain. To the nearest parallel, Clement Dodd likened Cyprus to the Northern Ireland case. The protestant Anglo-Scottish descendants of the settlers some centuries ago who settled there during the time of English dominion over Ireland feel strongly that the Republic of Eire has no claim to their land or allegiance (Dood 1998, 5). This is much the same as what the Turkish Cypriots feel about the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots excluded the possibility of establishing close links with the Turkish Cypriots by their burning firm belief that Cyprus was historically Greek. Accordingly, Greek Cypriots sought to embrace this Meagali-idea through enosis (unification with Greece). With their feelings of superiority over the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots could hardly think of entering into consociational relationships with Turkish Cypriot (Dodd 1999, 25). In so believing they virtually excluded the possibility of partnership. Particularly, the Church was to force this enosis.

However, in London, on 19 February 1959, two communal leaders, Archbishop Makarios and Fazil Kutchuk accepted a bicomunal constitution, which not only called for a bicomunal republic but also involved three international agreements:

- Treaty of Alliance committed Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey to the collective defense of the Republic of Cyprus and provided for the deployment of 950 Greek force troops and a counterpart Turkish contingent of 650 on the island.
The treaty of Establishment of Republic of Cyprus.

The Treaty of Guarantee, which required acceptance of the principle of bi-communal participation in the conduct of affair of state and forbade the amendment of basic articles of the constitution without the consent of the three guarantor powers. Article 4 stipulate that in the event of a crisis, the signatatories would consult with each other and if they fail to agree on joint action, each was empowered to act unilaterally to restore the status quo.

Nevertheless, in November 1963, Makarios sought to amend the constitution, which proved unacceptable both to the Turkish Cypriots and to Turkey. Successively, the premeditated violence initiated by the EOKA (national organization of Greek Cypriot fighters) broke out. There were hundreds of Turkish casualties and many thousands of Turkish Cypriots left the country to seek living in Britain, Australia, Turkey and elsewhere. British troops were called in to restore order, to be followed later by a UN contingent, UNFICYP. The intercession of President Lyndon Johnson with the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü deterred Ankara from armed intervention.

Interestingly, in March 1964, the Security Council in setting up UNFICYP (Resolution 186) referred to the Greek Cypriot government in a way to imply that it was the legitimate government of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots government assumed it had sovereignty over both communities. As a result the Turkish Cypriots, who constituted 20 percent of the island’s population and owned some 34% of the land were forced to live in enclaves covering less than 4% of Cyprus territory. Further, Turkish Cypriot participation in the government was no longer possible. It is really astonishing that the UN regarded the Greek Cypriots as the government of Cyprus, in spite of their crimes. Similar to the Korean division the Cyprus disputes seem to be a by-product of Cold War. British and American government were afraid that any opposition to the Greek Cypriot might have occasioned their calling in the Soviet Union, which would not have suited NATO (Dodd 1999, 25). They just didn’t want Cyprus becoming a Mediterranean Cuba and favored enosis (Dodd 1996, 6). The plight and rights of the Turkish Cypriots were virtually ignored. So their rapid decision to settle the dispute without considering deep-seated racial, ethnic, and religious antagonism among the society caused a seed of protracting inter-group conflict.

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Moreover, the states constituting the UN had, many of them, potential minority problems of their own which they did not wish to encourage and with this trend, the Greek lobby in the United States hit the right timing (ibid.).

Violence flared again in 1967, attacking Turkish Cypriots village by Greek Cypriots. And the landing of Turkish forces was narrowly averted. However, in 1974, when the Greek Junta overthrew President Makarious and installed Nikos Sampson as a president, well known for his involvement in anti-Turkish violence and his zeal for enosis, it alarmed Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the Turkish government decided to act. Prime Minister Bülent Evecit authorized an armed intervention. Turkey justified its action as an exercise of its right of unilateral intervention to uphold the constitutional order as stipulated under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. This prompted Turkey to intervene sealing the north of the island for Turkish Cypriot. Then Turkish Cypriots set up their own political institution, and in 1983 they declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state.

Since the military intervention in 1974, which placed 36 percent of the island’s territory under Turkish Cypriot control, the Cyprus dispute revolved around the intercommunal disagreement over how to restore the Cyprus State. For the Greek Cypriots the Turkish military intervention in 1974 is the real beginning of the Cyprus problem. They view the problem as one of foreign invasion and occupation, and violation of international law and human right, while Turkish Cypriots see it as their liberation by Turkey. Based on its experience during the years from 1963 to 1974, the Turkish Cypriot sees the problem as one of domination and oppression of the numerical minority as a result of Greek Cypriot leadership pursuit of enosis (Trigeorgis 1993, 346). The lack of shared definition of the problem has damaged the will and confidence to negotiate and resolve the issue. As Dodd argues, “the Greek Cypriot cannot remember what happened between 1963 and 1974, and that the Turkish Cypriot cannot forget” (Dodd, 1999, 33).

Since the division of the island the leaders of the two communities had a numerous meeting to settle the problem, most of them arranged by UN mediation. In February 1977 the leaders of the two communities, Makarios and Denktaş, agreed on four principles which characterized the future Cyprus State. In May 1979 Denktaş and the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou met and issued a ten-point communiqué which provided for the resumption of intercommunal talks on the basis of 1977 principles. Numerous inter communal talks have followed since then, generally focusing on the
political or the legal issues of the problem. However, most of talks ended in failure due to disagreement over the process and the objective of the negotiations.

Considering this basic background of the Cyprus issue, this section will explore why we need CBMs in Cyprus and why initiated CBMs in 1993 by the United Nation failed. It will try to demonstrate some problems of initiated CBMs in Cyprus.

III.2. Rationale of Implementing Confidence Building Measures in Cyprus

Like the case of two Koreas, the legacy of bitter rivalry and conflict, made the vicious cycle of enmity between the North and the South Cyprus. For the last 40 years, after the Green line was drawn, post-conflict peace building process has been going on in Cyprus primarily in the diplomatic and political fronts. However, it has become clear that diplomatic and political efforts that focus only on the official level are not sufficient. Success has yet to come.

One of the most unfortunate results of the lack of progress toward a political settlement in Cyprus is the increased distance between the two communities, leading to distorted images of the other, growing mistrust, and increasing differences in culture and mentality. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed there was a “deep crisis of confidence between the two sides”, and that it would be difficult “to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevail.”

Indeed, the current situation again looks likely to lead to coercive settlement, if allowed to continue. A key to promoting break through in peace negotiations, therefore, is long-term support for CBMs in peace-building activities aimed at conflict transformation, transforming the overall intercommunal relationship to cooperative rather than a conflictual one (Kaufman 2000, 15).

In a situation such as that in Cyprus, where there has been such a long period of separation, these trusting relationships are not likely to happen without some assistance. There is complete lack of integration, as each side worked to fulfill its own needs while undermining those of the other. Moreover like the case of two Koreas, and unlike Germany, two communities had bloodshed, severe civil war, between each other, which caused lots of casualties and refugees. This deepened the antagonism and disintegration of the two communal societies. Generally the old generation who has the experience of civil war thinks it is impossible to live with the other.

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In this situation, it is easy in the abstract for any conflict participant to argue, “my side suffered more”, but when they have a chance to contact the other saying, “my cousin was killed” or “my sister was raped,” it is impossible not to acknowledge that the other side suffered too. Such acknowledgement is often the first step toward reconceptualizing a conflict as a shared problem demanding a shared solution, which is the critical lack in the case of Cyprus as mentioned above. By listening to another viewpoint, participants will begin to understand their own history better, and they will develop a desire for correcting their own interpretation and presentation of the fact. The wall on the Green line was mostly of a psychological nature (Turkish Daily News, 7. 12. 2001). People living in different sides might wonder what would be behind that wire fence. They used to believe that the people on the other side were evil or murderers, killing people indiscriminately (ibid.).

Even though CBMs may seem less effective to settle the conflict by some politicians or scholars, it will definitely help both participants to rethink their attitude toward the conflict. Sharing of the problem by the two communities through contacts will help in reducing negative stereotypes and prejudice that normally characterize the conflictual environment, which will promote the willingness and confidence to negotiate (Richmond 1994, 11). Through CBMs the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots may explore each other fears and hence acknowledge their legitimacy, leading at least to the possibility of a win-win situation. Unlike Korea, Cyprus has such a small community, with a population of less than a million, the influence on politics will appear pervasive compared to that of Korea.

It has been pointed out that internal insurgency and lack of democracy are great difficulties standing in the way of inter-State agreements on mutual confidence and transparency (Stania 1991, 167). Fortunately, both the South and the North Cyprus are equipped with liberal and democratic institutions (ibid.). So compared with South Korea which is confronted with communist and monolithic society, which can hardly mix with pluralistic society, Cyprus is in better condition to implement CBMs. Besides, there is a roughly equivalent balance of power at the moment, and even the presence of an appropriate negotiating forum. Perhaps the critical factor is that there is not hot conflict in region (ibid.). Thus we may say the precondition or the climate is generally favorable to implement CBMs in Cyprus.

Moreover, as you can see from the table below, the influence of political left seems to be increasing among young educated generation. They believe Turkish
Cypriots should be independent from Turkey rather than harmonizing with Turkey (Hearl 2001, 8). As Derek Hearl argues, they are inclined toward Cyprocentrism. They will be the group who will support the solution through CBMs when the time comes. The Republican Turkish Party (CTP) is a strong supporter in this group, who has favored the CBMs and worked for. Even though they only gained 13.4% of the vote in the 2000 election, its leader Mehmet Ali Talat whose position as perhaps the most outspoken domestic opponent is very popular and widely respected figure both domestically and internationally (Dodd, 1998, 107-108). He became prime minister in 2004, and subsequently won the Presidential election held on 17 April 2005, pushing out conservative president Denktaş from the power. According to Mehmet Ali Talat, “although Turkish Cypriots majority were in favor of the CBMs, National Unity Party (UBP), the majority party, campaigned against the package of CBMs and collapsed the effort of CBMs. And even though a coalition partner, CTP, was strongly in favor of the CBMs, Mr. Denktaş, a founder of UBP as well as the President, who has strong historical reputation and charisma among Turkish Cypriot, managed to collapse the efforts of CBMs.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group / Level of Education</th>
<th>Territorial (Cypriot)</th>
<th>Ethno-national (Turkish)</th>
<th>Moslem</th>
<th>European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>50.6</td>
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<td><strong>48.5</strong></td>
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<td>9.1</td>
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Because of Greek Cypriot’s embargoes authorized by the United Nation, the Turkish Cypriots’ economy has grown steadily poorer while Greek Cypriots have grown richer. Official figures put GDP per capita in the Turkish bit of the island at one fifth of the 17,000$ in the Greek’s Southern part.11 If both sides wish a solution in the island, whether “federation” or “confederation” as they maintain respectively, both sides, particularly Greek Cypriot government, have to consider the serious economic problems of North Cyprus. Consequently, economic CBMs through a smooth rapprochement are essential if Cyprus wants to enjoy the economic and political benefits of its increased size more quickly. North Cyprus economy problem is not from the systematic or structure failure, rather it is from the Greek Cypriot embargoes with the UN.12 So when embargoes are lifted and CBMs are implemented, the economy recovery will be much faster due to its sound condition and small size. The situation that Greek Cypriots have neglected the North economy would result in a long period of recovery and hard time even though they may accomplish a certain form of unification. As lessons learnt from the history, South Korea’s past policies toward North Korea or Washington’s policy toward Cuba, Libya and Iraq demonstrated that a containment or isolation policy is not very effective for the solution.

Greek Cypriots’ containment and isolation policy made the Turkish Cypriots rely completely on Turkey. Declaration of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus was prompted by the perception of an increasing isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Due to Greek Cypriots continuing denial of any international role of Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were pushed toward independence (Richmond 1994, 19). Again, the Greek Cypriot response was to call for the application of sanction. As we have seen from the development of the Cyprus issue, this found little as they had proved to be dysfunctional until now, just pushing Turkish Cypriot more to depend on Turkey. It seems that the Greek Cypriots may simply acquiesce to the partition and concentrate on building their own prosperous state in the South (Wolfe 1988, 88). Perhaps they prefer partition, but they do not dare say it (Duner 1999, 493). But as reflected from the South Korean case this will not give any solution to the problem. They will not enjoy absolute security and prosperity unless they solved a de facto division in the island.

In December 4th 2001, there was the North and the South Summit talk, and the two

12 The Turkish Cypriot economy has serious constraints in international trade and foreign investment, e.g. higher transportation costs for its imports and exports.
leaders agreed to the following:13

- That the Secretary-General, in the exercise of his mission of good offices, would invite the two leaders to direct talks;
- That these talks will be held in Cyprus starting in mid-January 2002 on UN premises;
- That there will be no precondition;
- That all issues will be on the table;
- That they will continue to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is achieved.
- That nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed.

This face-to-face interaction will provide a new and significant opportunity for both parties in reaching a common understanding on how they can move forward. Like the evolvement of CSCE or the South Korea’s engagement policy toward the North, often step-by-step agreements build more trust than complete agreements. As Denktash, the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus at that time, stressed in the text of the opening statement in the Summit talk, both sides should “focus on what their common interests are and how they can serve them by mutual efforts”, and that “effort for a viable settlement in Cyprus could yield desired result only in an environment of mutual trust.”14 The most important thing, however, is that both sides should be prepared for a win-win scenario, not a win-lose scenario.

No viable solution to the Cyprus problem can be found if the previous attitudes and approaches continue to rule the day. Changes must occur so that reconciliation and cooperation replace acrimony and discord. Surely, CBMs can promote these changes. Even after the settlement is reached, like the South Korea’s economic CBMs or engagement policy (Sunshine policy, Gyung-hyup), bi-communal business ventures or the establishment of bi-communal institutions will be critical for developing strong connection between the two communities. As Ismail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, noted, “if solution were to be reached, the CBMs accepted by both sides would provide the catalyst” (Cem, 1998, 141-150).

III.3. Confidence Building Measures in Cyprus

Throughout the long and sporadic negotiation effort, little thought has been
devoted to creating the social, psychological, educational, developmental, and institutional infrastructure necessary for the two communities to come closer together. Over the past years, not until 1993, the negotiations hadn’t provided any impetus for inter-communal cooperation on a scale.

The UN Set of Ideas began to be constructed during 1990-1991 on the basis of consultation by UN officers with both sides, and discussion in Ankara and Athens. In 1992, Boutros Boutros Ghali was greatly encouraged at the Security Council, which began to play a very positive role in the dispute, offering him direct support. He tried to get agreement on a Set of Ideas. The end of the Cold War enhanced the role that the UN could play (Richmond 1994, 24). However, these efforts failed. There were sharp disagreements on sovereignty, territory, displaced persons, and some constitution provisions. As a result, Ghali presented a paper entitled ‘Summary of the current positions of the two sides in relation to the set of ideas.’ This document compared the Greek and Turkish Cypriot position with the UN position and indicated that Denktaş’s position was still falling outside of the ‘Set of Ideas’.

In fact, as Clement Dodd argues, it was the Turkish Cypriots who responded to the Set of Ideas and criticized them also because they found some of proposals unacceptable. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriot accepted 91 of the 100 paragraphs form the Set of Ideas. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriot did not commit themselves at all. It was for them a success that the Turkish Cypriots were reacting strongly. The Greek Cypriot just avoided commitment by saying that the Set of Ideas could form the basis for discussion (Dodd 1998, 50). Besides, when a change of leadership occurred in the Greek Cypriot side a couple of months later, the new leader Glafkos Clerides denounced the Set of Ideas proposal as well. The Greek Cypriot gave more importance on the EU entrance as their leverage to the solution rather than the UN negotiations. Therefore, Ghalis’s opinion, “only Denktaş’s position was still falling outside of the Set of Ideas”, in the document was an odd expression, since neither side had accepted the Set of Ideas.

After the collapse of the Set of Ideas initiative, the UN sought to promote measures to build confidence between the two sides. As noted, there was a “deep crisis of confidence between the two sides.” The Security Council then passed a

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15 For full text of “Set of Ideas” see Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Cambirdgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1998), 141-161.
16 During the presidential election in Greek Cypriot side the whole campaign has been confined on the Set of Ideas.
resolution in support of the confidence building measures (CBMs) in 1993. The purpose of confidence-building measures was to facilitate early agreement on an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. The implementation of these measures were to help build trust and good will between the two communities and serve a catalyst for the ongoing effort to achieve mutually agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem.\(^{17}\)

The proposed CBMs included the following:\(^{18}\)

- Expert cooperation on the short-term and long term water problems in Cyprus, in particular increasing the water supply.
- Expert cooperation on education, in particular to promote inter-communal harmony and friendship.
- Joint cultural and sports events, including the joint use of the Cetinkaya field in the Buffer Zone near the Ledra Palace Hotel.
- Meeting of political party leaders of both sides
- Journalists of both sides crossing the lines by only showing their press ID cards issued by United Nations. Opening joint journalist meeting room at the Ledra Palace Hotel.
- Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of both sides to identify and develop joint commercial projects.
- Expert cooperation in area such as health and the environment
- Cooperative arrangements on electricity taking into account the electric generator in the north.
- Inter-communal cooperation in Pyla, including the free movement of goods in the same manner as agreed in Varosha/ Maraş (in Turkish).
- The reconstruction and operation of Varosha/ Maraş
- The reopening of Nicosia International Airport

Among the confidence building measures contained in the UN proposal, two major items, the settlement of Varosha/ Maraş and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport closed since 1974, were focused in the negotiation.

Varosha/ Maraş (in Turkish) is unoccupied fenced area some 4 km by 1.5 km. Before 1974, Varosha/ Maraş was a mainly Greek Cypriot trading and tourism zone. Since 1974 it has been under the control of the Turkish Cypriot government. It has


been kept by the Turkish Cypriots as a bargaining chip so that it was not opened to settlement to the Turkish refugees form the South (Bölükbaş 1995, 474). The UN proposal was for the area to be governed by the UN until there is a final settlement and promote re-development as a tourist and free trade zone. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be able to enter the area freely and without any formality. And those who wish to establish commercial enterprise in the area would be provided with the area premises on the basis of long-term leasing and the construction of new premises. On the other hand, since the bulk of the property was previously Greek Cypriots owned, the UN noted that property could be reclaimed by former owner. Joint ventures between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be promoted and developed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the two sides. An interesting proposal was that foreign tourists would be allowed to move through the area eventually to either side.

Nicosia International Airport (NIA) is located some 8 km to the west of Nicosia. Since the cease-fire of August 1974, it is completely within the UN controlled buffer zone. The package of CBMs called for NIA to be reopened for the equal benefit of both communities for civilian passenger and cargo traffic from both sides under the administration and operation control of the UN. Landing rights at the airport was restricted to foreign airlines that have landing rights in Cyprus as well as to airlines registered in Turkey. Furthermore, foreign visitors who entered Cyprus through Nicosia airport would not be hindered from moving freely between the North and the South. While reconstructing the NIA the Greek and Turkish Cypriot will have a chance to contact each other. By working together during the reconstruction it will promote trust and confidence that people may learn to live with each other and lay the foundation of peaceful coexistence. Since the NIA was to serve as an export processing zone (EPZ) akin to that operating at Shannon Airport in Ireland, it was recognized that the reopening of the airport would have a profound effect on the economic situation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The proposal also recognized that ‘the opening of the airport would mean the lifting for all practical purposes of the economic obstacles that have been weighing heavily on the community.’

<Map 1>

Varosha/Maraş And NIA Proposal

During the negotiation, Mr. Denktaş took the position that adequate compensation should be provided by lifting of the embargo that has been maintained on the Turkish Cypriot side. In particular, he called for Erçan (Tymbou) Airport to be allowed to receive direct flights to and from European destinations and for the lifting of restriction on sea ports in the North Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side made a major concession on its part, placing Varosha/Maraş under the UN administration. As noted earlier it was important bargaining chip for the Turkish Cypriots. However, according to ICAO’s (International Civil Aviation Organization) legal counsel, Ghali responded, “it did not seem possible, without recognizing a Turkish Cypriot State, to envisage the kind of arrangements related to Erçan (Tymbou) airport and the Cyprus Turkish airline.”

But there are ambiguities surrounding this response. How about the case like Taiwan which is also not recognized as a state among many nations but has international flight? There are various international flights in Taiwan landing and departing; most of them are from the states not recognizing Taiwan as a state but recognizing Peoples’ Republic of China as legitimate state. Besides, Taiwan is not a member of the ICAO nor IATA (International Air Transport Association). It appears to be a double standard of the UN, based on the biased inequality. If the UN or the European states really want why cannot it be exercised in Cyprus?

As Oliver Richmond argues “the Turkish Cypriots tend to question the authority and neutrality of the UN, while the Greek Cypriots sought to rely on its support”

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21 Taiwan’s China Airlines and Eva Airlines are not the member of ICAO nor IATA. For more information see http://www.icao.org/cgi/goto.pl?icao/en/members and http://www.iata.org/membership/
The process of mediation had not managed to reduce the feeling that a solution could only lead to both sides losing, particularly the Turkish Cypriots side. It is generally held that the Varosha/Maraş and NIA deal was from the beginning fixed in favor of the Greek Cypriots (Dodd 1998, 26). Turkish Cypriots fear of domination from the majority Greek Cypriots has never really been addressed, leading to a win-lose mentality during the negotiations. This is something that the UN has failed to address throughout its implicit support of the Greek Cypriots side (ibid.).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the confidence building process is the development of negotiation, and implementation of an agreement, including the practices. Further, the most fundamental prerequisite for the CBMs is mutual recognition of each other’s right to exist (Hoik 1991, 40). This is the critical mistake that the UN made in its CBMs proposal. If the UN, which is international body trying to mediate the problem, doesn’t recognize each other equally how can this process be initiated or evolved into practice. Truly, we hardly go into a negotiation unless we are recognized equally from the other partner or mediator. Obviously the Turkish Cypriots would require guarantees in the CBMs negotiations, normally given in agreement between states, would be in fact be forthcoming and would not in any way depend on the Greek Cypriot government by virtue of its international recognition as the Government of Republic of Cyprus (Dodd 1998, 58). The success of the Greek Cypriot community in gaining international support for their case undermined the negotiations. Actually they have no legal or moral right to that status, and British government said on March 12, 1964 that “Cyprus Government” could mean only a government which acts with the concurrence of its Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members.22 There has been no concurrence since 1963. Greek Cypriot should remember that there was a thaw and reconciliation after when Germany and Korea acknowledged each other.

The UN’s approach to peace-building and peace-making in Cyprus, instead of working toward the establishment equality, is unfortunately resulting in the perpetuation of the biased inequality created by the other side. This gave the UN and other third parties, e.g. EU, a major handicap in addressing the root causes of the conflict and the underlying issues in Cyprus. This reason why the Turkish Cypriots regard third party mediation as outside interference, rather than mediation.

Moreover during the CBMs negotiation, the Greek Cypriots have asserted

withdrawal of Turkish troops from the North Cyprus for the precondition of the CBMs. Greek Cypriots asked to replace Turkish troops with international force. Greek Cypriot made continuous rhetoric about “occupied part of the island”, “occupation forces”, “puppet government” and so on. But one should remember that Turkish intervention did not come out of nowhere. It was direct result of the Greek Cypriot enosis supported by the Greek Junta, destroying the constitutional setup and murdering hundreds of Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots. As Ismael Cem argues, “the massacre of the Bosnian Muslims in spite of the presence of ‘international forces’ is still fresh in memories, as is the experience of the 1963-1974 period in Cyprus itself, during which an international force, UNFICYP, was nothing but a passive observer to the bloodshed” (Cem 2001, 145). There can be no guarantee that the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriot from 1963 to 1974, would necessarily disappear.

There are some 36,000 US military troops in South Korea and 42,000 in Japan due to its need for the security. Does this make them an American puppet or decrease a legitimacy of their government? South Korean government to execute the engagement policy or Sunshine Policy in a consistent manner is from the strong security system. Though peace through cooperation and negotiations is the basic idea behind these policies, the maintenance of sound national security is predicated upon its implementation. It means that the groundwork for execution of CBMs are reinforcing by a staunch security system. Military strength should be considered and decreased in step-by-step process as mutual confidence emerges through CBMs. Accordingly, the military presence in the island should be decreased in the context of a political settlement. For the Turkish Cypriot minority, Turkish troops and guarantees provide insurance against potential repression and domination by the Greek Cypriot majority. As Turkish Cypriots argues, considering that there wasn’t bloodshed since 1974 which lasted more than a decade, somehow their military presence has provided for the security of both communities.

Although two important issues, the reconstruction of Varosha and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport failed, there were some measures undertaken successfully, such as the meeting of political party leaders of both sides, expert cooperation in area such as health and the environment, and etc. Particularly, considering inter-communal

23 In terms of military capability, South Korea can deter a possible military provocation by the North mired in a worst economic crunch. In addition, Seoul has strengthened its ability to cope with a security crisis on the peninsula through concerted efforts with Washington and Tokyo.
cooperation in Pyla it is much ahead from the Korea's Peace Zone project in DMZ, which may give some lessons to Korea. This kind of Peace Zone could be a catalyst in developing into a Unification-Peace City. And if such a city functions well, it can lead to a second and even a third similar city that could help to develop unification and reconciliation process. Thus, such measures could help make the joint area a meeting ground of communicating vessels, narrowing the economic, geographic, communication, and cultural gaps presently separating two communities (Trigeorgis 1993, 357). For Greek Cypriots, this joint area would be the experimental nucleus of a cooperative centralized federation.

When the absence of trust and confidence between ethnic groups thwarts the full realization of “peaceful co-existence”, in spite of the cessation of war, such bi-communal programs can be used as strategies toward a post-conflict peace building process (Lasan 1998, 20). As Franco-German cooperation has shown, historic enemies can overcome their past. Succumbing to historical pessimism is an admission of defeat.


Unlike Korean, which was a unitary state before the crisis, Cyprus had an experience of functional federation before the conflict. Thus the debates of federation or confederation as a united Cyprus have been main subject from the beginning rather than normalization process that follows after the successful CBMs implementation. It has been main hot political controversy between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot.

Three years after independence in 1960, the attempt to govern through functional federalism ended in civil war. There was not a real desire to create a federal entity during this period. The 1960 settlement was basically imposed on the Cypriots by the three outside interested powers without regard for local realities and social-psychological concern. The majority of Greek Cypriots insistently called for union with Greece, enosis, and their feelings of superiority over the Turkish Cypriot could hardly think of entering into consociational relationships with them (Dodd 1999, 25). As is well known, the Constitution was overthrown in 1963-65 as the result of Greek Cypriot pressure, the extremes of violence they used to obtain their ends, and the acquiescence of the international community to this situation. The resulting collapse of the republic is taken as evidence that consociationalism could not survive in the
absence of a balance of power between the two communities (Wolfe 1998, 75).

Intervention by Greece and Turkey in 1974 resulted in a de facto partitioning of republic into two ethnically homogenous areas. After 1974, the basis and scope of the intercommunal talks changed and the search for bringing a “federal” solution to the Cyprus problem began. The Turkish and the Greek Cypriot communities had different opinions with regard to the federal solution. Both sides produced their desiderate for a federal settlement on 12 February 1977, after agreeing on four guidelines:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Question of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the state.

However, even position with professed agreement in principle, such as a bizonal federation, have received widely different interpretations. The Greek Cypriots argued for a centralized or unitary federation without borders, while the Turkish Cypriots wanted a loose or decentralized confederation of two autonomous states to preserve security. Taking this one step further, the Turkish Cypriots idea of federation was merely a disguised partition, on the other hand, the Greek Cypriots resigned this interpretation and with international support behind them, sought to limit the size and power of the Turkish Cypriot part of a future federate state (Richmond 1994, 18). Turkish Cypriots’ fear of a strong central government, which threatens their identity and participation as equal partners in the republic, originated from the fact that they are a minority and from the past experience. The Turkish Cypriot side also wanted equality in the execution of policy in the Council of Ministers and virtual equality in the proposed federal assembly. The essential problem began to emerge from whether sovereignty lay with the federal state or with each state. The situation is worsened by a preoccupation with receiving or denying prior recognition to each other.

Again the recognition is important for the solution. How can there be a
federation or confederation without acknowledging a second federal partner? Equal
county could lead to the exchange of goods and services and to all kinds of
communication between the two states. Like the case of Korea and Germany, there will
not be any progress in their relations without recognizing a counter partner. Ostpolitk of
West Germany and Nordpolitk of South Korea were initiations recognizing the
adversary as a partner for co-prosperity, laying a cornerstone for unification through
peaceful coexistence. Accordingly, the principle of recognition is an effective
approach to curbing confrontation between the two Cyprus states and promoting
mutual interests with a view to attaining confidence building and stable relations. The
old policy of political isolation and containment of North Cyprus should be abandoned
for one of assistance and cooperation, and it will create an atmosphere conducive to
change in the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriot’s hard-line policy toward the
Turkish Cypriot will only prompt a vicious circles of escalating tension, straining inter-
Cyprus relations and triggering a security dilemma to cause the Turkish Cypriot to play
hardball.

Because of Greek Cypriots, as the government of Cyprus, continuing denial of any
international role of Turkish Cypriots, the negotiations were always at the deadlock
circumstances. Greek Cypriots switching their policies toward the Turkish Cypriots from
containment to, possibly, engagement, would have a lot of things to win from such a
policy shift. The opening statement of the Secretary General of UN at the
intercommunal talks is explicit in many ways:

“…Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the
Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but
one of two communities in the state of Cyprus. (…)My mandate is also explicit that
the participation of the two communities in the process is on equal footing. (…) The
political equality of the two communities and the bi-communal nature of the federation
need to be acknowledged.”

It would be extremely dangerous to bring the two sides together abruptly after a
separation of 40 years, especially a country who had bloodshed experience. Sometimes intercommunal contact and commingling can exacerbate the conflict, especially if the necessary social-psychological preparation and institutional
infrastructure are not in place (Trigeorgis 1993, 357) Gradual and step-by-step

24 United Nations Security Council, The opening of statement of the Secretary General of UN at
the intercommunal talks, S/21183(New York, 26.2.1990), 7.
preparations for unification will enable the creation of one Cyprus by filling the space and period in Cyprus history left void for such a long time. Based on this strong foundation we can draw a prospect for peaceful unified Cyprus. Again, this demonstrates the importance of CBMs, which will increase contacts between the two communities.

Moreover, we have seen the dissolution of federalism, such as Yugoslavia, which has instilled the Turkish Cypriot the fear that no matter how strong the building blocks of a new federation, the Turkish Cypriot could be faced with a new Greek Cypriot assault not dissimilar to that of the Serbs against the Muslim in Bosnia (Bolukbaşi, 1995, 468). In order to get over this Turkish fear, it is proper to consider interim period, such as a Korea commonwealth, an interim stage on the way to complete unification preparing the legal and institutional groundwork for a unified Korea. This interim period will initiate and expedite reunification procedures by creating a partnership between the two communities. As James Wolfe argues, “a confederal solution based on the need for efficiency in the performance of governmental functions has the potential of providing a means of overcoming ethnic cleavage on Cyprus” (Wolfe 1988, 86). Then it seems that, Turkish Cypriot favored position “Federalism by evolution” on the constitution of a proposed Federal Republic of Cyprus is persuasive.

A successful federation requires mutual sympathy among the populations involved, some mutual need, and the assurance that one will not dominate others (Dodd 1999, 4). As noted, there should be a widespread desire to create a federal entity between the two communities as well. Hence, progress toward a stronger federation should be envisaged by a step-by-step procedure as confidence between the two sides increase.

IV. Conclusion

Considering a positive current Cyprus political environment by historic face-to-face summit talks and following dining meetings, it is very high time to think about CBMs implementation. No doubt, CBMs are one of the important agenda in Cyprus at the moment. The article focused on the peace building process rather than a standoff political or other legal issues. Consequently, the main discussion and analysis was the role of CBMs in creating peace regime and their use by each party. Particularly focusing on the Cyprus disputes, the article has presented how confidence building can

25 For more information see Reed Coughlan, “The prospect of a federated settlement in Cyprus and lessons from political theory and practical experience”, A paper presented to the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies(November, 1998), 24-27.
be important in effort to improve security relations among contesting states. It is a fundamental contention of this work that it is helpful to think about Cyprus security management options, whether to promote confidence building agreements or coercive settlement. Chiefly, it tried to show how CBMs, especially non-military CBMs, could promote or facilitate constructive changes and avoid undesirable development in Cyprus. It attempted to demonstrate the importance of CBMs, generally emphasizing the economical and social CBMs, as pilot projects or models for action that encourage reconciliation, which would visualize a peaceful co-existence. Some of the issues that are observed and learned by the Cyprus case are; negative role of hawks and myth, importance of political willingness, and most importantly, socio-economic benefits of CBMs.

The main focus was on exploring some positive aspects of confidence building in Cyprus, such as Varosha project and Peace zone project. Through this approach it tried to encourage different thinking in security management, solving the problem by cooperation and coexistence rather than containment or isolation. The central idea here is to promote interaction and the development of shared competence. Through contacts, communication and dialogue, they can seek common ground while reserving differences, narrowing the gap and expanding consensus. Cyprus case brought a distinctive point of view that genuine peace regime would be built only when both Cyprus recognize that their security can be best provided for not by unrestrained pursuit of superiority in military strength but by cooperation. Thus it is important for both North and South Cypriots to overcome the paranoiac perception of threats through more transparency and interaction. Cypriots should overcome their old-fashioned myth among them. Succumbing to historical pessimism and myth is an admission of defeat. Perhaps, formation of Single Korean Team in the World Table Tennis Championship and Soccer Championship can be a model case that can be exported to Cyprus for their reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

As an important foundation, the article explicitly showed why both sides should respect and acknowledge each other, not to interfere into each other’s internal affairs, not to slander each other, and not to take actions aiming at sabotaging or overthrowing the other. Learning from the West German Ostpolitik and South Korean Nordpolitik, it demonstrated the reason why Cypriots should recognize each other’s governments as legitimate bargaining partners and to realize the balance between the North and the South Cyprus, in order to maintain peace and prosperity in the island and then to unite.

The lack of political will has created a kind of vicious circle which has, in turn,
fostered the competitive conception of security and the paranoiac perception of threats. Thus, the most essential factor in peace regime building in Cyprus is the willingness of both Cyprus to coexist peacefully. When such will does not exist, even if CBMs are initiated they cannot facilitate constructive changes or bear fruitful results, rather it will become meaningless. Then the best policy may be maintaining thorough vigilance and reliable deterrence, continuation of coercive settlement. Does anyone want such situation? As James Macintosh argues, the confidence building process can facilitate, focus, and amplify the potential for a significant positive transformation in the security relations of participating states only when conditions are supportive (Macintosh 1996, 31). We have to remember that peace cannot be forced upon unwilling, and undefeated party. As an old adage goes, one may take a horse to the water, but one cannot make him drink. Greater understanding of the confidence building process can help states appreciate the promise such measures offer, and the long-term benefits which can be achieved through their implementation. Especially, a better understanding by policy makers of the strengths and limitation of confidence building is essential to ensure that they make the most productive use of this security management approach and do not become disillusioned because of the misapplication (Macintosh 1996, 70). This means that the primary effort must be devoted to the creation of initial conditions sufficient to support the movement forward.

There are always conservative circles who see this kind of engagement policy with skepticism and even as a sell-out. Thus, in order to execute CBMs policy in a consistent manner, the following requirements must be met: strong security and public trust and backing. Therefore, a solid and unwavering security is always important, to convince a hardliner as well as to secure the general public support and trust, which is crucial for the continuous CBMs or engagement policy.

In the meantime a confrontationist and hardliner should realize that, although antagonistic structures can ensure relative stability under certain conditions, such as military equilibrium, they cannot guarantee lasting security. They should realize that their survival is no longer possible through confrontation, but only through cooperation. Any hard-line policy will trigger a security dilemma to cause both sides to play hardball. The adoption and implementation of CBMs is not zero-sum game in which one player’s gain matches the other’s loss. It is essential to bear in mind that shortsighted refusal to participate does not payoff in the long run. Everyone concerned will benefit from CBMs and growing mutual confidence. As seen from the
Cyprus case the influence of political left is increasing among young educated generation. They are the groups who try to accomplish a peaceful co-existence rather than debating old-fashioned deadlock political debates. They are considering more their economic benefits and prosperity, which will make them to choose a confidence building agreements as their security management instead of coercive settlement.

The first step is always difficult, but as long as it starts, it will develop and be fruitful. Many of these tasks are, to be sure, long term ones to bear fruit. The gradual building of confidence is undoubtedly a long and arduous path. However, the past experiences show that CBMs when successfully implemented and encouraged within the country, can give rise to concrete and measurable results in people’s well being, thus further enhancing the foundation for peace regime. Conflict resolution, particularly CBMs, is not only about agreements, but also about reaching agreements that can hold permanently. The significance of CBMs is to create an atmosphere in which a settlement can be reached, and be sustained once reached.

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국문초록

신뢰구축 방안(CBMs)을 통한 분쟁해결과 평화체제 구축
: 키프로스 사례연구

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본 논문은 신뢰구축방안(CBMs) 활동이 분쟁해결에 어떠한 영향력을 행사하는지에 대해 고찰해 보는 것이다. 특히 키프로스 분쟁에서의 신뢰구축방안 역할에 대해 알아 본으로써 분단국가에서의 평화정착과 분쟁해결에 신뢰구축방안이 어떻게 기여할 수 있는지를 고찰 할 것이다. 키프로스에서의 실증적인 신뢰구축 방안 사례를 찾아 보아 신뢰구축방안의 평화체제 구축에 기여 정도를 알아 본 것이다. 특히 키프로스의 바로샤(Varoha) 프로젝트나 평화지대 구축 사업을 조명해 본으로써 신뢰구축 방안의 긍정적인 측면을 검토해 본 것이다.

본 논문을 통해 신뢰구축방안이 결과적으로 분쟁해결의 건실한 토대와 분위기를 만들어 실질적인 평화체제 구축을 가능하게 할 수 있다는 측면을 보여주고자 한다. 또한 신뢰구축방안의 사례는 군사력에 방탕을 둔 분쟁 역제력보다 실질적인 분쟁해결을 할 수 있음을 키프로스 사례를 통해 보여 줄 것이다. 한번 구축된 신뢰는 분쟁해결을 위한 중요한 열쇠역할을 한다고 볼 수 있다.

주제어: 신뢰구축방안(Confidence Building Measures(CBMs), 분쟁해결, 터키, 키프로스, 터키계 키프로스인, 그리스계 키프로스인, 평화체제