The Ulama's Political Participation and Process :
The Role of Iranian Shia Ulama*

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I. Introduction.

The Ulama are a type of religious bodies in Iran. They have long tradition of
protesting against the power of the state and have involved in modern Iranian politics.
In addition, the Ulama have taken the more powerful position than the other Arabic the
Ulama in the field of politics. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the political roles of
Arabic Sunni Ulama declined but the role of Iranian Shia Ulama increased. This
situation originated in the following social circumstances.

First, the Muslim laymen are supposed to comply with the religious rules of the
Ulama in every aspect of life. Shia doctrine has adhered to a state by a clergyman who
is a representative of God.

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Second, the failure of Qazar Dynasty, which caused foreign powers to dispossess Iran of political and economic property.

Third, the solid alliance of the Ulama and the bazaaris, who were threatened by the credit financing policies and concession policies introduced by Iranian government.

Fourth, the Ulama had achieved its own political and economic power as individuals.

Fifth, the Ulama could cultivate social power in the Atabat, the holy ground, that was located within the Iraq that Iranian government could not become involve in.

Finally, a mass struggle led by the Ulama, was very effective.

We can clearly understand the peculiar roles of the Ulama in the field of modern Iranian politics by considering all the factors of Iran's history - politics, economy, society, and culture. The religious and political roles of the Ulama, during the Iranian modern revolution, might be regarded as the most important factor with other political, economical, and social factors by considering the unique combination of religion and nation in Iran's history. Because the Ulama could be the only rulers that reign all Muslims and Islamic community from its religious ideology.

We can easily find the case of the Ulama's political intervention. For example, the "Tobacco Protest(1891-1892)", which has been evaluated as the positive resistance against the economical invasions of the western powers. Also, the Ulama could take the core political position during the Nationalist Movement by participating in the Constitutional Revolution(1905-1909) of which main purpose was establishing the limit of monarch's absolute power. However the influences of the Ulama's political and social power were weaken by the policy of Reza Shah (1925-1941) trying to establish centralized government. Moreover, Mossadeqs "National Front" got rid of political base from almost of the Ulama in the period of 1941-1953.

However, National Front became declined since 1953 and the Ulama showed up as the main political power organization at Tehran and Com, a scared place of Shia. In close vicinity to and after 1960s, the Ulama's newly organized political network were becoming active. the Ulama's political position became strong in accordance with the rising of Khomeini and his followers who were the low-ranking clergymen as a leader group of the anti-government bloc. Those things made the Islamic Revolution successful at 1979.

Like this, the Ulama has taken an active hand in Iran's national politics and ruled Iranian People directly during almost one hundred years. There are few dissertations accounting for the reason why the Ulama have been the religious and political ruler of modern nation.
So, I want to look into how the Ulama could intervene the Iran's politics and what
the Ulama had done for Iran's political and historical development as the religious
group at this dissertation. I will investigate this matter by analyzing the connection and
relations between religion and politics. So, it can help you understand present Iranian
politics by analyzing the Ulama's political role for modern Iran's history systematically.

II. Shia and the Ulama's Political Thought

To understand the relation between the Ulama and Iranian Politics in nineteenth
century, we need to research into the evolutional process of Shii religious doctrine
about religio-political succession of the Shia Imam and his role in relation to the Ulama.

In Shiism, the Imam as a deputy or agent of God is both the spiritual and political
head of the *umma* or Islamic community. The twelve Imams who succeeded the
Prophet Muhammad guided and guarded the Islamic community as charismatic leaders.
The Imam interprets the *sharia*, Islamic law, ad is responsible for its execution. The
principal functions of the Imam include (Momen 1985, 189): leading the Friday prayer;
leading the Holy War, or Jihad; enforcing judicial decisions; imposing legal penalties;
and receiving religious taxes (*Zakat* and *Khums*).

Shii political theory in Ira has developed around the Imam and the Imamate. It is
said that the Twelfth Imam disappeared in 873. He did not die but has been concealed
by God from the eyes of men. His life has been miraculously prolonged until the day
when he will manifest himself again by God's Permission. Someday, he will return to
this earth as *Mahdi*, or Messiah, shortly before the final Day of Judgement. The
Imam/Mahdi will lead the forces of righteousness against the forces of evil and will
establish a state based upon justice.

The Twelfth Imam went into occultation not only because of political hostility, but
also because of the danger to his life during the despotic Abbasid Caliphate. His
occultation left confused the Shia community without leadership. The Imam had left no
specific instructions as to how the community was to be organized in his absence. Who
on earth could have the legitimacy and leadership of the Imam in a situation where the
Imam was in occultation?

As early as the eleventh century, a great Muslim scholar Shaykut-Taifa reinterpreted
doctrine so as to allow delegation of the Imam's judicial authority to those *fugaha* (pl/
*faqih*, jurist) who had great knowledge of *fiqh* (Islamic law). He considered the four
special deputies (*Naib al Khass*: 872-939) who were designated by the Imam as the
best qualified persons to be *fugaha*. He also regarded the Ulama as the right men to act
as agents of charity by distributing Zakat and to lead the Friday prayers in the absence of the Imam or his special deputy.

After the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the deputy system lasted 70 years until the death of the last special deputy, Ali ibn Muhammad Simari, in 941. This era is called the Lesser Occultation. After the Lesser Occultation, the era of the absence of the Imam is called the Greater Occultation. The Greater Occultation, the period of time when there is no agent of the hidden Imam on this world, has continued for more than one thousand years until the present day (Mawdudi 1978, 230–235).

The four Naib al-Khass were four agents of the Twelfth Imam who were also called the Bab (Gate), the safir (Ambassador) or Nabib (Deputy) of the Twelfth Imam. They included Uthman ibn Said Umari (d.874); Muhammad ibn Uthman Umari (d.916); Abul-Qasim Husayn ibn Rugh Nawbakhti (d.937); and Ali ibn Muhammad Simmari (d.940).

By the thirteenth century, Muhaqiq al-Hilli (d.1277) was able to advance these concepts very considerably, He extended the judicial role of the Ulama to include the imposition of penalties. In the sixteenth century, Muhaqiq al-Karaki (d.1533) was the first to suggest that the Ulama were general deputies (Naib al-Amm) of the Occulted Imam, who were distinct from the four special deputies. However, he restricted his application of this argument of the assumption of the duty of leading Friday prayers.

It was shahid ath-Thani (d.1558) who took the concept of the general deputy to its logical conclusion and applied it to all religious functions and prerogatives of the Occulted Imam (Momen 1985, 190). Thus, the judicial authority of the Ulama became a direct reflection of the authority of the Imam himself. Even in the field of defensive hihad, Shahid identified a role for the Ulama. Only in the field of offensive jihad did he allow that the role of Occulted Imam had lapsed pending his return.

Thus, until the time of Shahid, the Ulama gradually evolved the theoretical basis of their authority. However, the Safavid Dynasty was too strong and maintained too close a control over the Ulama to enable them to put much of this into practice. The end of the Safavid Dynasty brought about the Weakening of the state system of courts with government-appointed judges and the mujtahids (practitioners of ijtihad, one of the bases of Islamic law) were able to replace these with sharia religious courts, resulting in the Ulama asserting judicial authority. Another eminent mujtahid, Sayyid Muhammad Shafti (d.1844) asserted the right to carry out penalties imposed in his religious court.
During the first Russo-Iranina War (1804-13), Shaykh Jafar Ghita (d.1812) and other eminent clerics gave a fatwa (religious decree) declaring jihad against the Russians and authorizing Fath Ali Shah, leader of Iran, to lead a holy war. This action implicitly recognized the Qajar Dynasty's legitimacy.

Thus, one by one, the lapsed functions of the Occulted Imam were taken over by the lama. Over the course of nine centuries, by a process of exegesis and innovative interpretation, the Ulama were able to affect considerable theoretical consolidation of their authority. However, there was as yet no claim by the Ulama to political authority.

Up until the time of the Safavids, the question of political theory in Shia Islam did not rise up, because until that time the Ulama had existed in the milieu of a strongly Sunni state. However, the Ulama came to regard themselves as guardians of public morals and toward the end of the Safavi Dynasty did not hesitate to speak out if they felt the king was straying from the path of the Sharia. The Safavid Dynasty can thus be seen as a period that saw a certain degree of separation between church (mosque) and state in Iran.

The Qajar Dynasty claimed no hereditary charisma in the same way as had the Safavids and so it turned to the Ulama to justify its rule. The Ulama were prepared to grant this, but used the opportunity to consolidate their position and affirm their independence.

It was Ulama such as Mirza Qummi (d.1816) and, more particularly, Sayyid Jafar Kshifi (d.1850), who produced a fully-developed Shia political theory that justified the Qajar Dynasty. Sayyid Jafar believed that the Imam held both religious and political leadership in the community. However, with the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, his functions have been divided and developed upon two groups who are the deputies of the Imam: the Ulama, who are charged with religious vice-regency, and the rulers, who have political vice-regency. If these two parties cooperate, then the affairs of the community run smoothly, because the Ulama cannot apply the Sharia unless the ruler establishes order, while the ruler needs the Ulama, without whose guidance he will stray towards injustice and tyranny (Momen 1985, 194-5).

It can be said that this Shia political theory emphasizes the idea of mutual complementary functions between religious and secular authorities. In summary, as the Imams were deputies between God and the Shia laymen, so the Ulama are deputies between the Occulted Imam/Mahdi and the Shia laymen. Accordingly, the Ulama became endowed with unprecedented influence on Iranian Muslims and firmly
established their participation in the socio-political sphere of the state upon Shia religio-political doctrine.

**III. Ulama's role and political position**

The elevation of Shiism to the status of national religion in Iran by the Safavids in 1501 brought a turning point in its history. Because Shiism denies legitimate authority to worldly powers, no authority in the strict sense of the term, resided in the Ulama (Algar 1969, 5). Rather, they fulfilled a practical function of considerable importance to the community, as religious scholars and judges. As a result of this, de facto authority came increasingly to adhere to them.

The Ulama were, in a limited sense, intermediaries between the community and the Imams, with some of the authority of the latter reflected upon them. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the Ulama possessed any authority similar to that of the Imams or that they could legitimately lay claim to infallibility. The resemblance of the Ulama to the Imams lies rather in their supplying a living source of reference and leadership for the Shia community. Those whose judgments are to be thus accepted are the mujtahids, the most important of the Shia Ulama. Their eminence depends on the acquisition of the rank of mujtahid. The lavish devotion accorded to some of the great mujtahids function and authority. The mujtahids came to personify the leadership of the community, and this was one of the chief sources of their political and social influence in Qajar Iran (Algar 1969, 5–6).

According to Juan R. Cole, it was with the arrival of the Safavids during the seventeenth century that some mujtahids began to assert that even rulers should obey mujtahids on significant issues. It can be said the government is an executive part of the religious authority, for a ruler is no more than a muqallid in contrast to the mujtahid, just like other lay believers who are not allowed to exercise ijtihad. It was claimed that lay believers should follow mujtahids who have special and outstanding knowledge of Sharia. However, the Akhbaris, who dominated the shrines of Arab Iraq in the period between the fall of the Safavid Dynasty and the establishment of Qajar rule, rejected the mujtahid's expanded function as incompatible with the authority of the Imams. They were defeated by the Usuli who supported ijtihad. The triumph of the Usuli brought a weighty result in to political situation. The Akhbaris could be said to be afraid of the socio-political influences of the Ulama ijtihad. This means that the Usuli could make ijtihad to establish a firm politico-social foundation for their rule after the
Akhbaris were executed. If the Akhbaris had taken a role as a leading school of Shia thought, the Ulama should have lost much of their political powers.

The Usuli triumph brought an expansion of the Ulama's socio-political role, made them become political leaders, and increased their status. It must be taken into consideration that the marja'-e taqlid was reestablished as a religious doctrine by the Usuli who came into power in the eighteenth century who followed a doctrine of strengthening the roles of mujtahids.

Marja'-e taqlid were inherited from the Usuli. During the early nineteenth century, the concept developed that Marja'-e taqlid (sources of imitation) were needed who could exercise fatwas that bound believers and affected on government issues. Shaikh Mortaza Ansari, who restrained himself from going too deep into politics, and Ayatollah Khomeini, who stayed deep in politics, are the well-known sources of limitation. Not all the generations has Marja'-e taqlid who are recognized during their lifetimes. However, the development of this "Binding Rule" by mujtahid, however, built up a kind of fluid hierarchy. By this, Iranian Shiism was made stronger and the Ulama grew as an influential political body that was independent from the secular state. During the nineteenth century, mujtahids had grown into a unique political system by following Usuli doctrine emphasizing believers should follow living mujtahids. This hierarchical system could be divided into mujtahid and muqallid (those who made decisions and those who followed decisions).

During 120 years between Qajar rule (1785) and Constitution Revolution (1905), the Ulama took a leading role in Iran. The Ulama confronted the secular sovereign early on, and this feud never stopped, even during foreign invasions.

The Ulama consolidated their position by taking effective actions against foreign powers during the transitional period between Safavids and the Qajars. For the Ulama, there were three possible ways of relating to the state. All three are, of course, justified by their proponents through exegesis from the Qur'an and hadith (stories about the life of the Prophet Muhammad that are considered to be a source of Islamic law)(Momen 1985, 193–194):

1. Political co-operation: The Ulama can co-operate with the state and provide it with recognition. They can accept appointment to official positions in the state. This can be justified by the contention that the state is preventing anarchy and only where there is order can the provisions of the Sharia be fully implemented. Cooperation with a non-Shia or unjust government is only permissible under compulsion on the pain of
death or grave loss when the provisions of taqiyya (religious dissimulation, hiding religious beliefs to prevent persecution) come into play.

2. Political activism: the Ulama can actively involve themselves in politics, seeking to bring the temporal authorities into line with the sharia. Thus, if the government complies with them, they dominate it (as happened during parts of the Safavid period and also in present-day Iran). Or, they oppose the government. This attitude can be justified because all government is usurping the authority of the Hidden Imam and the Ulama as the Naib al-Amm of the Hidden Imam and Ulama, as experts in the sharia, are the best persons to guide the government. Western scholars have tended to make a great deal out of this political option, and it cannot be denied that there have been a few dramatic occasions, such as the agitation against the Tobacco Regime in 1891-2, the Constitutional movement is 1905-9 and the 1979 Revolution in Iran, when this option has been taken up by the majority of the Ulama with dramatic political effect.

3. Political aloofness: The Ulama can remain totally aloof from all political matters. This has always traditionally been the attitude of the majority of the Ulama. Indeed, it has usually been considered that only Ulama who have remained aloof from all other activity and concentrated on furthering the sharia can rise to the highest ranks. However, this did not apply during Safavid times, nor does it apply in present-day Iran).

IV. The Financial Resources of the Ulama

The unique the Ulama system has several basis for its existence, such as Shia doctrine of the union of church and state, support of mosques and mullas (religious officials) nationwide, socially-guaranteed status, and the Ulama's altruistic values. However, financial independence can be considered to be a substantial socio-economic base. More than 90% of the Iranian population are not only followers, but fervent practitioners of their faith. The head of every family bears a twofold fiscal responsibility: on one hand, he must pay taxes to the government; on the other hand, he is responsible to his locality and his mosque for certain religious taxes (Nobari 1978, 36–38). It is true that an independent position of the Ulama is could not be found during the Safavid period, when the state had a system to secure the Ulama's financial sources. The independent position of the Ulama is therefore to its diverse financial resources that are separate from the state.

Muslim religious taxes are called Khoms and Zakat. The former, which particularly involves shopkeepers and merchants, should be equivalent to one fifth of profits. The second applies to agriculture, especially to herding. In Sunni states, it is legal for the
state to collect this Khoms and Zakat, but not in Shia states, because Imam (now in occultation) is the only legal collector of Khoms and Zakat. Most of Shia Muslims in the past two centuries have believed that they should pay the tithe known as "the share of the Imam (sahma Imam, half of the khums tax) to their mujtahid in his capacity as deputy of the hidden Imam.

Because the Ulama had the right to collect a sizable sum in their role as Naib-al Amm (the deputy), financial authority moved from the state to a specific person or a small group and was shared as occasion demands. Moreover, mujtahids secured ample funds by managing waqf (charitable trusts), significant financial organizations for the Ulama.

Shia Ulama seemed to be financial power stronger than Sunni Ulama even during the nineteenth century. The Ulama's fixed income owes its origin to Safavids tradition. Safavid sovereigns supported the Ulama financially because they considered Ulama to be supporters, not competitors. For this reason, the Ulama exerted their managing power of waqf funds under the Safavids and the Qajars this custom.

Safavids contributed for the Ulama's economic power by giving subsidy and by giving authority over religious taxes and waqf. The economic and ideological power of the Ulama was dependent upon the sovereign. However, during the seventeenth century, the sovereign's power decreased and the Ulama began to deny the religious legitimacy of the state and to insist mujtahid had the legitimacy.

Although Nadir confiscated waqf property under an anti-religion policy during the eighteenth century, economic power of the Ulama did not decrease. In other words, the early Safavids' economic support to the Ulama built up the financial basis for anti-state action by the Ulama.

On observing the relationship with the great merchants called the Bazaari, the Ulama could be said to have opposed the sovereign by collecting sizable funds through the Khums and the development ijtihad as an independent power independent of the state.

Bazaaris throughout the country accelerated the growing independence of the clergy from the state through the institution of Sahme Imam ("the portion of the Imam"). This was a kind of tax that bazaaris would pay to the Ulama to purify their earnings for one year. According to this practice, one-half of the Khums, or, in effect, 10% of the profits on trade, was designated for the clergy and religious institutions. The money was used for the purposes of upkeep and construction of mosques, stipends for theological students, faculty salaries, and other institutional purposes (Noori 1982, 155–156).
Thus, the bazaaris became the main financial backers of the religious institutions. Khums and Sahme Imam played two important roles. They were, as mentioned above, the backbone of the financial independence of the clergy from the state. They also played a major role in connecting the unprivileged classes with bazaaris and with the Ulama. The mechanism of this interconnection was the intermediate role of the Ulama as agents for dispensing the Khums and Sahme Imam from the bazaaris to the poor people and poor mullahs all across the country, in both cities and villages (Ghandchi-Tehrani 1962, 130-131).

In general, the clergy's financial ties to the bazaaris furnished the latter with the lever to use the religious taxes to enforce their political views on the Ulama if the latter did not abide by the bazaaris' notion of political orthodoxy.

Spontaneous supports by the masses of the Tobacco Protest (1891-2), Constitution Revolution (1905-9), and the Islamic Revolution (1978-9) were due to this strong socio-economic bond between the clergy and masses.

Compared to the government, whose relief organizations are inefficient, insufficient, and corrupt, the social welfare of the Ulama intensified the ties between the Ulama and the masses and increased its influence.

V. Epilogue

During the 19th century, the fact that the conflict between the state and the Ulama deepened was due to changes in the international environment which influenced Iran. Social shock arising from foreign powers' infiltration can be pointed to as a characteristic of Iran's modern history. In the Great Game between Great Britain and Czarist Russia, the Qajar Dynasty, which could not defend against the foreign powers' infiltration effectively, lost its nation's substantial sovereignty through loan and concession policies. However, because the shah conspired with foreign national powers to maintain his own political authority, his actions oppressed his subjects and strengthened governmental autocracy. Iranians joined together against the shah's autocracy and foreign despoliation of Iran's natural resources. The Ulama were obliged to intervene in Iran's problems by stating that they had to protect Islam and Muslims from foreign and domestic oppression.

Under these circumstances, discussions about the Ulama's political participation extended to criticism and, in the early nineteenth century, due to the victory of the Usuli school that increased the power of the mujtahids. In addition, as long as they invoked fatwas that could restrict all Muslim believers, religious authority based on
tazlid (tradition/predicate) needed to be established to provide a base for future fatwas. In this point of view, during the nineteenth century Iran's conflict between religious authority and secular force was begun by those Ulama who took advantage of the infiltration of outside powers into Iran and the decline of the Qajar Dynasty.

In fact, the Ulama's sudden change in roles at the end of the nineteenth century was not only a return to the traditional social authority of the Imam's, but was a result of changes in the political, economic, social, educational, and military situation that developed broadly in the inside and outside Iran during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Under the nationalist point of view, relationships among existing groups within Iranian society should be considered. We should take care to understand the relation between the bazaaris who were against the foreign power's economic infiltration in order to understand the nineteenth-century Ulama's sudden change in roles. Including the mujtahids, the Ulama's practical influence and financial sources relied on Muslim society, especially the bazaaris and merchant associations. Therefore, the Ulama had to aid each other in their role as nationalists who opposed the foreign powers' economic infiltration. The Ulama came to use their power independently from the nation's political sovereignty because of economic support from the bazaaris and their roles as spiritual leaders.

There are three reasons why the Ulama intervened in Iranian politics. First, from a religious point of view, during the Imam's occultation, the Ulama, as the Imam's deputy, was the only person who could rule Muslim society. We can see that Shia dogma provided a powerful ideological weapon for Ulama. Second, from a historical point of view, in 1501 the Safavid Dynasty established Shiism as the state religion and the clergy and state cooperated in order to cope with internal and external problems. Especially at the end of the Qajar Dynasty, as a result of the nation not coping effectively with foreign imperialism, the Ulama were able to intervene in the secular sovereign's political problems and formed a nationalist bloc in order to protect the nation's profits and independence. Lastly, from a political point of view, the Ulama's influence on Iranian politics was a modern development. In other words, due to Iran's oppressive political system in which all political opposition were blocked, the Iranian people had to take advantage of the Ulama's authority as a means of protest and political refuge.

From the way we have examined into the modern politics of Iran, during the Safavid period, the Ulama legitimized a secular leader who caused injustice and led to the
Iranians breaking away from the path of Islam. Of course, the autocrat who possessed secular authority was also Muslim. However, he did not have the knowledge of Islamic law or theology that the Ulama possessed, and, because autocrats did not rule the country based on Islamic theory, the country fell into tyranny. The secular leader's authority was thus religiously "illegal" and corrupt, and such a person should not have the responsibility for leading Muslim society. Thus, the Ulama were vested with worldly authority to fulfill both religious and secular leadership roles and, later, to combine these two roles under the Islamic Republic of Iran. Just like Plato's philosopher who governs the ideal state, the administration of an Islamic country is called the vilayet-i faqih, the administration by an Islamic jurist.

The concept of a government over the ideal Islamic state led by a professional Islamic jurist, or faqih, emerged during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The first Faqih was Ayatollah Khomeini, who represented the Islamic Republic of Iran as the supreme mujtahid and who is defined clearly as a marja'a-e taqlid by Article I of the Iranian Constitution.

It is interesting to note that Iran's name is different from that of other Islamic countries and emphasizes the religious character of the state. From the common Western view, it is difficult to understand Iranian politics. We would make a mistake to examine Middle Eastern countries' Sunni and Shia Ulama with the same dogmatic standard and point of view. In conclusion, in order to study Iran's modern politics from an Islamic perspective, we need to develop political theory that distinguishes Shia politics from Sunni politics.
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울라마의 정치참여와 과정 : 이란의 쉬아 울라마의 역할

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울라마는 하나의 종교적 집단으로서 현대 이란 정치의 관여해왔다. 이란에서 시아 무슬림의 종교적 공동체가 정치적 정치적 공동체보다 더 강력하다는 것은 역사적으로 시아 교리를 바탕으로 하는 민족적 동질성이 배양되어 왔음에 기인한다. 1501 년 시아 이슬람을 국교로 채택한 사파비 페르시아 국가에서 울라마는 국가 권력의 지원하에 점차 독자적인 교리 개발을 물론 정치적 지위도 확보해나갔다.

이러한 상황에서 울라마의 정치 참여에 대한 논의가 그들 내부에서 교리 해석상에 논란으로 발전하여 마침내 19 세기 초기 아흐바리 학파에 대한 우슬리 학파의 승리로 무즈타히드에게 이즈티하드 즉 독자적인 권력을 구축할 수 있게 되었다. 또한 모든 무슬림 신자들을 구속할 수 있는 파트와를 발동할 수 있는 하나의 마르자의 타클리드라는 종교적 권력의 구심점이 구축되었다.

19 세기 연초.cz제운동과 입헌혁명을 통해서 서구의 충격에 대한 대응으로 울라마가 민족의 기도적 세력으로 부상하였지만 서구 이데올로기 및 근대화의 가속으로 그들의 정치 사회적 역할이 그 당시 상대적으로 감소한 것은 이란 정치사에 있어서 매우 특징적이다. 1979 년 이란-이슬람 혁명을 통하여 울라마는 이란-이슬람 공화국을 건설하고 지금까지 이란-무슬림 국민을 통치하고 있다. 앞으로도 울라마는 시아 무슬림 공동체에서 이슬람과 국가를 수호하는 중추세력으로서 중요한 역할을 지속할 것으로 보인다.

주제어 : 울라마, 시아, 이맘, 시이즘, 무즈타히드, 벨레야티 파키, 마르자가 타클리드